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                                       ABSTRACT   
 
This thesis is an assessment of the position of Islamic law and English law regarding the doctrine 
of the frustration of the contract. The thesis gave in the first general view about Islamic law and 
Saudi legal system, also about the contract in Islamic law in general. This study provides a 
detailed and critical account of the principles of frustration of contract law which operate under 
Islamic law and English law, where appropriate, identifies and critically evaluates the differences 
between the principles of frustration of contract which operate respectively under Islamic law 
and English law and to recognize the effect of the frustration on the performance of the contract. 
 In the case of the absence of theory of frustration of contract in Islamic Law, an attempt will be 
made to create a complete doctrine of frustration of contract. Researcher discussed the frustration 
of contract in Islamic Law. In the case of the absence of theory of frustration of contract in 
Islamic Law, an attempt will be made to create a complete theory of frustration of contract in 
Islamic law.  
This is recognised owing to the fact that most cases of the application of frustration fall under the 
doctrine of impossibility. Impossibility can be regarded as taking place ‘when there supervening 
events without default of either party and for which the contract makes no sufficient provision 
which so significant changes the nature, if the cases where impossibility relates to the subject-
matter of contracts or relates to the parties, subjective or objective impossibility. This study 
discusses the issue of Frustration of contract due to external factors covering cases of legal 
impossibility. This study examines the discharge of contract if there is circumstances do not 
make the performance impossibility but became difficult to perform such as impracticability and 
frustration of purpose.    
 It will also look in some detail at the limitations and narrow scope of the doctrine of frustration, 
and also discuss contractual parties’ sometimes preferred alternatives, such as drafting force 
majeure clauses and hardship clauses.
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                                          CHAPTER ONE 
                                   General Introduction  
       
1.1 Preface  
 
Civil liability is considered one of the most important legal topics due to its continuous practical 
applications, and at the same time research into civil liability is considered the most accurate and 
difficult. Civil liability is composed of two main divisions: contractual liability and tortious 
liability. Contractual liability occupies a prominent place in the field of civil liability because it is 
a guarantee of the performance of obligations. The laws around the world, including Islamic law 
and English law, place great importance on the law of the contract and civil liability. The reason 
for the role of contract being at the heart of law is that it crosses a number of disciplines and 
industries, because it stems from covenants (i.e. promises). Contracts can be seen in family law 
with the marriage agreement, pre-nuptial agreements, parental rights and child custody 
agreements. These factors indicate that the contract is wider than the commercial realm and 
clearly part of the domestic sphere. In fact there are cases where contract law crosses the 
commercial and the domestic, such as renting, purchasing and the family law. The law of 
contract also applies to higher levels of law, such as treaty law, where the state signs and then 
ratifies a treaty to indicate that it confirms itself bound by the contractual obligations within
 
. The 
implication of this is that contract law is an intrinsic set of principles that underlie the legal 
system. In fact, the legitimacy of criminal law stems from the citizen breaking their “contract” 
with the state to act in a “good manner”. Thus, it is essential to understand that the nature of 
contract law is not only based on a formulaic test, but crosses so many areas that there will be an 
erosion of formulas in the interests of fairness (and morality?). The result of this is that it is 
necessary to examine the concept of contractual obligations in order to understand the nature of 
contract law.  
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It is clear that the law of contract is not a self-standing area of law; rather, it provides an 
underlying set of principles across all areas of law. A fundamental principle that underlies 
contract is pact sunt servanda (all promises must be kept). This is the nature of a covenant in 
English law, albeit there has been erosion to a more formulaic model in the law of modern 
contract. The concept of pact sunt servanda is in its clearest form within French Civil Law, in 
which promise and obligation have been codified . There is a clear moral element with this 
framework, which is reflective of the historical model of contract in common law, i.e. this is the 
application of contract as promise.  
The starting point of contractual obligations across all jurisdictions is that the rule of law will not 
interfere with a consensual agreement between individuals. This is then tempered by what the 
state identifies as the ingredients to create a valid promise, which will include capability and 
intention between the parties to make the said agreement. The tests that have been created point 
to binding contractual obligations based on party autonomy, and consensual agreement to be 
bound by the promise. The rule of law should not become involved, unless the contract is based 
on illegality. The primary way to discharge a contract in both English and Islamic law is through 
performance. However, there are four forms of discharge, which are: performance; agreement; 
operation of law; and breach of contract. The rationale for supporting performance is that it 
maintains the fundamental principle of pact suntservanda. Failure to meet these obligations 
results in a breach of the law of contract and damages are payable. The same is true if there is not 
full performance of the contract, because the point of consideration is that the detriment is 
matched through the performance. The approach in English law will result in a situation where 
the performance and breach are the primary applications, because party autonomy requires that 
the contractual obligations are fulfilled. Under Islamic law the operation of the law will 
discharge the contract, so long as it is clear that such a contract is not valid in the first place. The 
impact of this is that a similar approach to the English model is present. This is not necessarily 
true, because sharia non-compliance should be treated as illegality of contract under English law 
(i.e. a form of discharge). This means that there is a lax approach under the Islamic model to 
discharge and operation of the law. The question still to be considered is whether the latter 
system has a lax system for frustration, which is bound by a high threshold under English law. 
The answer will be determined by the treatment of contractual obligations and the role of the 
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parties. This means that discharge of contract will be briefly examined under English law to set 
up the final discussion on frustration.  
Discharge is a simple concept, which is the identification that the contractual relationship has 
ended. The ending of this relationship may or may not have a breach depending on the nature of 
performance or intervening factors. The English courts will rule for damages in the case of 
breach and only in exceptional circumstances force specific performance, because an arm’s 
length to the contract has to be taken. To order specific performance (i.e. refusing discharge 
through breach and demanding discharge through performance) requires that there will be 
systemic injustice (i.e. damages will not remedy the harm). The same will be true for the court to 
rule that the law will discharge the contract (i.e. there has to be illegality, such as corruption or 
duress that cannot be remedied by altering the contract).  
The approach to frustration can be identified in a similar manner under English law, because the 
contract has imposed obligations on the parties and the court will only intervene by imposing 
damages for any breach. This is because the parties have agreed to the terms, which means it is 
for the parties to discharge the contract and claim the appropriate remedy for failure of full 
performance. The Islamic approach illustrates that there is a high degree of intervention and 
relaxing of formalities, in order to provide for sharia compliance and meet the moral 
requirements of Islamic society. Hence, on this basis, is that the approach to frustration will 
illustrate the extent that the discharge of contract on fairness will take place within the Islamic 
system.  
Contracts are made by the parties which are intended to be kept until they have been completely 
performed. The principle of sanctity of contract is another facet of the parties’ intention. As such 
every party to a contract enters into the contract on the assumption that there will be a reasonable 
balance between the reciprocal burdens and benefits of the parties and both intend to gain from 
the performance of the contract. The occurrence of changed circumstances may have various 
detrimental effects on the contract, ranging from full impossibility to perform to the situation 
where performance remains possible but either becomes excessively onerous or ceases to be of 
any use to one of the contracting parties. According to the requirements of the principle of 
sanctity of contract, change in the circumstances of a contract is not regarded as relevant as long 
as it is within the normal range of events which the parties intended to allocate their 
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consequential risks by the contract. Thus two situations are to be regarded: one is when 
performance of the contract becomes impossible and the other when performance of the contract 
becomes so excessively onerous for one of the parties that it was beyond the contemplation of 
the parties when they made the contract. These two types of situations are clearly distinguishable 
in theory. In the case of impossibility, the contract cannot be performed because supervening 
events make the performance of the contract totally impossible and the solution for this situation 
is discharge of the contract. In a case of economic hardship, performance of the contract is still 
possible, but the disadvantaged party will bear an excessive difficulty if he/she is compelled to 
continue with the performance of the contract in accordance with its original terms. 
 
It is in the field of such commercial contracts that the subject of impossibility of performance 
gains its prime importance. In the changing world of today, endangered by wars, riots, rebellions, 
revolution and natural disasters, and faced with many economic uncertainties caused by currency 
fluctuations, inflation and other economic factors, the contractors may frequently find 
themselves in a situation which they could never have foreseen when entering into the contract. 
To find relief in such circumstances, they usually invoke the doctrine of impossibility of 
performance.    
This study will consist of an attempt to analyse the doctrine of frustration and its operation in 
relation to contracts. It will look closely at both the concept of initial impossibility arising from a 
common mistake on the part of both parties as to the state of things before the contract was 
agreed and the concept of subsequent impossibility and frustration. The latter deals with a 
situation whether the parties enter into agreement on terms both express and implied and then a 
supervening event renders the performance of that agreement radically different from that which 
was envisaged by both parties at the outset. These themes will be discussed in greater detail in 
the first section and will run throughout the work. The research will examine the concept of 
objective and subjective impossibility, and the rules relating to discharge of contractual 
obligations and allocation of risk. It will look at the situation when either the subject matter or a 
thing essential for performance is destroyed or unavailable, either partially or completely. It will 
then look at how the death or supervening incapacity of a party will affect a personal contract. 
Towards the latter part of the dissertation, it will discuss the problems that arise when a method 
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of performance becomes impossible or a particular source becomes unavailable. It will conclude 
by looking at the effect of delay and temporary impossibility on a contract. 
Parties, while entering into a contract by their free will, share the risk attendant on the 
transaction, essential of the contract, and while doing so, voluntarily and willingly define their 
reciprocal obligations under the contract. It is up to the parties to incorporate in the contract any 
saving or restrictive clauses regarding their defined obligations. Such clauses have been termed 
as exemption or exception clauses. Under Islamic and English law, if any unforeseen or 
unforeseeable supervening events make the performance of the contract impossible through no 
fault of the party concerned, the contract may be frustrated. Frustration is an operation of law. It 
results in automatic involuntary discharge of the contract, relieving both parties of their liabilities 
from the point of time of occurrence of that event. However, in Islamic law not all cases of 
frustration are discharged automatically, but the party of the contract in some cases has the right 
to perform the contract or discharge the contract.  
Sometime the supervening events do not render the performance of contract impossible, but 
make the performance onerous for the party. This is dealt with under the doctrine of 
impracticability of performance of the contract. Impracticability applies when the performance of 
the contract is still possible but economically very difficult. 
Frustration of contract law is in general limited, because its contractual model is based on the 
knowledge of accepted risks that the parties pursue regardless. This means that the potential for 
frustrating acts should be built into the contract or clearly make the whole purpose of the contract 
impossible. The Islamic approach, on the other hand, is based on fairness and known risks. This 
means that the doctrine of unforeseen circumstances can frustrate the contract. The implication 
of this is that the concept of pact suntservanda is based on the narrow framework of what is 
conceived in the contract (i.e. the knowledge of the parties) in the Islamic model. The result of 
this is that the English and Islamic approaches to frustration set an exceptionally high threshold 
to frustration. 
It is important to note that in both systems the sanctity of contract is the prima facie rule, which 
is aptly expressed in Liamco v. Libya. This case held that: 
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“The principle of the sanctity of contracts [...] has always constituted an integral part of most 
legal systems. These include those systems that are based [on] Roman law, the Napoleonic Code 
(e.g. article 1134) and other European civil codes, as well as Anglo-Saxon Common Law and 
Islamic Jurisprudence ‘Shari’ah’. 
This means that the use of frustration will be the exception to the norm, which is illustrated in the 
Islamic law of obligations. A Muslim must “be true to the obligations which you have 
undertaken... Your obligations which you have taken in the sight of Allah... For Allah is your 
witness”. The fundamental difference is that the obligation of the contract will not impose undue 
hardship or illegality
1
, because this will be in breach of sharia law.  
The fundamental principle in English common law is that frustration will not occur unless there 
is a contractual obligation or the whole purpose of the contract has completely slipped away. 
This is an exceptionally high threshold to meet. The Islamic system is based on hardship, in 
which an intervening act of Allah will allow the contract to be discharged. The Islamic element 
of fairness also infers the right to discharge the contract in unforeseen circumstances that create 
hardship on the basis of just cause. This is confirmed in the Qur’an, which identifies that: 
“O you who have believed, do not consume one another's wealth unjustly but only [in lawful] 
business by mutual consent. And do not kill yourselves [or one another]. Indeed, Allah is to you 
ever Merciful”. 
This means that once the social or religious element comes into play the contract can come into 
play, which indicates that there will be discharge in a similar manner as adapting the contract in 
Islamic law.  
On the other hand, the English model will not allow discharge on undue hardship. Rather, there 
has to be a contractual provision or the purpose of the contract can no longer be upheld. 
Therefore, the main distinction that is present is that the English model will adapt the contract to 
                                                          
1
 There are two types of illegality in Islamic law:  the first case of the invalidity of the contract at the beginning 
before the formation of the contract, such that the subject matter of the contract is prohibited in Islamic law, such as 
the sale of alcohol or contract includes a usury, also the government issued a law prohibits dealing with the types of 
thing. So contracts which are absolutely null and void due the kind of this illegality. The second type is illegality, 
come after the formation of the contract because of the supervening events make the contract impossible to be 
performed because of this kind of illegality we will discuss that in later chapters.    
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meet the intention of the parties and enforce the contract even if it creates hardship, i.e. the 
parties have agreed to the risk. This illustrates a formalist model of contract. The doctrine of 
frustration will only provide the parties with limited application and will only apply if there are 
circumstances beyond the parties’ control which rendered the performance impossible. Force 
majeure is a clause commonly found in commercial agreements – which clauses have been 
drafted to cover a wider range of circumstances that may have an effect on the commercial 
benefits of the parties to the contract – states that one or both parties will not be liable for 
performance of its obligations or allows a party to suspend performance upon the existence of 
certain extraordinary events. 
This study will distinguish between some doctrines. For example, the doctrine of frustration, and 
the doctrine of impracticability contain elements of hardship, although it is important for the 
purpose of the study to make an obvious distinction between a force majeure clause and a 
hardship clause. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
 
The study is of a library type and relies heavily on the writings of the classical Muslim jurists 
and English writers. For the supplementary data, the study refers to modern writings including 
books, reports, journals and seminar papers. In alignment with the information electronic 
resources, the study also, involving an analysis and comparative study of a range of documents. 
Taking a comparative approach the thesis aims to consider and explore the similarities and 
differences between the legal systems being studied. To the extent that the differences between 
the legal systems under study are traceable and recognisable this thesis aims to examine the legal 
and factual reasons for such differences. This study will require a wide-ranging search through 
documents, such as legal sources and dictionaries, in order to collect the required data. Thus, 
there are two steps in the research: the collection of the data and the examination of these data 
according to comparative jurisprudence. The study initially requires a review of the literature of 
Islamic law and an explanation of its history, sources and principles. The study of legal matters 
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requires the use of special terms and expressions, which require particular definition and 
discussion. This literature will provide the reader with a background to the concept of Islam, its 
methodology of making law and an explanation of the ambiguous terms that it uses in discussing 
law. Sources which have been selected for analysis in this paper include primary sources, such as 
legislative enactments and case decisions, as well as secondary sources, including academic 
journal articles, academic textbooks and practitioners’ legal guides. While this author has 
imposed no jurisdictional constraints upon the source selection criteria utilised, this researcher 
has only been able to analyse those sources which were either authored in English or which were 
authored in Arabic but later translated into English. There have not been enough references 
written in English regarding the study of Islamic law, where most of them have been written in 
Arabic, thus, all texts quoted from references are translated by the researcher.  
The methodology of this study takes the form of a literature review. To some extent, the research 
depth of this study is unavoidably limited by the fact that there exists very little English research 
on the differences between the way that Islamic contract law is applied and enforced by each of 
the four main schools of Islamic jurisprudence. With this limitation in mind, this researcher has 
chosen to treat all four schools of Islamic contract law as being identical, except where there is 
evidence, in the academic literature, of a divergence in approach between them. As far as a study 
of Islamic law is concerned, the discussion of the views of schools of legal thought is essential. 
Amongst the well known schools of legal thought are the Hanafis, Malikis, Shafiis and Hanbalis. 
Therefore, the discussion could be so broad that it would be almost impossible to cover all the 
schools of law due to time constraints. As a result, this study employs a selective approach, 
rather than examining every Islamic school of legal thought. In fact, even in a particular school, 
there are sometimes several opinions about a particular problem and it is quite difficult to study 
every single opinion of the school concerned. In such a case, the study restricts its focus to the 
most dominant view within those selected schools that can be considered as representing the 
view of the school as a whole. This study is neither influenced by a particular school nor 
discredits any of them. The selective approach only aims to identify how a particular school of 
legal thought works on legal problems, and what sources of law it refers to in its attempts to 
provide solutions for those problems. By doing this, the selective study can be regarded as the 
means to identify legal issues, whilst the final result will trace the discussion back up to the 
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original sources of law. If the final finding favours the view of a particular school of legal 
thought, it should not be interpreted that the study discredits the remaining schools. 
For the purpose of extracting legal issues, the study mostly refers directly to Muslim classical 
literature. As most of the classical writings had no clear headings and indexes, this research has 
taken every possible care to extract all the issues that are so related to its scope of discussion. 
The case of law study is taken as one of the important and reliable methods for legal research. 
Case study can be defined as a method of research where the facts and grounds of each legal 
issue are dealt with by taking an individual case. The study focuses upon the decisions of the 
courts in English Law which has a large amount of published cases, so in studying English law 
the main focus was on primary sources, while scholarly commentary writings were of help in 
analysing the specific issues relating to the subject of the study, as well as there is some of the 
court cases from Saudi Arabia that the researcher has got them personal by visiting the courts in 
Saudi Arabia. 
In this study, the issues relating to Islamic law have been discussed separately, then the 
following chapters discuss issues of English law. In conclusion, there is a comparative study 
between Islamic law and English law, the aims of the method because Islamic law differs from 
English law in many aspects, such as the sources of law. Also there is a different method of 
writing legal books between Islamic law and English law, as well as Islamic law in general is not 
known to Western readers, so the discussion of Islamic law separately will gives the reader a 
clearer picture about Islamic law’s view. So the method is useful for the Western lawyer not only 
because, like every other comparative study, it will help him enrich his/her knowledge of the 
law, and understand his/her own legal system better, but also because there is evidence showing 
a cross-cultural influence between Islamic law and the Western legal systems. 
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1.3 The Aims of the Study 
 
 The primary aim of this paper is to provide a detailed and critical account of the 
principles of frustration of contract law which operate under Islamic law and English law. 
A secondary aim of this study is to identify and critically evaluate the differences 
between the principles of Islamic contract law which operate respectively under the four 
schools of law. 
 To comprehensively analyse the set of rules and legal opinions which control the 
frustration of the contract, and examine how these might be integrated into and reconciled 
with the judicial practices. It is also intended to show how Islamic law and English law 
may be adapted.  
 To examine the current concept and legal nature of the doctrine of frustration in Islamic 
law and English law. The aim is to examine this concept in the four main law Schools of 
Islamic law to find out the extent to which they recognise this problem and what kind of 
legal effects they consider for it. 
 The fact that Islamic law is not known to the Western world in its full details has been the 
main reason for emphasising it in this thesis. 
 To build a theory of frustration in Islamic law by collecting the issues and data relating to 
the doctrine of frustration of contract from different chapters in jurisprudence books and 
different nominated contracts.  
 To assess the effects of frustration on the performance of the contract and to determine 
the effects. 
 To realise the similarities and differences relating to the doctrine of frustration among 
Islamic law and English law to help jurists and lawyers across the world.  
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1.4 Difficulties Facing the Study 
 
 The nonexistence of a theory of frustration in Islamic law which is a result of the non-
theory of contract law; this adds to the researcher the burden of collecting the data from 
many places in the legal books, which leads to more time and effort. 
 The lack of previous studies covering the frustration of contract in Islamic law in general, 
and some of the cases in English law. 
 The difficulty of getting the judicial judgement in Saudi Arabia because the cases are not 
published and not classified, so the researcher had to go some cases personal, there is 
attempt to publish some cases, but still in the preparation stage. 
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                                           CHAPTER TWO 
                  Introduction to Islamic law and Saudi Legal System 
 
2.1  Introduction  
 
Whilst it has been seen, historically, that Islamic law was somewhat reserved within the Islamic 
state, it has become increasingly mainstream and recognised in jurisdictions that would not 
traditionally have been viewed as having an Islamic root. Islamic law—the product of Islam's 
centuries of stored experience—is the embodiment of ideal Islamic life. Essentially, it is the 
framework of Islam itself. Although the religion describes what ideal life should constitute, the 
law indicates the right path to follow in order to arrive at the desired outcome. It is important to 
stress that the existence of laws for the regulation of society is extremely necessary once such a 
relationship is established. In reality, social life requires various transactions between 
individuals, and it creates various relationships. For instance, in recent times, commercial 
transactions between Muslim nations—as well as between other nations—have been extended 
considerably. Therefore, it has become necessary to have fundamental principles and rules that 
determine the rights of every individual in relation to the others. 
This chapter will consider the various aspects of Islamic law, including definitions associated 
with Shari’ah, as well as the legislative system that exists and the various sources and principles 
associated with Islamic law. Firstly, however, a brief introduction to the epistemology associated 
with Islamic law is provided in order to understand from where such various factors have 
evolved, and to provide an understanding of the nature of Shari’ah, as well as its sources and 
objectives. This is important as this thesis will discuss areas of law mainly in the light of 
Shari'ah—again, in order to understand Islamic law.  
Islamic law can be seen as largely rooted in the religious concepts associated with Islam. As this 
chapter progresses, there is consideration to the various sources with which the underlying ethos 
of Islamic law is associated and the religious concepts that should be applied. Moreover, this 
chapter is also intended to provide a brief account of the Saudi legal system in which Islamic law 
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is applied, and reference will be made to Saudi law cases. The aim of the chapter is to enable us 
to understand contracts in Islamic law as understanding of the basis of the contract and source of 
the law of contract will lead to better knowledge of how such a contract works. 
2.2  The Concept of Shari’ah 
 
The word Shari'ah literally refers to a path trodden by camels to a water source. It also means the 
path to the watering place. In the Islamic sense, it refers to the path to be followed and the path 
that the believer has to tread in order to obtain guidance in this world and deliverance in the 
next.
1
 The definition of Shari’ah is central to Islamic law. In its broadest sense, Shari’ah law is a 
body of law that is custom-based, and which has its root in the religion of Islam. Shari’ah law is 
potentially very far-reaching, and covers both the criminal and civil justice systems, as well as 
dealing with personal conduct and moral conduct, in addition to a number of other spheres, such 
as political, social, and economic, although the set of rules has been developed so that they can 
be applied to any relevant situation as it arises. As Muslim states operate as theocracies, the 
religious text is effectively the law, and therefore the application of these religious texts is 
referred to as Shari’ah. Thus, Shari’ah refers to a set of rules, regulations, teachings, and values 
governing the lives of Muslims, Shari’ah is a system of belief that encompasses not only 
people’s relationship with God, but also provides Muslims with a code that regulates their whole 
life.
2
 
Whilst Islamic law is part of Shari’ah, Islamic law generally is used in reference to the system of 
law associated with the religion of Islam. Some writers use the terms Islamic law, Shari’ah or 
Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh) interchangeably. This could easily result in confusion for readers 
seeking to determine the significance of each concept. However, in the context of this research, 
the term ‘Islamic law’ is used in conformity with modern usage, and thus refers to the entire 
system of law and jurisprudence. Owing to its breadth of scope, the term Shari’ah cannot be 
rendered in English by any single word. The closest approximation may be ‘religion’, although 
Shari’ah implies a focus on the prescriptive side of religion.3  
                                                          
1
 Abdurrahman Doi, Shari`ah Islamic law(2ed edn, Taha Publishers Ltd 2008)  23  
2
 John Esposito L, What Everyone Needs to Know about Islam (2ed edn, Oxford University Press, 2011)  178 
3
 Kamali Mohammad, Shari’ah law An introduction ( Oneworld Publications 2008)  40 
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Notably, Shari’ah is divided into three wide categories: the first deals with ritual or religious 
matters that regulate worships, like prayers or fasting etc., referred to as Ibadat; the second 
category deals with transaction matters, such as civil and other legal obligations, called 
Muamalat; and the third is one that deals with criminal matters or punishment, namely Auquobat. 
The second and third categories are also called Islamic law.
4
 As far back as the ninth century, 
there has been the opportunity to interpret texts as well as to refine the rules that apply in terms 
of Islamic societies; this was an opportunity afforded to scholars in the area of Islamic religion. 
Essentially, separation of power was put in place in order to ensure that the ruler could not 
simply reinterpret these decisions made by the scholars. Over the years and through successive 
empires, the separation has developed, although there was never any formal separation laid down 
in writing. Over time, the way in which the Shari’ah law has been interpreted has enabled the 
Muslim world to become modernised in its approach, and thus has become more able to react to 
the challenges of modern society, thereby making it much more likely to integrate with the 
Western world and its legal systems.
5
 
Interestingly, the Dictionary of Islam defines Shari’ah as God's eternal and immutable will for 
humanity, as expressed in the Qur’an6 and Sunnah7—Muhammad’s example. This does not 
necessarily assist greatly when it comes to determining how it should apply in the legal context, 
but does reaffirm the fact that Shari’ah law is very much based on religion, and applying this 
latest belief to more traditional legal concepts. Although Islamic law is based on eternal 
principles or frozen wisdom, the law itself is mutable.
8
 
Despite the seeming ambiguity of the definition, Shari’ah law seems to be applied across 
approximately 50 of the Islamic states and countries; however, the degree with which it is 
                                                          
4
 ibid 42. 
5
 Mumisa Micheal, Islamic law Theory & Interpretation (Amana Publications 2002) 2 
6
 Arabic word is the holy book of religion of Islam also sometimes transliterated as Quran, Kuran, Koran, Qur’ān, 
Coran or al-Qur’ān. Qur’an is the word of God as revealed to the Prophet, Muhammad (peace be upon him) through 
the Archangel Gabriel as the circumstances and situations so demanded. This is the foundation of Islamic 
jurisprudence. Even though the Quran is written, it does not appear in a legal code. It deals with faith and belief, 
morality and rules of conduct, spirituality, worships, and social life and legal matters. 
7
 The term Sunnah is Arabic word refers to the statements and actions of the Prophet Muhammad, as well as 
statements and actions of others done in his presence, with his knowledge and approval, it come as second source of 
law. 
8
Noel J Coulson, A History of Islamic Law ( Edinburgh University Press 2006)  36 
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applied is variable, and there are also different interpretations placed on the religious text, which 
can result in different legal applications, depending on the state. 
The argument that arises here is that, despite this, it should be noted that, as Islamic law has 
become integrated into the justice system, it still bases itself on religion, and therefore the courts 
are religious courts, which are often officiated on by religious men or clerics. In fact, the 
interpretation of Islamic law is not limited to the religious men, but in Islam is allowed to any 
one of the law scholars or researchers in this field so as to interpret the law and give their opinion 
about any case. Markedly, the law scholars could be academics at the university, judges, lawyers, 
or anybody capable of and qualified to give a sound opinion on matters of Islamic law. He/she is 
entitled to understand Islamic law and its methods of the inference the rules from sources of 
Islamic law and applies the rule on the present case. Moreover, non-Muslims are able to apply 
Islamic law, such as that which is happening in some banks or finance institutions in some 
Western countries: for example, the applications of Islamic finance standards or Islamic 
contracts in some banks of the United Kingdom.
9
  
2.2.1 The differences between Shari’ah and Fiqh  
  
 The development and applicability of Islamic Law today, interpretation is a fundamental 
constituent of ensuring an ever-evolving, ever-organic Islamic Law which is able and willing to 
keep up with an ever-changing society.  It is through Fiqh that this is to be achieved.  
Fiqh ‘literally means knowledge or understanding.’10 In the context of Islamic law, Fiqh refers to 
the ‘human understanding or comprehension of … [the] divine law.’11 In addition, Shari’ah 
constitutes the source from which Fiqh is developed through ijtihad, the latter meaning ‘to exert 
all one’s effort to know, against all odds, what God’s law is.’ 12 
As noted by countless experts, there exists a hazy grey ground between Shari’ah and Fiqh with 
the ‘undefined borderline between revealed law and jurist formalities.’ 13 In quantative terms, 
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there exists a difference between Shari’ah and Fiqh given that there has always existed one 
Qur’an and Sunnah. 
Furthermore, Shari’ah includes general provisions and principles whilst Fiqh tackles more 
specific issues. A good illustration for this distinction is the prohibition of cigarette smoking. 
Whilst the Qur’an forbids believers from taking their own life, it is Fiqh, which, as an extension 
of this principle forbade cigarette smoking when it was discovered that it was potentially deadly. 
14
 
 
In addition, there is also a very significant qualitative difference which is also the most 
problematic when dealing with the confusion in question.  A Shari’ah principle is established by 
‘the Great Legislator or what the Prophet spoke of in well-proved Sunnah, whereas a Fiqh 
principle is rationale by a Muslim or a jurist.’ As a result, ‘should not be an obstacle before new 
thinking or…creativity and renovation.’15 Thus, the divine framework that constitutes the 
backdrop of the Shari’ah renders it sacred and primary and, thus, not to be meddled with, but it is 
the human characteristic of Fiqh which allows significant interpretations to be made in a more 
flexible manner. Nevertheless, it must be noted that Fiqh is to remain within the letter and spirit 
of the Shari’ah. The important qualitative distinction between the two lead to Dr. Said Ramadan 
promoting the term Muslim jurisprudence rather than Islamic jurisprudence when referring to 
Fiqh because ‘an incorrect legal conclusion rendered under Fiqh, of which there have been many, 
properly should not be classified as Islamic.’16  
In conclusion, Shari’ah is divine and general whereas Fiqh is human and specific. 
Notwithstanding the significance of understanding the differences between the two, their 
interrelated, interconnected nature cannot be undermined given that Fiqh allows for the ‘practical 
application of the Shari’ah’ 17 It enables Shari’ah to be everything that many argue it is not, that 
being a source of law that responds to the needs and wants of societies through time and space. 
Nevertheless, the interpretation and application of Fiqh is not universal given that schools of 
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thought vary across the regions of the Muslim world which are characterized by different 
cultures and customs. 
18
 
 
2.3  Islamic Legislation  
 
Islamic legislation and the ethos and history behind the various rulings and principles are not a 
straightforward issue. The actual vast body of Islamic legislation is often referred to as Shari’ah 
law as this is thought to encompass all of the various strands of this body of law. It is actually 
quite interesting to note that the direct translation of Shari’ah is a ‘way’ or path which suggests 
that, rather than being a body of law in the strictest sense of the word, it is actually more a way 
of being or guidance. This ethos is reflected in the fact that, although Islamic law is now 
regarded as a body of legislative rules, it remains the largest body of religious law and, as such, 
is based on Islamic jurisprudence to a large extent.
19
 Shari’ah, in the widest sense, also dictates 
the way in which other aspects, such as social and economic issues, are dealt with within the 
Muslim community. For the purpose of this paper, focus is placed on the legislative background 
and sources, although it is recognised that other social and religious factors have a direct bearing 
on many of the legislative issues raised. There is little or no distinction between the religion and 
the law, in this context, with religious texts being viewed as law, although the application of 
legislation and religious texts may prove to be different when a close examination is undertaken. 
The foundation of Islamic law and the jurisprudence that develops these legislative requirements 
is referred to as Fiqh. Fiqh is seen as slightly different from Shari’ah whereby the Fiqh refers to 
the inferences and ideas drawn by Muslim scholars and the Shari’ah refers more to the principle 
underlying the processes that the scholars follow. This should mean that, in the main, Shari’ah 
and Fiqh are in harmony, although this is inevitably not always the case, and conflicts will arise 
occasionally. The two key sources of Shari’ah law are the Qur’an and Sunnah. Under Shari’ah 
law, it is noted that some laws and rules are regarded as divine and will be relevant regardless of 
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the situation or timeframe, whereas other sources have been developed over the years by scholars 
applying Islamic legislation. For this reason, the history of Islamic legislation is critically 
important to the understanding of the modern-day applications of this religious law.
20
 
Fiqh has a particularly long history with many of the Fiqh thoughts dating back to very early 
Muslim communities. Particularly influential was the jurist, Muhammad ibn Idris ash-Shafi`I, 
from the late 8
th
 Century, who laid out the Islamic jurisprudence principles, which remain central 
to this day. In this very early book, four key roots of Islamic law were identified: the Qur'an and 
Sunnah, mentioned previously, as well as the Ijma and Qiyas. The ideas proposed in this book 
were developed considerably by the Islamic jurists between the 8
th
 Century and the 13
th
 Century. 
In actual fact, this period was so influential that it was known as the Islamic Golden Age. The 
body of law, known as Shari’ah, is actually rooted in the teachings of the Prophet of Allah and 
the corresponding sayings of Muhammad, which were stated in the Qur’an and Sunnah. This is 
largely why Islamic legislative roles are said to be founded in the two key areas of Qur’an and 
Sunnah.
21
   
It was not until around 1,400 years ago that Islam began to take a more structured and formal 
approach that could be aligned with standard legislative processes. Throughout the period of 
development, Shari’ah was seen as so much more than a simple body of law, and was viewed as 
a way of life, thus making the exact legislative conditions difficult to ascertain or pinpoint. 
There is no denying that the scholars of Islam have been extremely influential in the 
development of Shari’ah law, and for many centuries it was the scholars who were responsible 
for upholding the laws and who were also responsible for developing new ones where 
necessary—all of which were related back to the key texts. In the time of the Ottoman Empire 
during the early 19
th
 Century, Shari’ah law was codified. The codification not only had the effect 
of making Islamic law more legalistic in nature, but also meant that it was more regularly 
compared with other legal systems, and was increasingly viewed as a body of law rather than a 
religious matter.
22
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Such codification was not undertaken lightly, which was largely as a result of military activity 
within the Ottoman Empire and overall reforms that were occurring internally. This codification 
was also quite clearly a step towards westernising the country. Moreover, by adopting a body of 
principles or doctrine that could be relied upon, it was considerably easier for those studying 
Islam to identify with it as a legislative body. Using the thoughts and ideas of scholars as the 
basis of legal principles was a foreign concept to westernised society, and it was much easier for 
them to understand one codified system that could be referred to in regard to any legal matter. 
Once such codification had taken place, the power of the scholars disappeared immediately as 
they were no longer able to have a final say in terms of what should be law or how the law 
should develop; thus, the power shifted to the state itself, as is normal in westernised society.
23
 
Multiple sources of Islamic law are pulled together to form the body of legislation, known as 
Shari’ah. Historically, the sources have been somewhat fluid, coming from individual scholars, 
as discussed above. However, over time, such legislative sources and processes have become 
more formalised, partly due to internal need and partly due to the need to implement a greater 
degree of alignment with western society.
24
 Throughout history, one of the key sources of 
legislative conditions and rules has come from the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and this is where 
those studying Islamic legislative systems will look in order to gain guidance in the first instance. 
Qur’an actually is a direct transcript from Allah.25 
The various different schools of Islamic jurisprudence place different levels of importance on the 
sources in terms of deriving legislative guidance. For example, the Sunni schools of law will 
look at multiple secondary sources, such as customs or general judicial consent, as key sources 
of legislation. They argue that the independent reasoning of both theorists and judges are vital in 
the interpretation of legislation and the codification of Islamic law. This is not a uniformed 
opinion; rather, the codified legislation is used differently by different Islamic schools of law. 
For example, the Maliki and Hanbali schools of law rely much more heavily on the Hadith, or 
the codified principles, arguing that there is no place for analogy or independent reasoning, and 
that the letter of the law should be followed at all times. When drawing an analogy with the 
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English legal system, such different opinions could be seen as an analogous with the different 
methods of statutory interpretation, albeit on a slightly more inflexible basis.
26
 
Although these various approaches may be very different, in reality, the actual practical 
application varies very little between the various schools. Regardless of which approach is 
implemented, the Qur’an remains the primary source of Islamic law and the overall foundation 
underpinning all legislation. Despite the fact that Islamic legislation is now being codified, the 
Qur’an is seen as the Word of God, and is therefore highly influential—not only in the legal 
sphere but also in terms of political and social issues. In Medina, the issue of social economic 
legislation is given prevalence and remains central to the Islamic legislation system. Although it 
is recognised as important, it is not a legal code as western society understands it; it is based 
more on relationships and the way in which individuals should interact with each other. There is, 
however, a range of approximately 500 verses that deal exclusively with the rules of human 
conduct; these are relatively close to a body of law and legislation as those in the UK would 
understand it.
27
 Throughout history, the interpretation of the Qur’an has been undertaken by 
companions of either Muhammad or Imam, and is thought to be amongst the most authoritative 
interpretations of the basic code. 
The other primary source that is recognised as being heavily relied upon in terms of legislative 
sources is that of the Sunnah. This is slightly less formal in terms of legislation or code, and 
relies on the traditions and customs of Muhammad himself. The two are interlinked with each 
other, with the Sunnah being a justified source of law according to the Qur’an itself. The Qur’an 
encourages all Muslims to follow the Prophet Muhammad; therefore, his traditions are 
considered to have been intertwined and as justifiable as the Qur’an as a source of law, and thus 
part of the legislative body of rules. 
Although there is a slight difference in the treatment of the Sunnah amongst Muslims, the vast 
majority do see the Sunnah as a vital piece of legislation alongside the Qur’an, and is required 
for supplementation and clarification as necessary. This supplemental nature is more useful in 
the area of religious practices; however, Islamic law is so inherently linked with religious 
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practices that the Sunnah is seen as a reliable and formative source of law and thus a body of 
quasi-legislation to be followed by all Muslims.  
Naturally, there is some difficulty in considering the Sunnah as a form of legislative source due 
to the verbal nature of the guidance and the likelihood that emphasis will have changed as it has 
been passed through the companions. That said, however, these have been largely recorded in the 
Hadith, and are viewed as conclusive by most Islamic lawyers.
28
 As is the case with other 
legislative sources seen in the western society, the Hadith has been developed in such a way that 
the strength of the rule is determined based on a range of criteria, such as the size of the report 
and the way in which it has been transmitted.  
As well as the key legislative sources of Qur’an and Sunnah, there are multiple secondary 
sources drawn on to assist with the interpretation or understanding of these primary legislative 
sources. Different Islamic schools have different opinions regarding the overall validity of the 
use of these sources, although they are generally recognised to be at least partially useful in areas 
where the primary legislative style sources are silent or ambiguous.
29
 
Consensus is one of the strongest secondary sources, and is once again linked back to the 
primary sources, thus giving it greater weight from a legislative point of view. Essentially, 
consensus or ‘Ijma’ is the process whereby all jurists have come to the same conclusion on a 
subject. Where there has been unanimity of decision from Muslims, this is deemed to be 
persuasive towards the way in which the Islamic rules are interpreted going forward. Inevitably, 
there are differences in opinion in terms of whether or not consensus is deemed a reliable source 
of law, with Sunni jurists being prepared to accept it as equally important (in terms of 
legislation) as the primary sources. Shiite jurists, on the other hand, recognise consensus as valid, 
although it is viewed very much as secondary to the primary sources. Regardless of the level of 
acceptance, however, in modern Muslim practices, the process of consensus and practice is 
viewed not as much as a legislative authority but rather as a way of ensuring democracy and 
adaptability for necessary reforms.
30
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As seen in traditional western society, there is also the process of analogical deduction (or Qiyas) 
,which is simply deducing rules and processes based on all of the available sources.
31
 This is 
rather akin to statutory interpretation and, whilst it does not add to the legislative body itself, is a 
key example of how willing the Islamic system is to allow for interpretation of the core rules. In 
all cases, even where this type of analogy is accepted, it is necessary for the judgments to be 
based on logic and not to be arbitrarily determined.  
Regardless of the sources of the legislative body of rules and the various degrees of acceptance 
that each source attracts, there are several key principles that run throughout the primary 
legislation and the supporting secondary legislation. There is a strong misconception surrounding 
Islamic law which suggests that the judiciary applying Islamic rules are bound by the ancient 
rules of the Qur’an, with no flexibility at all to account for modern situations.32 There is also the 
notion that there are fixed penalties for every crime, meaning that any sentencing flexibility is 
also withdrawn. This is not, in reality, the case, and certain serious crimes are controlled by the 
Qur’an, with a wide flexibility afforded to the judiciary when it comes to lesser crimes. 
Nevertheless, when considering the sources and the way in which Islamic legislation has 
developed and operates, it is easy to see from where such notions derive. Without doubt, the 
matter is not that straightforward.  
Some of the key principles surrounding Islamic legislation can go a long way towards explaining 
how Islamic law operates in the modern setting. Firstly, it is important to recognise that, despite 
the developments, Islam and the state remain inherently linked. Muslims are bound by the will of 
Allah, which is a view is reiterated throughout their legislation; this link cannot be eroded when 
determining the way in which Islamic legislation operates. Due to the sheer volume of Muslims 
across the world, the Islamic legislative cannot be ignored, and is commonly discussed alongside 
more traditional legal systems, such as English common law.
33
 
Unsurprisingly, Islamic principles are largely founded in religion and follow guiding principles 
in their application. For example, one of the key principles is that every action should be 
                                                          
31
 Muhammad Masud, Islamic Legal Philosophy, Pakistan: Islamic Research Institute, Reprint 1984. 
32
 Al-Thakeb, Fahed & Scott Joseph E, ‘Islamic Law: An Examination of its Revitalization’ (1981 ) 21 British 
Journal of Criminology 58,69.   
33
Hisham Ramadan, Understanding Islamic Law: From Classical to Contemporary ( Lanham AltaMira Press 2006) 
20 
37 
 
considered in light of the underlying motive and the intent behind such an action.
34
 This is 
clearly stated by the Prophet’s statement: 
‘Actions are but by intentions, and a man will have only what he intended. So whoever 
emigrated for Allah and His Messenger, then his emigration was for Allah and His Messenger. 
And whoever emigrated to attain some worldly benefit or get married, then his emigration is for 
what he undertook it to achieve’.35 
Secondly, there is the notion that harm needs to be removed, and that no harm should be done or 
initiated against another individual. A third principle is that, when it comes to social transactions, 
customs and norms can become a deciding factor in terms of what is considered acceptable (and 
what is not). Fourthly, there is the ability given to the law to make allowances where the accused 
faces particular difficulties or hardships. For instance, although it is forbidden to show one’s 
body to a member of the opposite sex, if this were done in pursuit of necessary medical 
treatment, then no crime would be committed. Finally, there is the principle that, where 
something is established with certainly, for example, laid down clearly in the Qur’an, only other 
evidence which is as certain would be sufficient to refute this rule.
36
 
It is clear to see that the Islamic legislative body is not as rigid or complex as it would initially 
appear. Whilst it differs fundamentally from other legal systems due to the fact that it is so 
strongly linked with religion, the reality is that the development and interpretation is not wildly 
different from that seen in the common law system of English law.
37
 Legislative sources remain 
paramount, with support from guiding principles and secondary sources where necessary.  
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2.4  The Sources of Islamic Law 
 
There are, of course, many different sources of Islamic law in the same way that there are 
multiple different sources in other legal systems. Such sources are broadly split into primary and 
secondary sources, each of which will be discussed in turn. In reality, there is a wide range of 
different secondary sources that can be drawn upon; this will depend largely on the court 
applying the law; however, the main secondary sources will be considered here. 
 
 
2.4.1  Primary Sources  
 
The scholars agree that the Qur’an and the Sunnah constitute the primary sources of Shari’ah. 
These two sources are discussed as follows. 
 
2.4.1.1 Qur'an: 
 
The clear primary source of Islamic law is that of the Qur’an, which is defined in the Qur’an 
itself as being ‘a sending-down from the Lord of all the worlds’.38 Essentially, the Qur’an is 
viewed as a text sent down from God and put into words by the Prophet Muhammad. The Qur’an 
is the Holy Script of the Muslim and the foremost source of the law of Islam. The Arabic term 
Qur’an literally means ‘reading’ or ‘recitation’. It may be defined as the book containing the 
speech of God revealed to the Prophet Muhammad in Arabic and transmitted by continuous 
testimony. The Revelation was conveyed to the Prophet by the Noble Angel Gabriel, who took 
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the Divine Words directly from Allah and transmitted them to the Messenger of God (the Angel 
acting as an intermediary between Allah and His Messenger). The authenticity of the Holy Text 
is proven by universally accepted testimony. It has been protected from any alteration, and has 
remained intact in memory and in written record throughout the generations.  
The Qur’an is composed of more than 6,200 verses,39 divided into 114 chapters.40 Its individual 
verses were pronounced over roughly 23 years of Muhammad’s Prophet-hood. Of these verses, 
less than one-tenth relate to law and Jurisprudence, whilst the remainder are largely concerned 
with matters of belief and morality, the five pillars
41
 of the faith, and a variety of other themes.
 
 
Despite this seemingly strong source of law, there are some difficulties that need to be 
interpreted, particularly when the social context changes. Typical difficulties associated with the 
Qur’an include whether or not an expression within it should be looked at in the general form, or 
whether there are exceptions that could be drawn upon in certain limited circumstances. For 
example, there has been considerable discussion regarding whether or not the statement in 
Chapter 24—which states: ‘A woman who fornicates and a man who fornicates flog them both a 
hundred times’42—refers to all men and women, or simply free men and women. When looked at 
in conjunction with Q4:25, it can be seen that a different punishment exists for slave
43
 men and 
women and, thus, it has been interpreted that Q24 is only to apply to free individuals.
44
 
The difficulties of interpretation can also be seen when it comes to an expression that remains 
unqualified in one clause, but which has been qualified later on in the text. Accordingly, the 
question, in this context, becomes concerned with whether or not this qualification can be 
applied throughout the text. Furthermore, there may also be contradictions throughout the text 
and decisions that have to be made as to which interpretation should be used. This will invariably 
result in judges having to take into account the facts surrounding the decision that they are 
making. In many cases, therefore, secondary sources will have to be drawn upon in order to 
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make the most appropriate decision; however, there are qualifications required for scholars 
seeking to interpret Qur’an, so the judge may be the scholar or has to refer to the opinions of 
scholars of the Qur’an interpretation. Essentially, the judge has wide range to apply any 
interpretation he considers adequate and/or suitable for the case under examination.   
As the Qur’an is written in Arabic, a detailed knowledge of the language is also necessary in 
order for interpretation to be possible. Over the years, the Qur’an has been systematised slightly, 
and there are now five different statements types recognised from which judgements can 
potentially be drawn. 
Firstly, there is the unambiguous judgement or text contained within the Qur’an, and where there 
is no ambiguity this should be applied as it stands. Secondly, there is the apparent meaning 
which is overt within the text, and the expressions within the Qur’an should be taken at face 
value unless there can be some sort of evidence produced that should be taken to the contrary. 
Thirdly, and less persuasive, is the indication that exists within the Qur’an that suggests that, 
where implications can be drawn from the text, these should be used unless there is indication to 
the contrary that this is not what was intended. Fourthly, there is the use of what is understood as 
part of the Qur’an; this can refer to the softer aspect of implications drawn from the Qur’an. This 
may be particularly useful where the social or economic context needs to be taken into account. 
Finally, there is the concept of likeness, and where the judges are struggling to find 
interpretation, they can look for similar situations in order to draw information and to 
accordingly assist with the interpretation. 
The Qur'an is the first and most important source of Islamic law. However, this does not mean 
that the Qur'an provides a direct and specific rule governing every issue, nor does it give all 
details for every case. Rather, the Qur’an has laid down broad guidelines that cover, in a general 
sense, every conceivable matter. 
It be should be noted here that there are cases not mentioned in the Qur’an; there are general 
provisions to maintain justice amongst people, and engorge to search for truth. As such, we can 
understand that, if the Muslims jurists, legislators and judges do not find in Islamic law any law 
that applies in the case, they can take from any law in the world if it does not conflict with 
41 
 
Islamic law standards. Thus, the applications of some other laws that achieve justice are required 
by the Qur’an.  
 
 
 
2.4.1.2 The (Sanah) Prophetic Traditions: 
 
A second primary source is that of prophetic traditions, referred to as Sunna or Sanah, which 
considers the way in which the Qur’an operates in reality. Prophetic Tradition is considered one 
of the absolute sources of law.
45
 When looking at the Qur’an, as described above, the focus is 
always exclusively on the actual text; in practice, this text does not operate in its own vacuum, 
and it is necessary to consider the surrounding circumstances and the way in which it applies to 
the day-to-day life of those following the law of Islam. 
It is noted here, in accordance with Islamic law, that the Qur’an and its application is delivered 
through human messengers. As recognised in the Qur’an itself, ‘The Noble Spirit brought it 
down onto your heart for you to be one of the warners, in a clear, Arabic tongue’.46 Clearly, 
where there is any form of interpretation in this way by human messenger, there is likely to be a 
further source of legislation that needs to be considered. 
Once the message has been transferred to the human messenger, it can then be acted upon with 
the written source noted down in a Hadeeth,
47
 a collection referred to as the Sunna. This resource 
is derived from various different prophets, with a prophet being described by A’isha48 as ‘the 
Qur’an walking’. Therefore, although this primary source also finds its roots in the Qur’an itself, 
the prophet often adds additional information, meaning that it becomes its own source of 
legislation distinct from the Qur’an. 
                                                          
45
 Apart from a few jurists who indicate that the Qur’an is the only source of the law and voided the validity of the 
Sunnah as a source. For further  
46
 Qur’an 26: 193, 194,195 
47
 Hadith and Sunnah are generally taken as synonymous terms. 
48
 (614-678) Third wife of Prophet Mohammad. 
42 
 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the two primary sources are heavily interlinked, and it is quite 
common for judges, when looking at the Qur’an, to also look towards the relevant Hadeeth in 
order to gain a greater understanding of the appropriate interpretation. It is these two primary 
sources that are used as the basis of law; however, other schools of law associated with Islam are 
also relevant.
49
 Ultimately, however, although the various different sources of Islam may 
interpret the meaning of the text differently, they are all derived from the same text. Therefore, 
although these two sources are viewed as independent, they are, in fact, so interlinked that they 
are largely considered one primary source of legislation, working with each other to assist with 
the interpretation across the various schools of Islamic law.
50
 
 
2.4.2  Secondary Sources  
 
As well as the primary resources listed above, there is also a wide range of secondary resources 
that may be drawn upon by judges when attempting to apply the various different aspects of the 
Qur’an to the decisions brought before them. 
 
2.4.2.1 Consensus of Opinion (Ijma): 
 
When considering the way in which Islamic law should be interpreted and practically applied, it 
has been noted that Ijma or consensus is seen as the most valuable of the secondary sources. As a 
legal term, consensus is defined as agreement amongst the jurists
51
 of the Muslim community in 
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a particular age, after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, on a legal question. There is some 
dispute as to whether or not consensus is a local or universal concept; however, on the whole, it 
has been recognised by al-Shafi that the consensus is seen as universal. Ijma developed as a valid 
source in the law on the authority of the Qur’an and the Sunnah.52 
One of the most frequently quoted proofs for the authority of Ijma is the Prophetic Saying, ‘My 
followers (or community) shall never agree upon an error’.53 This statement is not clear in terms 
of legitimising consensus as a source in the law, and yet shows that, when there is agreement 
amongst the Muslim community, falsehood cannot occur and has to be implemented.  
When looking at the analysis undertaken by Malik, it is clear that practice and custom were seen 
as being particularly important when considering the source of Islamic law, and that the people 
of Madina had previously accepted that there was general agreement when applying these 
consensus, whereas a more specific concept of consensus has also been developed in relation to 
the Amal of Madina,
54
 which deals with differences of opinion in custom and practice, and 
which should also be considered when it comes to the consensus of opinion. Therefore, although 
consensus is generally seen as a universal concept, there is still some dissent in relation to this 
view, and more localised customs can potentially be taken into account. A local Amal is not 
simply a local custom, and often represents the way in which the primary sources are practically 
applied in a non-textual way. Whereas the Hadith is often transferred from one person to another, 
the Amal is a much more generalised transmission of information relating to the operation of the 
Islamic legal texts. It can, therefore, be somewhat harder to interpret, yet nevertheless can offer 
flexibility when applying the text in the modern context, and is therefore viewed as an important 
secondary resource.
55
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In the first centuries of Islam, there is consensus Ijma about many cases in Islamic law. 
However, at the present time an occurrence of Ijma became rarely, it is in fact logically and 
historically possible. However, Ijma still considered as a source of Islamic law in the old issues, 
but there cases in the modern time we found consensus among scholars, such as drugs 
prohibition, eating or dealing, money laundering and computer and network crimes. 
 
2.4.2.2 Analogy Qiyas: 
 
Analogy is also seen to be important as a source of Islamic law. It was most fervently put 
forward by Abu Hanifa when he showed that he was particularly keen to exercise analogies in 
attempting to establish new judgements where the Qur’an or other textual sources do not provide 
sufficient clarity. In this way, he referred to analogies in order to reach a conclusion. This 
technique was also favoured by other Islamic schools of law, which viewed analogies as the 
fourth source, following on from the primary sources and use of custom. Typical analogies 
accepted as part of this analysis include the belief that being intoxicated by wine is considered to 
be Haram; this could be extended to the analogies with being intoxicated by any other substance. 
Analogies are actually becoming increasingly important in the modern context, and have been 
central to the judgements reached by both Malik and Abu Hanifa, despite being rejected by 
others, such as Al-Shafi,
56
 for all but the most obvious of situations. 
Although these four sources—namely the two primary sources mentioned above and two 
secondary sources—are seen as central to the operation of Islamic law, there are, in fact, other 
sources that need to be mentioned, and which can be drawn upon, either to supplement a 
previous resource or to otherwise assist where there is excessive ambiguity or difficulties 
associated with a decision before the court.
57
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2.4.2.3 Considerations of Public Interest (Maslaha): 
 
One of these additional sources is that of consideration of the public interest, directly translated 
as ‘something of benefit’.58 When applied in the context of interpreting Islamic legislation, this 
refers to situations where there is no definitive statement in the text, and there has been no 
judgement that can be relied upon. Maslaha relates to a situation where there is no other 
reference made to a given issue. It allows jurists to refer to their own analysis and reasoning in 
order to introduce juridical decisions, which give benefit, taking into account their historical and 
geographical contexts. In order for maslaha to be upheld as a valid source in the law, it must not 
contradict or conflict with the primary sources of Islamic law, namely the Qur’an or the 
Prophet’s Traditions (Sunna).59 
Maslaha is not mere utilitarianism, maslaha created from the conception that Shari'ah is for the 
promotion of the social good and utility and the avoidance of harm and corruption. So on of aims 
of maslaha is utilitarianism.
60
  
Where this is the case, the basic provision is that a decision can be made for the general benefit 
of the community or the public—provided it does not go directly against a previous or existing 
judgement. One of the main supporters of this approach is Malik, although others have also 
shown indication that they are prepared to accept consideration of the public interest in certain 
circumstances. For example, this can be seen where it was necessary to demolish a building next 
to a mosque in order to allow more people to use the facilities. Again, this was seen as a 
consideration of public interest, and was not something that was expressly allowed under the 
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Qur’an but which was decided to be in keeping with the underlying text. A more practical 
example is establishing a prison as a place of detention for certain well-defined purposes. In the 
time of the prophet and Abu Bakr
61
 there were no jails; rather, people would be detained such as, 
for example, by being tied to a pillar in the mosque and kept there until such time as judgement 
was made about them. Umar
62
, however, bought a house in Makkah which he made into a prison. 
Maslaha is frequently used in the modern world to meet new situations and challenges. One 
example is the prohibition to sell firearms during a civil disturbance, as this may intensify the 
struggle. 
 
2.4.2.4 Custom and the Law (Urf): 
 
Finally, there is the custom or Urf, which refers to the general pattern of day-to-day life, and 
which includes factors such as food, language, and clothing. For example, when attempting to 
interpret the Qur’an, there are times where the strict definition, in accordance with the dictionary, 
is simply not appropriate. Where this is the case, the customary meaning should be considered 
and taken into account if this is deemed appropriate. 
As is evident from its definition, custom must be good and beneficial for people in order for it to 
constitute a valid basis for legal decisions. Hence, any practice considered harmful or which may 
bring about no benefit to the community cannot amount to a valid basis—even though it may be 
commonly practised amongst the people. Furthermore, in order for custom to be considered 
legally, it must not contradict the principles provided in the Holy Book and Prophet’s 
Traditions.
63
  
Examples of valid custom include the use of commercial advertisements to sell products, and the 
use of card facilities for payment. These commercial practises are deemed valid because of the 
benefit they give to people and their adherence to the basic rules of Islamic doctrine. In contrast, 
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obtaining of a bank loan based on interest is not considered a valid commercial practice. This 
commonplace transaction by the community does not validate the type of custom as it contradicts 
the fundamental principles of Islamic rules. 
Drawing all of these factors together, it can be seen that there are multiple different sources of 
Islamic legislation and, whilst the Qur’an and the words of the Prophets form the primary base of 
the legislation, there are multiple secondary sources that can be drawn upon to assist, where there 
is ambiguity. Different judges will tend to favour different approaches, particularly with it comes 
to using secondary sources to support their decision; this can offer a degree of flexibility that is 
necessary in any legislative system, but can also establish ambiguity, which is an on-going 
challenge for all legislative systems, including that of Islam.
64
 
 
 
 
2.5  The Principle of (Ijtihad) in Islamic law. 
 
Having assessed the various different sources of Islamic law, the next principle deemed relevant 
to this discussion is which legal decisions are made and processes followed, namely that of 
Ijtihad. This involves the independent interpretation of the various different legal sources 
available. Ijtihad
65
 is the making of a decision in Islamic law by personal effort to reach 
independent interpretation or opinion not precisely covered by Qur’an or Sunnah.  
On the whole, this principle is generally associated with the Islamic jurisprudence, and there has 
been some dispute as to whether or not this principle remains valid, with some Western scholars 
believing that Ijtihad is no longer practised, although there is also an important body of law that 
suggests that the principle is still very much a part of Islamic law. 
The history of the principle can be seen back in early Islam; it then became slowly integrated 
into more mainstream Islam principles, although it did also have difficulties during the 12
th
 
                                                          
64
 For further information, see, Mawil Izzi Dien, M., Islamic Law from Historical foundation to Contemporary 
Practice( Edinburgh University Press 2004) 60, and Mohammad Kamali , Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence ( 
Islamic Texts Society 2003) 291-295. 
65
 Taqlid is opposite of Ijtihad it mean: copying or following opinion or decision of scholar without examining it. 
48 
 
Century, at which time several errors of judgement brought into question whether or not it was a 
valuable principle going forward. 
Central to the application of this principle is the educated Muslim who applies the interpretation; 
therefore, the qualifications of these key individuals are seen as critically important to how well 
it is recognised and how readily it is applied in the modern world.
66
 
The Islamic scholar responsible for this interpretation needs to meet with a specific set of 
requirements regarding their qualifications. Fundamentally, this means that they are competently 
able to interpret Shari’ah law based on the situations put before them. It is possible for the 
individual scholar to specialise in a specific area of law, such as family law, but more commonly, 
they are seen as generalist experts. The exact qualifications were laid out by Abu al Husan al-
Basri, which briefly states that the individual needs to understand the overall objectives of 
Shari’ah law, and also that they have a complete understanding of the various different sources 
of Islamic law. 
One of the key points deemed particularly relevant to the use of this principle is the fact that God 
is considered to be all knowing and all powerful, and that only God has the power to create laws 
that will apply to humans. Humans are used as messengers when it comes to applying these laws, 
but it is not the role of the humans to alter this basic law in any way whatsoever.
67
 
In order to achieve this objective, it is clearly vitally important that there are well-respected 
scholars who are able to interpret the various different sources associated with Islamic law to 
ensure that God's will is transcribed, accurately, and applied by the relevant humans during any 
court cases brought before the Islamic courts. Essentially, therefore, this principle centres on 
interpreting and transcribing God's will, based on all of the sources mentioned above, so they can 
be applied to any practical situation put before the court, and only the most well respected 
scholars are able to undertake this role with any authority. 
In Modern times, Islamic law is needed to Ijtihad as there are many new issues that need a legal 
opinion, with this lacking in Islamic jurisprudence. Moroever, it is acknowledged that there are 
legal problems arising, with waiting needing prior to solving the issue: for example, electronic 
                                                          
66
 Frank Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System Studies Of Saudi Arabia (Leiden Brill 2000) 29 
67
 Muhammad Masud & others, Dispensing Justice in Islam: Qadis and Their Judgements( Leiden Brill 2006) 361 
49 
 
commerce has various legal problems, such as the formation of e-contracts. Another example is 
that of air transportation contracts, which did not exist in past and which engorges jurists to 
apply in a broad sense the theory of Ijtihad.
68
 
Ijtihad, in modern times, occurs through governmental legislation; in the form of legal opinions 
and judicial decisions by Islamic judges or committees, as well as through scholarly writings. 
Modern society often presents a more challenging prospect for Ijtihad compared to its medieval 
counterpart when issues pertaining to marriage, divorce, property, and inheritance, for example, 
were more predictable due to the slower pace of social change. The unprecedented diversity and 
scope of knowledge today make it impossible for any one person to acquire the mastery of all the 
disciplines relevant to Ijtihad. Hence, it becomes necessary to turn Ijtihad into a consultative 
process that utilises the skills not only of jurists of Islamic law but also of experts in other 
disciplines, with vital importance to society, such as science, technology, economics, and 
medicine.  
In addition to addressing some of society’s needs, collective Ijtihad may also build a greater 
spirit of unity and consensus amongst Muslims. Although Ijtihad often served, in the past, to 
widen the scope of disagreement more so than to bring about unity and consensus, there is a 
great need now in regard to unity on issues that could be addressed more effectively through 
‘collective’ Ijtihad and legislation. 
The Saudi Courts apply Ijtihad in cases which are brought before them. In this regard, markedly, 
Saudi judges apply Ijtihad to reach decisions concerning cases that fall outside of the provisions 
provided by the Shari'ah. However, it remains that the application of this principle is not based 
on a clear view, with some judges possibly issuing a judgement differing from a precedent in the 
same case as a result of the new Ijtihad. Without doubt, this is a misunderstanding of the nature 
of Ijtihad. The law of Judiciary dealt with the departure from an interpretation or Ijtihad adopted 
by the court in previous cases.
69
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2.6.The Concept of Hisbah (or Hisba) in Islamic law 
  
The term hisbah, literally translated, means “…the commanding of the good, when it has become 
neglected, and the forbidding of the evil, when its practice becomes manifest.
70”  
 
At one level, the term is used to describe the religious and moral obligation which Islam confers 
on all Muslims to do what is good and to avoid what is evil
71
 and, importantly, to enforce this 
principle in society by holding ‘un-Islamic’ Muslins to account72. The extent to which this 
collective obligation is conferred on an individual depends upon the extent of that individual’s 
ability to enforce hisbah. The primary texts of Islam make it clear that the obligations of 
individual Muslims are proportionate to their abilities; for example, Allah says, ‘So fear Allah as 
much as you can…73’ 
 
However, the most common usage for the term is to describe the religious institution, under 
Islamic law, which is tasked with the official supervision over the markets and the religious, 
moral and social affairs within the Islamic city
74
. The state officials tasked with this role are 
called muhtasib or ‘inspectors’, and are among the most highly respected religious officials 
within the organizational hierarchy of Islam
75
. 
 
While the office of muhtasib and the institution of hisbah are religious, their function is 
primarily economic. Historically, the Prophet and, later, his caliphs used to roam the markets, 
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giving instructions to market traders for fair and just dealings. However, as the nature of 
government affairs became more complicated and time-demanding, it was deemed necessary to 
delegate this important public function to non-caliphs, or muhtasib. Historians suggest that the 
first muhtasib were appointed under Abbasid caliph al-Mahdi, the third Abbasid caliph
76
. 
 
 
2.6.1 The role of the Hisbah (or Hisba) in Islamic law 
 
By empowering each and every Muslim to use their best endeavours to enforce Islamic law 
within their homes and communities, hisbah, in its guise as the religious and moral obligation of 
all Muslims, was a mechanism for the self-reinforcement of Islamic law principals in Muslim 
society. In short, it sought to create a culture of whistle-blowing, that would encourage the least 
religious Muslim members of society to desist from engaging in immoral conduct and to be more 
compliant citizens in their public (and, to some extent, private) lives. 
 
Historically, the role of the hisbah, in its guise as a religious office or institution, was to create a 
system for the public enforcement of the principle of hisbah. The role of the muhtasib under this 
system was intrinsically flexible. In fact it has been argued that one of the functions of the 
muhtasib was to regulate those areas of conduct which the other public officials did not enjoy 
competence or jurisdiction to regulate
77
. Nevertheless, core areas of early muhtasib competence 
were well-established. Abdul Azim Islahi lists the following functions of the muhtasib as officers 
of hisbah: “Works related to al-hisbah generally discussed socio-economic control, moral and 
market supervision, prevention of monopolies, check on cheating and fraud and such other 
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corrupting practices, standardization of products [and] facilitation of the supply of 
necessities…78”  
 
This list is non-exhaustive, and over-simplistic, but nevertheless gives a good indication of the 
types of role that the muhtasib played in Islamic society. Key omissions from this list include the 
enforcement of prayer and fasting
79
, the supervision of industry (which included product 
standardization, minimum wage regulation and arbitration), the regulation of professional service 
providers such as doctors and teachers, the supervision of trading practices (which included the 
standardization of units and measures and product quality control) and various civil functions 
(such as the enforcement of environmental regulations and public safety ordinaces)
80
. 
 
The muhtasib enjoyed virtually limitless discretion in discharging their religious functions, 
although they were guided by certain principles derived directly from primary Islamic texts. One 
of these principles pertained to the function of muhtasib as regulator of market-generated 
injustices; if the injustice could not be eliminated by the adoption of special measures, then the 
task of the muhtasib was to limit or mitigate that injustice to maximum extent possible
81
. 
 
It has been argued that one of the most useful functions of the muhtasib was to foster a direct 
connection between Islamic law and the Muslims that were subjected to it. As Roy Mottahedeh 
and Kristen Stilt explain, “[T]he muhtasib would patrol public spaces and enforce “laws” 
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wherever he saw a violation. The muhtasib therefore gave Islamic law an immediate presence in 
public space and was an important face of the law in society.
82” 
 
As new laws on taxation were implemented, under the Ottoman rule, it has been argued that the 
function of collecting taxes from market traders was added to this list
83
. Some authors have 
argued that the addition of tax collecting as a function of the muhtasib evidences the increasingly 
political nature of their role. This extension, they argue, represented a corruption of the religious 
principles upon which the office of muhtasib and the institution of hisbah were founded
84
 and 
undermined the confidence that ordinary Mulims placed in these officials as guardians of Islamic 
morality. 
 
The intrinsic conflict between the religious and political functions of the muhtasib, and the 
inappropriateness of this encroachment, is well-illustrated by Hallaq, who argues the one of the 
historic functions of the muhtasib was to bring government officials to court on charges of 
corruption or abuses of the powers
85
; if this was the role of the muhtasib and the muhtasib were 
also tasked with the collection of taxes—an intrinsically policital function—then it begs the 
question, who would be able to bring a corrupt muhtasib to court? 
 
Support for the view that the muhtasib became a predominantly political office can be gleaned 
from the fact that the role of muhtasib continued to exist even under non-Muslim rule; muhtasib 
were deemed to play a sufficiently important non-religious function that there was sufficient 
work to keep these individuals in public office.  
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2.7 Four Schools of Islamic Law 
 
The largest branch of Islam is that of Sunni and, as part of the Sunni Islam theories, there are 
four schools of thought which are followed. These four legal schools represent four distinct 
schools of thought associated with mainstream Islam and although they differ substantially, they 
are all accepted by each other as potentially valuable successors of the Prophet Mohammad and 
his companions. All four schools will be discussed briefly below. 
 
 
2.7.1  Hanafi School 
 
The Hanafi School is the oldest surviving school of Islamic law, and one with the largest 
following. This was established and developed by Abu Hanifah,
86
 who founded a school to study 
this train of thought. The main regions that follow this school of thought include Muslims from 
India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and is also recognised as quite popular in the United 
Kingdom.
87
 
This school of thought is one of the oldest in terms of Islam, and places significant emphasis on 
using reason when interpreting the main sources. Essentially, this is the most popular approach to 
interpreting Islam, and aims to apply the text in a reasonable manner, thus allowing flexibility to 
deal with changes in society; this flexibility has resulted in it being one of the most followed 
schools of Islam. 
 
2.7.2  Maliki 
This school of thought was developed by Malik,
88
 and is recognised the oldest student of Abu 
Hanifah, and is therefore seen as an evolution of this basic school of thought. Approximately 
25% of all Muslims follow this school of thought, which is considered to be particularly popular 
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in the Western world. It differs from the other three schools of thought based on the way in 
which it relies heavily upon customs and principles—much more so than strict rules and 
regulations based on the primary source; this may explain, to a certain extent, why it is more 
readily accepted by the Western world.
89
 
 
2.7.3  Shafi’i 
 
The Shafi’i school of thought was derived from al-Shafi,90 and is a student of Malik, showing yet 
a further layer of development associated with the four schools of Islam. It is primarily followed 
by Muslims in Malaysia, , Jordan, Lebanon, and Indonesia, as well as many of the Kurdish 
regions. As part of this school of law, the acceptable sources are stated as being the Qur’an, the 
Sunnah, Consensus, and Analogy only, and they are ordered in this way. This school of thought 
is particularly keen on academic rigour, and does not readily accept conjecture. A large body of 
precedent is also seen as being relevant to this school of thought, to an extent that it is not with 
the other schools of thought, thus making analogical deduction a particular favourite task of this 
school of thought.
91
 
 
2.7.4  Hanbali 
 
Finally, there is the school of Hanbali, which was developed by bin Hanbal,
92
 which is 
particularly prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula region. This school of thought moves back to the 
more traditional Islamic viewpoint that places God as an external source that is not manmade in 
any way, and which must be viewed as an external jurisprudence that cannot be altered by 
manmade interpretation. As well as relying heavily on the primary sources, consent is seen as 
very important with this school of thought. 
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2.8 The Categories of Islamic Law (Figh) Jurisprudence 
 
The reference to Figh is the terminology used when discussing Islamic jurisprudence in its 
entirety, and is further acknowledged as an extension of Shari’ah law, which is based entirely on 
the primary sources of the Qur’an and the words of the Prophets. When considering Islamic 
jurisprudence, these principles are extended to look at the way in which interpretation is involved 
with the various different jurists over the years. In reality, this extension of Islamic jurisprudence 
works alongside the traditional approaches, but does imply much deeper understanding, and 
therefore requires individuals who are specifically trained in the art of jurisprudence.
93
 
Essentially, jurisprudence associated with Islamic law involves gaining a particularly deep 
understanding of the issues associated with the law, drawing not only on the primary sources but 
also on any other source that may be appropriate, depending on the question at hand. 
Figh has been described by Ibn Khaldun as being the ‘knowledge of the rules of God which 
concern the actions of persons who own themselves bound to obey the law respecting what is 
required (wajib), forbidden (haraam), recommended (mandūb), disapproved (makrūh) or merely 
permitted (mubah)’.94 
Of course, there are occasions where the Qur’an is very clear and will offer a concrete way of 
dealing with the specific issue, such as, for example, when it comes to the way in which the 
ritual prior to daily prayer is undertaken. However, this is not always the case and, at times, 
much deeper interpretations are required; this is where the Islamic jurisprudence may come into 
play. Consider the situation where there are statements in the Qur’an that indicate that an 
individual needs to undertake daily prayer during the period of Ramadan, but the actual 
processes are not described, and it is therefore necessary to look at the workings of the Prophets 
in order to determine how such prayers should be undertaken. Therefore, whilst Islamic 
jurisprudence recognises that the divine law comes from the Qur’an and the workings of the 
Prophets, there is nevertheless a crucial need to interpret these and the use of Fiqh.
95
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This jurisprudence falls into two broad areas: the first looking at the rules relating to actions 
taken, and the second relating to the various different circumstances that may surround these 
chosen actions. 
When it comes to the rules surrounding action, the jurisprudence incorporates the notion of 
obligation, permissibility, recommendation, and prohibition. The other rules relating to such 
factors surrounding actions include cause, permit, enforcement, and condition. Based on this, the 
rules are broadly split into worship and dealings so as to allow for a suitable analysis.
96
 
Due to the specialist nature of Islamic jurisprudence and the complexity often associated with the 
in-depth analysis, Islamic jurisprudence of this nature has been split into multiple different fields, 
with experts specialising in one area. These fields include economic, political, criminal, 
theological, marital and etiquettical. When undertaking various different approaches to 
jurisprudence, the four schools of Islam, as noted above, will draw on this jurisprudence to at 
least some degree, with both aspects of the interpretation of Islamic law used in combination so 
as to obtain a complete view of the Islamic system. 
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 2.9 The legal system in Saudi Arabia   
 
Because the Saudi Arabia good example of adoption of application of Islamic law, and in this 
research there are many court cases from Saudi courts, also the judicial system is unknown to 
many western readers and lawyers. Therefore, it is very important to give an overview of the 
judicial system in Saudi Arabia. 
 
2.9.1  General Background about Saudi Arabia 
 
King Abdulaziz Al- Saud
97
 united the huge area of the Arabian Peninsula to form the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia. The first contact with another nation was with Great Britain in 1915. King 
Abdulaziz entered into negotiations with the British government, and signed treaties confirming 
the complete independence of the country. Later, ‘[i]n September 1932, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia officially acquired its present name’.98  
The population of Saudi Arabia was approximately nineteen million in 2010; such a small 
number occupying a land area of approximately 2.3 million kilometres gives the country a very 
low population density.
99
 Prior to the discovery of oil, most of the people lived in the southern 
and northern parts of the country in which the majority of the farms were located. However, 
following the discovery of oil in 1938 in the eastern part of Saudi Arabia, many people migrated 
to Dahran, Dammam, and some other eastern cities to work in foreign oil companies, particularly 
the Arabian Zmerican Oil Company (APJNCO);
100
 however, with the beginning of the new 
Saudi policy of diversification of the economic sources and reduced dependence on oil, and also 
following the establishment of several agricultural and industrial projects throughout the 
Kingdom, people have been living in most parts of the country. 
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The law of Saudi Arabia is Islamic law, which, although based on Quartic precept and 
tradition,
101
 nevertheless easily adapts itself to the changing conditions of the modern world. 
Islam has covered the commercial and civil laws in order to maintain peace and order based on 
justice and respect for the obligations arising from contracts; the Qur’an, however, does not 
discuss commercial and civil matters in detail, but rather gives general principles that may be 
applied in every place and time. When one of the Prophet's companions asked him about non-
religious matters, the Prophet said, ‘You know better about your civil non-religious matters’.102 
Saudi Arabia is a monarchy. The King is the religious leader, ‘Imam’, and he is the source of 
political power in the country (Hokum). The power and duties of the King are defined in Islamic 
law.
103
 Importantly, the King serves for the good of the people, and he has been given full 
authority to issue or approve any law provided it does not contradict Islamic law. Moreover, a 
Council of Ministers, presided over by the King, was established in 1953. This Council possesses 
both legislative and executive powers in the Kingdom.
104
 The Council of Ministers is responsible 
for controlling all the government's affairs, such as economic, legal, industrial, and regional 
policies. On March 1, 1992, King Fahad bin Abdulaziz issued a series of Royal Decrees 
establishing a constitution for the country. One decree establishes the basic system of the 
government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
105
 whilst another decree provides for the creation 
of a 150-member Consultative Council (Majlis Al-Shura), which has the power to review the 
government's regulations and policies.
106
 
The influence of the Shari'ah in Saudi Arabia has been apparent since the formulation of Islamic 
jurisprudence in the 8
th
 Century. In Saudi Arabia, the dominance of Islamic law is indisputable; 
thus, some have claimed that Saudi Arabia is the only country ‘which bases its legal system on 
pure Shari'ah and practises it in its entirety. It is true to say that Shari'ah is the main source of law 
in Saudi Arabia, but there are other sources, i.e., a parallel body of secular State Regulations 
(nizam) issued by Royal Decree as well as custom and practice.' Markedly, 31 Certain decrees, 
rules and regulations have been promulgated in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the last four 
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decades. With great effort, the Kingdom has built its own legal system and a modern structure of 
government. 
 
2.9.2  Legal Judiciary System (General Guardianship) 
 
Saudi law is based on Shari’ah (Islamic) law, a judicial system is based on Islamic law (Shari’ah) 
for both criminal and civil cases. Moreover, the courts apply the laws issued by government, but 
the laws must not contradict Islamic law. The basic law states, ‘The courts will apply the rules of 
the Islamic Shari'ah in the cases that are brought before them, in accordance with what is 
indicated in the Book and the Sunnah, and statutes decreed by the Ruler which do not contradict 
the Book or the Sunnah’.107 
The original principle is that Shari'ah courts are the sole judicial authority in all cases; the courts 
enjoy a general jurisdiction to try all cases, except those exempt by law. The law of the judiciary 
declares ‘…Courts shall have jurisdiction to decide with respect to all cases according to rules 
for the jurisdiction of courts forth in the Law of Procedure before Shari’ah Courts and Law of 
Criminal Procedures’. 108 When looking at the Law of Procedure before Shari’ah Courts and the 
Law of Criminal Procedures, we find that such laws define the jurisdiction of the courts in a 
number of types of case, although there are cases not identified. This has created some kind of 
conflict between the courts as well as with the Judicial Committees. Regardless, however, there 
is now the re-drafting of these laws in order to comply with the new law of the judiciary.
109
 It is 
considered that the re-drafting may deal with the problem. 
The legal judiciary system is considered the normal judicial system dealing with all types of 
dispute occurring within the country. The Law of the Judiciary 1975
110
 declares in Article 5 that 
Shari'ah Courts consist of the following:
111
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1- The Supreme Judicial Council. 
2- The appellate Courts 
3- The General Courts 
4- The Summary Courts. 
Each court has its own field of specialty according to the system of organisation. The law of 
judiciary in Saudi Arabia was issued in 1975, but is no longer valid for work in this time because 
of the inadequacy to deal with new cases and the criticisms it faced, such as it did not include 
three degrees of litigation. There are courts of first instance and the Court of Appellate, but in 
fact the court of appellate in Saudi Arabia is considered as a court of cassation, the parties did 
not appear before the court of appellate. Also, in 2005, Saudi Arabia became a fully-fledged 
member of World Trade Organisation (WTO), and in 2007, King Abdullah issued royal decrees 
to reform of the judiciary, including a new law of the judiciary that aims to reform the judiciary 
system and provide for an improved two-degree appeals process. This is being implemented in 
stages during the next few years; however, the stages have not yet been implemented as the 
government planned.  
The new Law of the Judiciary organises the Court System in the following hierarchical structure, 
notably in descending order:  
1. Supreme Court 
2. Courts of Appeals; and, 
3. Courts of First Instance, which are composed of: 
a. General Courts; 
b. Criminal Courts; 
c. Personal Status Courts; 
d. Commercial Courts; and 
e. Labour Court 
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1. The Supreme Court  
The Supreme Court in Saudi Arabia came as the highest authority in the judicial system instead 
of Supreme Judicial Council's main function. The Supreme Court has several legislative, 
consultative, and judicial roles. In addition to the function set forth by the Laws of Procedures, 
before Shari'ah Courts and the Law of Criminal Procedure, the Court will supervise the 
implementation of Islamic law and regulations enacted by the King, which are consistent with 
the issues that fall within the general jurisdiction of the judiciary.
112
 The Supreme Court will 
review rulings issued or upheld by the Courts of Appeals, including those relating to cases 
punishable by death and other certain major crimes. In addition, the Supreme Court will review 
judgments and decisions issued or supported by the Courts of Appeals on matters not mentioned 
previously.
113
 These include questions of law or questions of procedure—not questions of fact—
if the objections to judgments are based on:
114
 
1. A violation of the of Islamic Shari'ah provisions and regulations issued by the King that 
does not contradict with Shari'ah rules; 
2. Entry of judgment from a Court not properly constituted as provided for by the Law of 
the Judiciary and other regulations; 
3. Entry of judgment from an incompetent Court or Circuit Court; and 
4. Fault in the framing of an incident, or impropriety in its description of said case. 
In the current time, the Supreme Court does not take its new jurisdiction, but still performs the 
judicial function of The Supreme Judicial Council in the old law, consequent of the delay in 
implementation of judiciary reform plan.   
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2. Court of Appeal 
The new reforms announced by King Abdullah are aimed at introducing safeguards, such as 
Courts of Appeal, which can overturn decisions by lower courts. The new law established Courts 
of Appeals in each of the Kingdom's provinces. Each court comprises function through 
specialised circuits, made up of three three-judge panels, except for the Criminal Circuit, which 
reviews judgments involving certain major crimes, including those that bear the death sentence. 
It is composed of five judge panels.
115
 Courts of Appeal comprise the following circuits: 1- 
Labour Circuits, 2- Commercial Circuits, 3- Criminal Circuits, 4- Personal Status Circuits, and 5- 
Civil Circuits. Importantly, it will also be possible to establish specialised Appeals Circuits in the 
counties of each province where a Court of Appeal is established. The Court of Appeals are 
known to hear appealable decisions from lower courts; they render their judgment after hearing 
the litigants' arguments in accordance with the Law of Procedure before Shari'ah Courts and the 
Law of Criminal Procedure.
116
 
 
 
 
3. The Courts of First Instance 
The new Law of Judiciary established new courts of first instance in Saudi Arabia’s provinces, 
counties, and districts in accordance to the needs of the system. The courts of first instance 
consist of the following courts:
117
 
a. General Courts 
b. Criminal Courts 
c. Commercial Courts 
d. Labour Courts 
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e. Personal Status Court. 
General Courts are established in provinces, and consist of specialised circuits including 
Implementation and Approval Circuits, and Traffic Cases Circuits. General Courts are composed 
of one- or three-judge panels, as specified by the Supreme of Judicial Council. The Criminal 
Courts consist of the following specialised circuits: Qisas (Retaliatory Punishment) Cases 
Circuits, Hudud Cases Circuits (Prescribed Punishment), Ta'zir (Discretionary Punishment) 
Cases Circuits, and Juvenile Cases Circuits. The Criminal Courts are composed of a three-judge 
panel. Other cases (offences) specified by the Supreme of Judicial Council will be heard by one 
judge. Other Personal Status, Commercial, and Labour Courts will consist of specialised circuits, 
as needed, and are composed of one or more judges as specified by the Supreme of Judicial 
Council.
118
 
There has been the criticism of the judicial system in Saudi Arabia, with the point raised that 
there are types of dispute falling under the jurisdiction of specialised huge numbers of 
committees for the settlement of disputes.
119
 The special committees have been created to 
implement the law outside the judicial branch. The committees fall under different Ministries or 
Administrative departments, such as the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Ministry of 
Business, Ministry of Information, or Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. The members of the 
committees do not subject to judges’ appointment conditions or qualifications. Chief Judge 
Nasser Al Dawood,
120
 for example, thinks that the commissions in the current situation will lead 
to the dispersing of judiciary in Saudi Arabia. Importantly, he has called for the incorporation of 
these jurisdictions into The Ministry of Justice. In actual fact, it is true to state that the huge of 
numbers of committees or commissions for dispute settlements are unacceptable in the current 
time, and effect justice in Saudi Arabia; they create a conflict between the principles. However, 
more recently, the Saudi Arabian government has enacted a new judiciary law aiming to reform 
the judiciary system with the plan to be implemented several stages,
121
 one of which is concerned 
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with transferring the jurisdictions of the committees to the courts; however, there is delay in the 
application of the plan.  
In Saudi Arabia, there is no concept of judicial precedent in many cases, which means that the 
decisions of a court or a judicial committee have no binding authority with respect to another 
case. In general, there is also no system of court reporting in the Kingdom, and there are also no 
publishing of judgements. Thus, often, it is not possible to reach a conclusion on the way in 
which a Saudi court or judicial committee would view a particular case. Even though the 
Ministry of Justice in Saudi Arabia recently began to publish cases, that does not meet the 
standards of cases published in other legal systems in the world as there are only a small number 
of selected of cases, which will not soundly reflect judicial principals.
122
   
 
2.9.4  Administrative Judicial System (Board of Grievances) 
 
As mentioned previously, the Saudi Judicial system adheres to Islamic law, and dealing with 
grievances was conducted in the time of the prophet and Muslim rulers who came after prophet. 
Historically, the purpose of the Grievance Board (Diwan al-Mazalem) was to deal with disputes 
between individuals or citizens and administrators. In the early days of Islamic law, disputes 
were settled by the caliph (ruler), or later by his appointees. In the book al-A hkcain al-
Sultaniyya,
123
 by Al-Mawardi, the differences between the ordinary judges and the Grievance 
Board members (inazaliin or nazir al-mazalim), who were not actually called judges, were 
highlighted.  
Scholars have found it difficult to define the nature of the Grievance Board. Is it an executive or 
a judicial body? If it is judicial, is it a regular court, an equity court, an administrative court, an 
appellate court, or some combination? Some scholars see it as a judicial body; some see it as an 
administrative tribunal that existed long before the modern French administrative court system; 
and some go as far to assert that Islamic law was, in fact, the precedent for the French 
administrative judicial system. However, at the present time in Saudi Arabia, the Grievance of 
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Board is considered an administrative court according to new Law of Grievance Board.
124
 The 
Board of Grievances Law organises the Board according to the following hierarchical 
structure:
125
  
 High Administrative Court 
 Administrative Courts of Appeals; and,  
 Administrative Courts  
The new law establishes one or more Administrative Courts. Each court will function through 
specialised circuits, such as Administrative Circuits, Employment, and Disciplinary Circuits, and 
Subsidiary Circuits, and will be composed of either a one- or three-judge panel. The 
Administrative Courts will have jurisdiction to decide the following:
126
 
a. Cases related to the rights provided for in the Civil and Military Service and Pension 
Laws for government employees and hired hands, and independent public entities and 
their heirs and claimants;  
b. Cases of objection filed by parties concerned by administrative decisions, where the 
reason for such an objection is lack of jurisdiction, a deficiency in form, a violation or 
erroneous application or interpretation of laws and regulations, or abuse of authority. The 
rejection or refusal of an administrative authority to take a decision that it should have 
taken pursuant to laws and regulations is considered to be an administrative decision; 
c. Cases of compensation filed by parties concerned against the government and 
independent public corporate entities resulting from their actions; 
 
d. Cases filed by parties regarding contract-related disputes where the government or an 
independent public corporate entity is a party; 
e. Disciplinary cases filed by the Bureau of Control and Investigation;  
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f. Other Administrative Disputes; and, 
g. Requests for implementation of foreign judgments. 
The Board of Grievances Law also comprises a restructuring and rearrangement of its courts and 
their jurisdiction in an aspect that maintains dedication of the Board to its duty as mainly an 
administrative judiciary relieved of the burden of commercial and penal cases. 
Manpower is the focus of the development process for the judiciary, and the essential means for 
its development; therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to the selection, qualification, training, 
monitoring, and encouragement of its personnel. Furthermore, it must benefit from experts in 
business, labour, and banking regulations, as well as other specialised fields working in the 
judiciary.
127
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                                      Chapter Three 
              The Theory of Contract Law in Islamic Law 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The essential principles at the root of all commercial operations and trade transaction in any legal 
system—not just Islamic law—are the regulations of the principles governing the law of contract 
and the regulations of obligations arising wherefrom. 
Unlike English contract law, which is very much based upon general legal theory and doctrines, 
contract law within Islamic Law tends to be highly specialised in that different sets of rules have 
been developed in order to regulate different types of agreement. As Saudi Legal explains, ‘The 
Islamic Law texts do not set out an all-embracing theory of contract law which applies to all 
types of contracts. Rather, the texts deal with certain contracts, such as sales, hire, loans, agency 
and guarantees, in individual chapters. Accordingly, certain rules which apply, for example, to 
contracts of sale do not necessarily apply to guarantees, and vice versa’.1 Whilst the various 
schools of Islamic Law, in the main, share their principles of contract law, different schools have 
nevertheless developed their own nuances and idiosyncrasies. Islamic contract law has won legal 
principles that are not known to many of the specialists in the law, particularly in English law. It 
is the purpose of this presents the chapter to explore these nuances through a critical analysis of 
the approach of Islamic law to the validation and enforcement of contractual agreements and 
before discuss the frustration of contract we have to write about the theory of contract in Islamic 
law to let the reader especially the English and western readers know and understand the 
principals of Islamic contract law to understand principals of frustration of contract.  
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3.2  The Definition and Concept of the Contract under Islamic Law 
 
It has been argued in the academic literature that, up until the 19
th
 Century, no definition of the 
term ‘contract’ could be found in any treatise on Islamic law2. In part, the reason for this is that 
Islamic jurisprudence is not dogmatic; as noted previously, principles are preferred to general 
theories, and definitions therefore tend to rely on general theories
3
. The definitions of contract 
came under the contract of sale, or when scholars write about a sale of goods, although it remains 
that there is no legal theory of contract in old traditional Islamic law; however, in some old 
Islamic law books, definitions of contract may be seen as separated from a sale contract
4
. The 
word contract is aqd which, literally translated, means the tying together of two or more things 
by rope
5
.  
In Islamic legal literature, a contract is used in two senses
6
. The first is in a general sense, where 
the contract is applied to every act undertaken in earnestness, and with firm determination—
regardless of whether or not it emerges from a unilateral intention such as trust, remission of 
debts, and grivet. Importantly, the word is used not only to refer to covenants, but also to refer to 
oaths and other types of promise, such as marriage vows
7
. Furthermore, the term is also 
referenced in the Quran to refer to personal obligations
8
. The second, in a specific sense, results 
from a mutual agreement, such as sale, hire, and agency. It is pertinent to note that modern 
Muslim scholars are inclined to apply the contract to bilateral contracts as is the case in English 
law
9
.  
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There are many Quranic verses that regulate the principles of contract through different terms, 
such as ‘contract’, ‘covenant’ and ‘promise’, with such verses supporting the opinion that a 
contract involves all aspects of life, including faith and obligations. For example: 
‘Oye who believe fulfil the contractual obligations’10, ‘and fulfil you covenant with me and 
as I fulfil my covenant with you’,11 and, ‘and they who keep their promises whenever they 
promise’12. 
The closest thing to a general definition for a contract, within the context of Islamic law, are 
those conceptions that have been proffered respectively by the Maliki School, Hanbali School, 
Hanafi School and Shafi’i School—schools of Islamic jurisprudence—in an attempt to explain 
the sale of goods contract. The emerging definitions of these four schools each revolve around 
the idea of valuable property being exchanged between two persons: within the Hanafi School, 
for example, a sale of goods contract is through the exchange of one coveted article for another 
coveted article by words or by deed
13
; within the Hanbali School, a sale of goods contract is seen 
as a mechanism for exchanging possession in physical property. Under this conception, one party 
relinquishes the possession of an item of property to another in exchange for the other party 
relinquishing the possession of another item of property
14
. 
There are indeed other meanings of the term afforded by different scholars: for example, the 
contract is defined as a legally binding agreement between two or more parties in which, for a 
consideration, one or more parties agrees to do something. However, Ibn Qudamah provides a 
slightly different definition to a sales contract, which is referenced as an exchange of a property 
against another property, conferring and producing possessions
15
. In Islamic modern law, there 
are numerous definitions taken from classical Islamic jurisprudence and modern law, such as 
through Alsanhury, where the term contract is noted as being, ‘a connection of an offer 
emanating from one parties with the acceptance of the other party in a manner which marks its 
effect on the subject matter of the contract’16. 
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The above meanings make it clear that a contract includes two parties in Islamic law; the contract 
aqd is usually used for two parties’ transactions, by offer from one party and acceptance from the 
other. However, it is also used for guarantees and gifts concluded by an offer only. There must 
be a legal union between the two declarations regarding the subject matter or the contractual 
obligations
17
.   
 
3.3 The Development of Contract Law under Islamic Law 
 
The principal role of Islamic contract law is not to build a new system of commercial contract 
law but to re-evaluate or approve existing institutions of contractual obligations laws, either 
completely or partially. Before Islam, Quraish
18
 used to engage in trade, and Makkah was a 
commercial city. Quraish had journeys by winter to Yemen and summer to Syria, as is 
proclaimed in the Quran
19
. Many Arabs had to obtain their livings from selling camels, horses, 
cattle and sheep, whilst the rest worked in commerce, their caravans set out around commercial 
cities in their countries. The Jews of Madinah held the leading position as far as trade and 
commerce, and carried out transactions contracts with Arabs living in Madinah. The practice of 
contract has been popular amongst Arabs since the pre-Islamic era, during which time 
commercial transactions existed as a sale of goods contract, a partnership contract, and contract 
of mortgage
20
. Many contracts in the period were not written, although some important contracts 
were. 
In Makkah and Madinah during the pre-Islamic period, there were certain customary commercial 
and agricultural contracts enforced through law by businessmen amongst themselves, and a 
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number of legal procedures for loans with interest contracts. Some laws were issued in Makkah 
by Dar al-Nadwah (Grand Council), although its authority was purely moral
21
. 
Following the rise of Islam, Arabs continued their commercial and business transactions. It has 
been argued in the academic literature that, as opposed to being characterised by general theories 
of contracts, Islamic contract law is characterised, conceptually, by general principles of law
22
. 
Such principles commonly take the form of legal maxims or detailed statements surrounding the 
specific goals and objectives of Sharia law. Whilst some of these maxims are derived directly 
from the Quran or from other primary Islamic texts, others are derived from the writings of 
eminent jurists and Islamic scholars. As Kamili explains, ‘The fiqh [the discipline of studying 
law as a science] has generally been developed by individual jurists in relation to particular 
themes and issues in the course of history… The actual wordings of the maxims are occasionally 
taken from the Quran or Ahadith but are more often the work of leading jurists and that have 
subsequently been refined by others throughout the ages’23. Importantly, there were Quranic 
injunctions, guiding Muslims to behave in trustworthy ways; these were consolidations with a 
supplement number of the prophet Hadiths, acting either as explanations or as new injunctions 
about contracts. Both types of injunction have been interpreted under schools of law. Such 
schools did not discuss the rules of contract as a separate body of law, but rather through certain 
nominated contracts, such as the contract of sale, the contract of company, or the contract of 
hiring.  
The majority of Muslim jurists have focused on the contract of sale when discussing the rules of 
contract. It is very fair to state that, although the scholars do not focus their work on establishing 
a general theory of contract, by analysing their great work in nominate contracts, however, it 
seems that they are fully aware of the basic concept of contracting. The evidence shows that, in 
almost all of their treaties, they have presented the discussion on every nominate contract in a 
standard form, which covers, inter alia: 
1. the discussion on the contracting parties, 
2. the discussion on the doctrine of offer and acceptance, and 
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3. the discussion on the subject matter of the contract. 
Various attempts were made by Ibn Taymiyya to generate theory of contract in the 13
th
 Century, 
who separated rules of contract and contract stipulations, discussing them separately from the 
contract of sale, although it was not full theory; it was the first attempt
24
. Nevertheless, the first 
Islamic theory of contract as a theory in modern-day law took place in the 19
th
 century, during 
which time the Ottoman’s Majallah Al-hkam Al-adliyyah was published by Hanafi scholars in 
Turkey. Murshid Al-Hayran’s Egyptian version of the Ottoman’s Majallah considered Islamic 
civil law, including the contract theory, with Muslim jurists subsequently starting to develop a 
general theory of contract and writing text books on the subject
25
; this is believed to have been 
owing to the influence of modern law—particularly Western laws, although money of new 
Islamic contract theory books still refers to the rules of contract of sale as a prototype and 
analogy for all other contracts. 
 
3.4  Freedom of Contract under Islamic Law
26
 
 
The concept of freedom of contract is not given much attention in the classical Islamic law 
books, either as diverse principles or as separate doctrine, although the freedom of contract 
operates. The main question that gives rise to controversy in this context is whether or not 
contracts are presumed to be lawful in the absence of a specific prohibition to the contrary, or 
indeed whether they are presumed to be unlawful unless provided for by Islamic law. With this 
in mind, there is consideration towards whether one may create a new contract or add to or vary 
the terms prescribed by Islamic law. In Islamic law, there is argument in this. Zahiri School
27
 
sees that only contracts expressly provided for by the primary texts of Islam can be deemed 
valid, as all other types of contract purport to change the divine legal status of things, without the 
affirmative authority of Islam. This opinion is seen to oppose any freedom of contracts or terms, 
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and thereby annuls any new form of contract and terms besides those nominate contracts and 
established stipulations in the Islamic law of contract. 
Another school
28
 of Islamic law takes the opposite view and rejects the narrow view, believing 
that all contracts are lawful unless they are specifically prohibited by the Quran, or another 
Islamic source, according to the view parties are free to make transactions outside the scope of 
the nominate contracts established by early jurists, and are therefore also able to enforce 
stipulations that are not mentioned in the Quran and the Sunnah. Ibn Taymiyya strongly supports 
the opinion, writing, ‘The general principal in contracts and stipulations is permissibility and 
validity. Any contract or stipulation is valid unless there is an explicitly text from the Quran, the 
Sunnah, the consensus or analogy proving its prohibition and voiding’29.  
The first opinion
30
 relies on the Prophet’s view that, ‘Every stipulation which is not in the book 
of Allah is void, even if it be one hundred stipulations’31. In actual fact, the majority of jurists 
understand the Prophet’s statement as denoting every contract or condition that is contrary to the 
Quran and traditions of the Prophet, rather than being a blanket rejection of every contract or 
terms not cited by such texts. The statement relates to any contract and stipulation prohibited by 
Islamic rules; thus, this saying, in essence, does not limit the liberty of the general Islamic 
principles. Moreover, the Prophet highlights that ‘Muslims are bound by their stipulations except 
for a stipulation which makes the unlawful lawful or makes the lawful unlawful’32. Such a 
viewpoint provides parties with the capacity to put forward any stipulations in any contract, 
stating that parties shall be permitted to carry out all the transactions they need if they do not 
conflict with Islamic law
33
.  
The term ‘freedom of contract’, in many respects, means the same thing under Sharia law as it 
does under English law, namely that parties are free to choose their own terms and conditions of 
contract, and that the law will rarely intervene to frustrate a lawful contract that has been formed 
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consensually between two parties with sufficient capacity to contract
34
. Both doctrines are 
subject to the perceived need to protect weak parties from the superior bargaining strengths of 
their counterparts.  
Within the context of Islamic law—where one party coerces another into entering into a 
contract—the contract is deemed unlawful; this is owing to the fact that coercion upsets the 
balance of equality between the parties, and accordingly stifles the operation of the principle of 
liberality upon which Islamic contract law is based.  
Under Islamic law, this interference with freedom of contract is not limited to cases where one of 
the parties exerts undue influence or duress upon the other; it applies equally to contracts that 
have been concluded by innocent or inexperienced parties or where there has been a 
misrepresentation by the more experienced party. This aspect of Islamic contract law is generally 
interpreted in the same way by the main schools of Islamic jurisprudence; as MacCormack 
writes, ‘The Maliki and Hanafi schools [both] believe a contract is void if one of the parties is 
inexperienced or innocent and there also needs to be misrepresentation or disproportionate 
obligations. In the Shafi’i and Hanbali schools, the obligations must be grossly disproportionate 
and there must also be fraud
35.’ 
Where this conception of freedom of contract differs substantially from English notions, the 
doctrine is in relation to the freedom of parties to choose applicable law; in the West, it is 
commonly accepted that contracting parties should be free to choose for themselves which laws 
regulate their agreement and which Courts or arbitrators preside over any dispute that arises; 
under Islamic law, the parties to a contract are neither entitled to select an alternative applicable 
law to govern their agreements nor entitled to nominate the Courts of another jurisdiction to 
preside over their disputes; Islamic law applies to all Muslims, irrespective of the terms and 
conditions of their private contracts. This is a point that appears to be routinely misunderstood. 
The academic literature is rife with sources that allege that freedom of contract, under Islamic 
law, includes the freedom to choose applicable law and jurisdiction. As Atai writes, ‘Islam 
recognises the concept of freedom of contract therefore the parties can choose Sharia principles 
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as the governing law of the contract. They can also choose the jurisdiction of the courts of a 
designated country as the forum for resolving disputes between the contracting parties. However, 
the application of Islamic principles by the selected forum depends on the laws of the country in 
which the enforcement is sought.
36’ 
Saud courts recognise the validity of the freedom of parties to choose applicable law. The courts 
in Saudi Arabia
37
 refuse to hear any case relating to dispute in contracts that include choice of 
applicable law or arbitration agreement because the case is out of the jurisdiction of the court. 
The case surrounding dispute a between a Saudi company and a Swedish company was owing to 
the supplementary contract appended to the main contract: as the main one has an arbitration 
agreement, a commercial court ruled to refuse to hear the disputes relating to the supplementary 
contact as there is an arbitration agreement in the main contract.
38
 Another case was concerned 
with a dispute between Saudi company and a British company, with such an agreement for 
arbitration before the London Chamber of Commerce. The Commercial Court of Appeal refused 
to hear the case before Saudi courts as there was agreement between the parties to choose 
another law
39
. 
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3.5  Formation of Contract  
 
Under Islamic law, a contract is recognised as valid if the elements of the contract are fulfilled
40
. 
A valid contract can be formed if there are the elements laid down in Islamic law, and which 
must exist in order for the contract to be considered lawful. The majority of Muslim jurists hold 
that the essential elements of a contract are threefold: the formation (offer, acceptance), subject 
matter, and parties. Hanafi jurists hold that there is only one element of a contract, namely the 
formation. This, however, implies the existence of other elements. From a practical point of 
view, there is no difference between the opinion of the Hanafi jurists and that of majority
41
.  
In Islamic law, the notion that agreement depends on the mutual assent of parties finds 
expression in the Quran in various traditions attributed to the Prophet. The verse of the Quern 
reads, ‘O ye who believe squander not your wealth among yourselves in vanity, except it be a 
trade by mutual consent’.42 The formation is required in order to establish whether or not two 
contracting parties really intend to create a contract. It is necessary to consider the declared 
intention of the parties or its kernel objective rather than any hidden ones. The consent of the two 
contracting parties is the main element in the conclusion of the contract; thus, without such 
formation, the contract will not come into existence as the intention and consent will remain 
concealed. As with other contracts, the parties must give their consent free of the impediment of 
fraud, duress, misrepresentation or mistake
43
. The formation of contract is an expression 
comprising two essential elements: offer Ijab and acceptance qabu. Both are normally made in 
the same meeting majils al 'aqd between the contracting parties
44
. 
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3.5.1 Offer Ijab and acceptance Qabul 
 
Whilst the Islamic doctrine of offer and acceptance is very similar in several key respects to the 
doctrine of offer and acceptance that prevails in English law, it has been argued in Islamic law 
that offer and acceptance play a more important role in the Islamic than in the common law of 
contract
45
; this is the same for all four schools of Islamic jurisprudence, as noted by Nasir: ‘The 
Hanbali, Shafi’i and Maliki’s also insist on both offer and acceptance, on the ground that no 
ownership of property can be transferred to and become binding on another person without the 
latter’s acceptance’46. 
Under Islamic contract law, once an offer has been made by one party, it must be accepted by 
another in order for a legally binding agreement to be deemed constituted. Acceptance must be 
effective in that it must actually be communicated to the offeree. Again, this view is supported 
by all four schools of Islamic jurisprudence. As Jalil and Rahman argue, ‘An acceptance must be 
communicated to the offeree to form an effective acceptance. The communication of acceptance 
is complete the moment it comes to the knowledge of the offeree. If the acceptance does not 
come to the knowledge of the offeree, it would not be an effective acceptance and no contract 
will be formed. This is the majority view of the classical Muslim jurists who are also of the 
opinion that when an offer is made to a person who is not present near the offeror, the Majlis
47
 
meeting will continue until the offeree receives the offer. For example, if the offer is sent by a 
letter through the post office, the Majlis will continue until the offeree receives the letter and he 
will be given some time to accept the offer, but not for long’48. 
In Islamic offer and acceptance doctrine, the offer and acceptance must be provided at the same 
time, within the same meeting. If an offer is made by one party to another at a meeting and 
acceptance is not provided during that same meeting, the offer is then deemed void within Sharia 
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law
49
. Whilst there are a number of minor differences of opinion between the four main schools 
of jurisprudence on this issue, their respective approaches are substantially identical
50
.  
This aspect of Islamic contract law has been criticised heavily for forcing Muslim businessmen 
to enter into contracts without being given proper time to reflect or the time they need to finalise 
the terms and price of their contracts. As Jalil & Rahman argue, ‘In a commercial contract 
sometimes extra time is needed to finalize the terms of the contract and to fix suitable price 
through bargaining. The requirement of simultaneous offer and acceptance at the same Majlis 
(meeting), thus, creates some problems to a business transaction in terms of making a wise 
decision in a time frame constraint. It is therefore highly recommended that the Muslim scholars 
should view the ridiculously time constraint concept of acceptance of offer in the same Majlis 
whereby if the offeree fails to accept the offer in the same Majlis (meeting) in the time allocated, 
the offer will automatically become void and unenforceable once the time limit has lapsed. This 
legal anomaly should be reviewed for the interest of legitimate execution of business transactions 
in the Muslim community currently prevailing when business has exponentially expanded.
51’ In 
the opinion of the author, this argument is over-stated; there is nothing preventing businessmen 
from preparing their contracts over an extended period of time and then, when they are ready, 
concluding their contract at a single meeting; after all, if key terms—such as price—have not yet 
been agreed, it cannot sensibly be argued that a firm offer to contract has been made. In many 
respects, this rule has the same effect as the rule against the imposition of a duty to negotiate in 
good faith; until the contract is signed or a handshake is procured, either party should be free to 
walk away from the prospective deal. That is simply a risk of doing business, and one which 
does not seem to have prevented Muslim men, thus far, from successfully partaking in business 
activities
52
. 
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3.5.2  Formation Phrases 
 
Contracts under Islamic law may be concluded in writing, verbally, or by conduct. As Ramadan 
explains, ‘Islamic contract law recognized both express contracts as well as what has been 
described in common law as contract by conduct. It presupposes the making of an offer either 
orally or by writing or by conduct’53. This author was unable to establish any evidence of 
significant divergences between the various schools of Islamic jurisprudence on this issue, 
despite there being an extensive search of the relevant academic literature on Islamic contract 
law.  
Whilst it is customary for certain words and phrases to be used when concluding a contractual 
agreement, generally speaking, there are no special formalities required of contracting parties
54
; 
however, formality rules apply to certain types of contract, such as the marriage contract
55
; 
therefore, it is not true to state that formation phrases are optional for all types of contract.  
 
3.5.2.1 Verbal:  
 
There is no dispute amongst jurists in regard to the conclusion of contract through words. The 
reason for this is that words are recognised as the basis of all kinds of expression, and other 
things can only take their place in cases of necessity. A basic rule in the context of Islamic law, 
however, is that the basis to be considered in contract is the meaning, and not words and forms. 
It is for this reason that jurists do not affix particular words to the formation of particular 
contracts. Wording should be clear so that the other party can easily understand them. 
Accordingly, any comprehensible phrase referring to the meaning of formation of contract can be 
considered. Also, any language—whether standard, local or even slang—understood by all 
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parties is permitted. If in the case that one of the parties speaks in a language not understood by 
another party, it must be interpreted
56
. 
Muslim jurisprudents have agreed that the contract formation should, by both parties, be 
expressed in the past tense. The first party may say, ‘I sold you my car’, the second party may 
say, ‘I bought’; the expression in past tense is the clearest phrase. There is no agreement between 
scholars on the use of another tense, such as the present, indicative, or the imperative. The 
majority of scholars believe they could be used if there is an indication of the intent barring any 
other possibility of intending a different contract; meaning the intention of the parties is quite 
clear
57
. 
According to Islamic law, in the case where parties are in the presence of each other, it is not 
acceptable that an offer is made in one place and acceptance is made in a different place. 
Consequently, in order for a contract to be legal, the offer and acceptance must be communicated 
at the same place where the parties stay together. For example, when one party meets another 
one in a place, such as the place of market, and offers his house for a certain price, but the other 
party has not issued the offer until both parties have separated from the place, in this case, unless 
it is agreed that the proposal be extended for a longer time, there would be no legal conclusion of 
the contract
58
. 
In Islamic law, contracts are conducted where parties are at a distance from each other. This can 
be classified, in a legal sense, as contracting between absentees. Hence, in such a contract, the 
offering party offers his proposal in one place, and the receiving party receives it at a different 
site. Contracting between absentees is a contract that is concluded between two contracting 
parties who are not gathered in one location. Islamic jurists provide an example of oral 
communication between contractual parties through a messenger. With this noted, it can be seen 
that when the parties are contracting in the presence of each other, the meeting place is the place 
at which the offer is made. When parties are contracting inter absents, the meeting place is the 
place at which the offer is communicated. This conclusion is justified by stating that the 
messenger is only a conduit pipe for conveying the words of the offeror. Thus, the position is the 
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same as if the offeror himself is present at the meeting place. Moreover, in the case of the 
formation of contract by telephone, the parties are absent from meeting place, but they have 
implemented communication by telephone at the same time.  
 
3.5.2.2 Writing:  
 
When parties are not contracting in the presence of each other, they can generate a contact 
through writing a letter sent by the offeror to the offeree. Notably, the words need to be clear and 
include the pivotal elements of the offer, and should be understood by both parties. An actual 
unity of the meeting place is not conceivable. Consequently, the offeree has to declare his 
acceptance in the very place where the offer was communicated to him.  
Some Shafi jurists have opposed the opinion maintaining that the one who is capable of 
contracting through verbal communication must not use writing as opposed to speech. According 
to these jurists, a contract in writing is permitted just for the person who is not capable of 
speaking
59
. 
There is an important issue for considering in terms of writing a contract, as discussed above, 
which is the formation of the contract. If we consider the opinions of the jurists of different 
schools of Islamic law, it can be seen that there is a large number of different opinions 
surrounding the formation of the contract, but none require the traditional written and signed 
agreement as a requisite for the validity of the contract.
60
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3.5.2.3  Gesture or Sign: 
 
All four schools allow a party who cannot speak—deaf and/or dumb persons—to contract 
through signing because verbal expression should be impossible if one of the parties is deaf or 
dumb. The intention of contractual parties is to be conveyed by signs. Signs must be clear and 
understood by all the parties. However, the Hanafi School and Shafi School are of the opinion 
that the formation of contracts through signs is not a way of interpreting the intention of parties, 
but it is considered as an interpretation of the intention of a party who is naturally unable to 
speak or to write. Thus, a party who is able to speak is not permitted to use a sign to interpret his 
intentions as spoken words and writing serve a more powerful form of expression of willingness 
than signs
61
. 
The Maliki School and Hanbali School permit the usage of signs, even if parties are able to speak 
or write, simply because they consider this to be a valid form of contract, which has the capacity 
to fully reflect the consent and intention of parties involved in the transaction as instrumental to 
expressing the will of contracting parties. The formation of a contract reveals the consent of 
parties to generate a specific contract
62
. 
 
3.5.2.4 Acts: 
 
This is termed as almuatah in Islamic law, which occurs by taking certain goods and giving the 
required money. For example, a seller may say to a buyer, ‘I sold you this food for £50’; the 
buyer puts the money on the desk and picks up the food. In Islamic law, the majority of jurists 
allow this form of concluding a contract; some of them are of the view that, in order to form a 
contract through conduct or act, it is necessary that the subject matter must be of a small value—
not expensive, such as a house, land, or gold
63
; nevertheless, Maliki and Hanbali jurists, even in 
the case of expansive subject matter, permit this. Shafi jurists do not allow the formation of 
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contracts by actions. If research is carried out amongst books, including information about the 
formation of contracts, it can be seen that the aim of formation of contract in Islamic law is the 
form indicting to the intention of the parties to conclude the contract; thus, the exchange of 
goods between two parties without any written document or signature, or the exchange of spoken 
words of offer and acceptance, are considered adequate for formation. Moreover, silence can be 
considered a valid tool of expression of the parties’ will if the circumstances of the case reflect 
that the silence of the party receiving an offer or goods can clearly refer to acceptance of the 
deal
64
.  
 
2.6  Classification of Contract under Islamic Law 
 
At the highest level, contracts under Islamic law can be divided into two categories: those 
contracts resulting from bilateral agreement, and those resulting from a unilateral agreement. 
Contracts falling into the former of these two categories are legally binding because of the 
application of the principle of commutative justice; contracts falling into the latter are legally 
binding because of the application of the principle of liberality. The significance of maintaining 
this distinction is that unilateral contracts are not subject to the same set of rules as bilateral 
contracts, precisely owing to their differing bases. Bilateral contracts cover the remaining 
transactions in Islamic law, which can be further divided into different classifications according 
to the very purpose and reason behind the deal and agreement. In this regard, these contracts may 
be classified into six groups, as follows: 
1. Contracts of exchange ('uqud al-mu'awadat) 
2. Contracts of security ('uqud al tawthiqat) 
3. Contracts of partnership (shirkah) 
4. Contracts of safe custody (wadi'ah) 
5. Contracts pertaining to the utilisation of usufruct ('uqud al manfa'ah)  
6. Contracts pertaining to do a work (e.g. wakalah and ju'alah). 
This classification is not intended to be exhaustive as, in the future, many new contracts 
encompassing different features would possibly come to exist on the basis of the doctrine of 
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permissibility (ibahah), as discussed previously; this would render all commercial transactions 
permissible in the absence of a clear prohibition. Nevertheless, the above classification seems to 
be relatively comprehensive in terms of covering all existing contracts found in Islamic law 
books
65
. 
Mention should be made to the fact that each of these classifications comprises different 
transactions, but ultimately contributes to the same purpose and reason behind the underlying 
contract. For example, the contract of exchange will primarily concern trading as well as selling 
and buying activities, with the inclusive of their subdivisions, such as cash sale, deferred 
payment sale, deferred delivery sale, sale on order, sale on debt, sale on currency, auction sale, 
and so on and so forth. Similarly, other types of contract also include many sub-divisions 
relevant to respective classification. For example, the contract of security deals not only with 
surety ship (kafalah) but also with pledge (rahn) and the transfer of debt (hiwalah) as the very 
purpose of these sub-contracts under contracts of security is to protect the interests of the parties 
to a contract—particularly the interest of the party in whose favour the respective contracts are 
concluded. As far as contracts pertaining to the utilisation of usufruct are concerned, it also 
covers a few sub-contracts, such as ijarah (hire and lease) ariyah (loan of tangible asset), waqf 
(endowment), and qard (loan of money), etc. The contract of partnership (shirkah) also includes 
different types of partnership, namely mudarabah
66
, musharakah
67
, sharikah al-abdan 
(partnership by contributing effort and skill), sharikah al-wujuh (partnership based on credit and 
reliability), muzara'ah
68
 and musaqat
69
 (partnership in fruit trees)
70
. 
 
                                                          
65
 Mohd, Billah, Shariah Standard of Business contrct, ibid , p 73  
66
 Mudarabah is a contract for sharing the profit of a business in which party contributes with capital and other trade 
with it.   
67
Musharakah is joint enterprise formed for conducting some business in which all partners share the profit 
according to a specific ratio while the loss is shared according to the ratio of the contribution. It is an ideal 
alternative for the interest based financing with far reaching effects on both production and distribution. 
68
 Muzara`ah is a contract between two parties in which one agrees to allow his land to be used by the other in return 
for a part of the produce of the land. 
69
 Musaqat is a contract between two parties, by which it is agreed that the one shall deliver over to the other his 
fruit trees for a specified period of time, , on condition that the other shall take care of them, tends and waters them 
and whatever is produced shall belong to them both . 
70
 Islamic World, Contracts In Islamic Commercial And Their Application In Modern Islamic Financial System 
(Islamic World, 2002) [Online] <http://www.islamic-world.net/economics/contract_02.htm> accessed 2
nd
 May 
2011. 
86 
 
 
3.7  Effect of Prohibitions on the Contract 
 
Under Islamic law, there are various types of transaction forbidden by Sharia law, which makes 
contracts in Islamic law different to other contract law; this will affect contract law. Accordingly, 
it can be seen that there are various different types of contract in Islamic banking exclusive in 
Islamic law; occasionally, Islamic courts consider various types of contract void because Islamic 
law prohibits these contracts. 
Under this section, some types of contract are briefly discussed, including those prohibited in 
Islamic law. The scholars of Islamic law are almost unanimous about the prohibition of those 
contracts below, although there is not necessarily consensus surrounding the details of such 
contracts. 
 
3.7.1  Usury (riba) 
 
The original meaning of the word riba, in Arabic, is to increase, mount up, grow and rise. 
Technically, riba refers to an increase in the principal in the case of a loan transaction. 
Accordingly, anything chargeable, in addition to the principal amount as a contractual obligation, 
falls within the purview of riba, and is therefore prohibited. Muhammad Ala Thanwi defines 
riba in following words: ‘Riba is an increase without any corresponding consideration which has 
been stipulated in favour of one of the two parties, in a contract of exchange’71. In the Quran, this 
word is used several times to convey just such meanings. For example, in the following verses 
variations of the word riba have been used to connote the idea of growth and height: 
And among his signs, that you see the earth barren, but when We send down water (rain) to 
it, it is stirred to life and growth [Ar. rabat] (of vegetation) Verily, he who gives it life, 
surely is able to give life to the dead (on the day of resurrection). Indeed He is Able to do 
all things.’  
And in another verse,  
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‘And the likeness of those who spend their wealth seeking Allah's pleasure while they in 
their own selves are sure and certain that Allah will reward them (for their spending in his 
cause), is the likeness of a garden on a height [Ar. rabwa]
72
. 
Scholars agree that usury is prohibited in Islamic law, and is regarded as being one of the major 
sins in Islam; thus, it is not permitted to take it or pay it. In addition, it is not permitted that an 
individual be a witness of such a contract that includes usury. 
There are two types of riba. Riba AI Nasiah can be defined as the amount the lender receives 
from the borrower over and above the principal amount. It can be regarded as the interest that the 
borrower pays for the use of the lender's money. Riba Al-Nasiah is also known as Riba Al-
Quran, as has been mentioned specifically in the Quran. This is often referred to as Riba Al- 
Jahiliyah pre-Islam, for this was the type of riba most prevalent in Arabia and considered to be 
the most abusive form before it was prohibited by Islam. Riba AI-Nasiah may comprise of two 
different types of interest: simple interest, which is interest calculated only on the initial amount 
of investment Compound interest
73
. In this type of transaction, the accumulated interest of prior 
periods is added to the amount lent so as to increase the total amount of debt. Importantly, the 
proponents of the liberal theory of riba suggest that the prohibition in Islam only extends to this 
particular type of interest as it was commonly used in pre-Islamic times and has the greatest 
scope for unfairness. Supporters of this point of view often cite the following verse from the 
Quran: ‘Oh ye who believe! Devour not usury, doubled and multiplied; but fear God; that ye 
may (really) prosper’74. However, it is by no means clear whether or not this is the only type of 
interest that the Quran prohibits. In other verses of the Quran regarding riba, there is no mention 
of a condition that the prohibition is limited to compound interest
75
. Moreover, there is no such 
qualification in the traditions of the Prophet. It clearly goes against the spirit of a ban on riba if 
income is earned even as simple interest for it can then be used to give more loans, allowing 
interest to remain as part of the economic life of a nation. In effect, interest will continue to 
become part of the principal, which is essentially compound interest. 
The second type of interest is Riba AI-Fadl, which is also known as riba of the Prophet as he 
prohibited its use. Riba Al-Fadl may be defined as the excess taken in exchange of specific 
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homogenous commodities and encountered in their hand-to-hand purchase and sale. The famous 
Hadith—where this exchange is forbidden by the Prophet—is as follows: sell ‘gold for gold, 
silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, salt for salt, like for like, 
equal for equal, hand to hand. If these types differ, then sell them as you wish’. Several points 
can be seen to emerge from this text: first, it is apparent that these six commodities should only 
be bought and sold in equal amounts
76
 and on the spot; there cannot be an unequal or a deferred 
sale as otherwise the transaction would fall under riba
77
. There is a difference amongst the 
various schools of thought as to whether or not the above prohibition is confined to these 
particular commodities or if they merely serve as examples. The majority view is that the key is 
the illa: i.e. the essential characteristic of a good that must be present and which makes a 
commodity comparable to the one specifically mentioned, and so within the ambit of the original 
prohibition. Amongst the four leading schools of thought in Islam, the focus of the illa differs 
slightly. Imam Abu Hanifa considers there to be two defining attributes: he observes that all of 
the above commodities are sold by weight or volume; thus, all commodities sold in this manner 
and exchanged with the same good fall under the prohibition. Imam Shafi’i focuses on two 
different attributes, considering that this law applies to every commodity, serving as a medium of 
exchange or which is edible. Imam Malik also focuses on the attribute that the commodity be 
edible or capable of preservation.  
Markedly, Imam Ibn Hanbal has a variety of criteria ascribed to him. The first view ascribes to 
him ideas similar to Imam Hanifa. The second view approves of the Shafi’i approach, whilst the 
third includes all of the characteristics approved by each school, namely weight, volume and 
whether or not it is edible
78
. Generally, it has been agreed by most scholars of Islamic law that, if 
a commodity bears the characteristics of being sold by weight and utilises a medium of 
exchange, then a deferred sale—or a sale of unequal quantities of the same good—is prohibited. 
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3.7.2  Gharar Uncertainty 
 
The word gharar comes from the root verb gharara/gharra (Gh.R.R.) signifying to reveal 
oneself and one's property to destruction without being aware of it ('ard nafswa mali-hi ii halak 
mm ghayr an ya'raf). the word gharar in the Arabic language covers a variety of negative 
elements such as deceit, cheating, danger, peril, and risk that might lead to destruction and loss.
79
 
Gharar is one of the major causes of the invalidity of a contract. It is an external prohibited 
attribute that invalidates the contract. Gharar takes place where the consequences of a 
transaction remain unknown. In this type of transaction, the contract is very risky owing to the 
percentage of loss being very high. There are many examples of its prohibition in Islamic 
jurisprudence, including, for example, the sale of birds in the sky or fish in the sea. The reason 
behind the prohibition of such produce is that the risk is very high, rendering such transactions 
similar to gambling. A second example is that of the trade practised in pre-Islamic times called 
bay` habl alhabla. This type of transaction relates to a buyer buying a she-camel which is to be 
the offspring of a she-camel, still in its mother’s womb80. 
Owing to ignorance, gharar occurs in two things: money and commodities. The former occurs in 
some countries where more than one currency is used, in which case the seller has to inform the 
buyer of the preferred currency type because there is a difference between the value of currencies 
and these impacts on the cost of goods
81
  
Ignorance, in commodities or goods, has two aspects. The first is ignorance of the goods 
themselves: for example, the seller says, ‘I will give you what is in my bag for £10’. The second 
is ignorance of the characteristics of a commodity, if it has the ability to influence the cost or the 
desire of the buyer. For instance, the place of production impacts on the price of some goods, 
therefore, the seller must inform the buyer about that. The difference between this category and 
the previous one is that, whilst in the former the buyer knows the commodities but is not sure 
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whether or not they can be bought, in the latter, the buyer does not have enough information 
about the goods, or the seller does not have enough information about the property or money. An 
instance of the first category is where A offers to B goods which are under the table for £10, 
whilst B cannot see the goods, and so B does not know them, whether they are watches, clothes, 
or rings. An example of the second category is where A offers a watch to B for £100, but A does 
not mention the manufacturer of the watch, so B knows the type of the product, but he does not 
know the brand of the watch, which would obviously impact the price of the product
82
. 
 
2.8  Discharge of Contract under Islamic Law 
 
In this sub-chapter, we examine the rules on the discharge of contract operational within Islamic 
Law; in particular, the way in which Islamic law deals with discharge by performance, discharge 
of contract by assignment of debt, and discharge by agreement. We also identify the differences 
in the rules on discharge of contract, which operate under different views in Islamic law. 
 
2.8.1  Discharge of Contract by Performance 
 
The mean aim of contract in Islamic law, as another law, is a performance of contractual 
obligations; the parties should complete the performance of all their obligations under the 
contract. Islamic law is very strict about the performance of contract, and the performance of 
contract is considered, in Islamic Sharia law, a part of faith. People are ordered through Quran 
injunctions to fulfil their obligations: 
‘Oye who believe, fulfil the contract’83, and the Quran certifies the conduct believers and 
compliments them in the following verse: ‘and they fulfil their contract which they have made’84. 
Essentially, the performance must be precise and exact; that is, a party’s performance of an 
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obligation under a contract must be carried out exactly with the timeframe set by the contract, 
and exactly to standard required by the contract. 
Islamic law emphasises that parties must perform contractual obligations in the exact time. With 
this in mind, the Prophet Mohammed states: ‘you have to have the worker’s salary before his 
sweat dries’85. Accordingly, the parties must perform the contract and conditions mentioned in 
the contract depending upon the expression or implied intentions of the parties, judged from the 
of nature of the contract and the surrounding circumstances, as well as according to the customs 
of the people in each place. Muslim jurists give an example of someone buying a lock, which 
includes the key the sale without stipulation in the contract. If, on the other hand, a buyer 
purchases a house, whether the furniture is considered part of the sale requires review of the 
contract: if the parties express that the furniture must be with the sale, the seller has to perform 
the contract and hand out the furniture; if there is no mention of this in the contract, the furniture 
is then not part of the sale
86
. 
There is a case in Saudi Arabia of Ali & Salem: Ali purchased land from Salem when there was 
crop of corns in the land ready to be cut. The parties did not mention the crop in the contract. 
Before delivery, the land seller wanted to cut the corn, but the buyer asked Salem to stop cutting 
the crop and leave the crop in the land because he believed the crop was part of the transaction. 
The seller believed that this was not within the boundaries of the sale, and the court held that the 
crop belonged to the seller because of the custom of the people, which follows that the crop 
belongs to the land, and deliveries of the land belong to the seller
87
.  
Every type of a contract in Islamic law has its own method of performance, but there are three 
kinds of obligations: the first governs the delivery of property, which can be replaced, the second 
concerns specific items that cannot be replaced, and the third considers the performance of an 
act. 
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3.8.1.1 Delivery of a Non-specific Property (dayn): 
 
The word dayn means debt in Arabic, and refers to contracts of debt and loan. In Islamic 
jurisprudence, however, its meaning is broader and extends to the transfer of all non-specific 
property. In Sharia, dayn is considered a contractual obligation to pay a sum of money or deliver 
fungibles. The principle that applies here determines that the property has to be recovered in kind 
or by something similar in order to enable the contract to be discharged
88
. 
The sources of debt dayn in Islamic jurisprudence can be found in the contracts of sale, hire, 
settlement sulh, Salam
89
, and loan qard. If in the sale contract, for example, the price is to be 
paid in fungibles or in cash, then that price becomes the dayn with all the contractual obligations 
associated with it. As soon as the sale is concluded, the ownership of the sold property is 
transferred to the purchaser, who subsequently becomes indebted for the price and under an 
obligation to pay it, unless it is agreed to delay payment or pay by instalments. If the purchaser 
fails to pay the price when it is due, he is considered to have failed to perform his obligation
90
. 
Likewise, in the case of a hire contract, if a stipulation is made as to immediate or deferred 
payment, the hirer is held legally responsible until he pays at the exact time set by the parties. In 
a contract of hire, where the parties did not make time of payment in the contract, it is very 
important to determine the moment when rent becomes due in order to establish the hirer's 
liability. The general rule is that the rent does not become obligatory simply because a contract 
has been concluded, but becomes payable when the property is put to the use for which it has 
been hired. It has been suggested that equality between the reciprocal obligations requires rent to 
be paid according to use, measured hourly over a month. However, since specifying and paying 
rent by the hour is cumbersome, the hirer is obliged to settle up at the end of every day
91
. 
In a loan qard
92
, the borrower is obliged to return, at the end of the loan period, its equivalent in 
amount, type, and description. The lender, however, may, according to the Shafi, Hanbali and 
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Hanafi Schools, demand full payment of the loan at any time before it is due to the lender
93
. The 
Maliki School, on the other hand, holds that any agreed delay is binding and must be observed; 
the borrower should not have to return the loan before the period time of loan
94
. 
 
3.8.1.2 The Delivery of Corpus (ayn) of a Specific Property: 
 
This obligation concerns the delivery of a specific property. The general principle in Islamic law 
is that the subject matter must be precisely determined as regards its essence, quantity and value. 
If the subject matter is an obligation or performance, it must be determined at the time of the 
contract, otherwise the contract is considered invalid
95
: for example, in a contract of hire, if the 
customer wants to rent a car, the car must be determined in the contract in terms of its model, 
quantity, registration number, and colour as the subject matter has to be known when the 
delivery time is due. 
The most common expression of the obligation to deliver in Islamic law appears in the contract 
of sale and the contract of hire, which are considered models for all bilateral contracts. The 
contract is concluded, with the ownership of the subject matter transferred immediately to the 
purchaser who is then obliged to pay its price, with the seller accordingly obliged to hand over 
the subject matter
96
. The delivery of the purchased subject matter, however, does not necessarily 
have to be physical. Delivery can be affected when the seller removes all restrictions between the 
sold goods and the purchaser so that the latter may obtain delivery without hindrance
97
.  
The rules of delivery are according to the type of subject matter. In the case of buildings, 
delivery may be made by handing over the key. If the subject matter of the contract is land or 
other unlocked real estate, delivery must be effected at or near the property, and the seller must 
give the buyer permission to take possession. In order for the delivery to be valid, the property 
must be clear and empty of any belongings; otherwise it is not considered a legal delivery, and 
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the vendor is in breach of his contractual obligation, meaning the seller has to transfer the 
property officially by transferring his name, in the official document, to the purchaser’s name, 
and handing over the document to the purchaser
98
. 
Under Sharia law, the obligation of delivery in a contract implies the guarantee that the object of 
the contract is free from any hidden defect (aib) and from any right of a third party attached to it. 
As far as the title is concerned, if it is proved that the sold property is owned by a third person, 
the seller is deemed to have failed to deliver. Likewise, in regard to quality, the vendor 
guarantees to the purchaser that the sold goods are in proper condition. Aib is defined as any 
defect existing in the goods at the time of the contract that will call for a reduction in value as 
recognised by the customary standards of merchants
99
. 
 
3.8.1.3 Obligation to Perform an Act: 
 
This is the third form of obligation recognised by Sharia, and concerns agreements to perform 
any kind of act. This type of obligation is commonly used to define terms of employment, and 
includes any kind of work. With this type of obligation, the contractor is deemed to be in breach 
if he has not performed the act or if the performance was only partial or otherwise recognised as 
faulty. In the case of an employment contract, the employee is obliged to perform a job. The 
contract of work or employment in Islamic law is terminated if the employee did his job 
according to the agreement between the parties and the employer paid the money to the 
employee; the private employee is different in that his obligation is to present himself in 
readiness for work for a certain period of time, even if he has not been given a specific job
100
. If 
he has worked only part of the stipulated period, he is deemed to be in breach of his contractual 
obligation, and thus will not be entitled to the full wages stipulated in the contract. Rather, he 
will be paid in proportion to the period of time he has actually worked. Thus, someone who hires 
himself out to work for one year for fixed wages but who only works for six months is still 
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entitled to be paid for those six months’ work, although he has not completed his full contractual 
obligation to work for a whole year
101
. 
The contract of employment can be further subdivided into two categories. The first covers the 
employees whose work has an effect on the goods upon which he works. Examples of this 
category include the tailor, the dyer or the carpenter. Such an employee is deemed to be in 
breach of his contractual obligation if he has not completely finished the contracted work and 
delivered it. The second category includes employees whose work has no apparent effect on the 
item given to him to work on, with such examples including the porter or the boatman. Such 
employees must fulfil the contracted job in order to discharge contractual obligations, but there is 
no duty to deliver it to the employer
102
. 
 
3.8.2  Discharge of Contract by Assignment of Debt Hawalah 
 
Assignment or Hawalah
103
 is an agreement to transfer a debt from the liability of the original 
debtor to the liability of another person. The debtor is freed from a debt whilst another is 
responsible for it. Thus, the responsibility for payment shifts to another party. It also refers to the 
document by which the transfer or assignment takes place, such as a bill of exchange, promissory 
note, cheque or draft. The mechanism of Hawalah is used for the settling of accounts by book 
transfers, without the need for physical transfer of cash. The debtor who transfers debt is referred 
to as a debtor–assignor muhil, the creditor creditor–assignee muhal and new debtor to whom 
transfer is made is the transferee muhal alayh
104
.  
The nature of the assignment of debt in Islamic law stipulates that there are two views relating to 
the nature of assignment Hawalah. The first view considers the assignment as a method of 
performance, where the debtor can pay the debt for the creditor directly or by transferring him to 
the transferee. The assignment is the transfer of demand only whilst the actual burden of 
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payment rests with the principal debtor. In this case, if the transferee becomes bankrupt, for 
example, the creditor again refers to the debtor to pay the debt because he did not complete the 
performance of his obligation. The second view considers the assignment as a new contract 
between the creditor and debtor, and so they apply all rules of contract in such a case, which 
takes the form of a transfer of debt, terminating the liability of the original debtor to a third party. 
If the transferee becomes bankrupt, the rules of contract will apply here, such as mistake, 
frustration, and impossibility
105
.    
The assignment of debt in Islamic law emphasises that it is lawful to transfer one’s debt to 
another. In the case of the transfer of debt from a debtor to a transferee, the latter should be asked 
to pay as he substitutes the debtor. Whether or not the transfer of debt requires the consent of all 
parties, i.e. debtor, creditor and transferee, remains under question, although the scholars agree 
that the consent of the debtor is required. The majority of scholars consider that the creditor must 
accept the assignment in order for it to be considered lawful. However, some consider that, if the 
transferee is a wealthy person and is able to perform his obligations, the consent of the assignee 
is then not required simply because the Prophet is reported to have stated the following: 
‘Procrastination in paying debts by a wealthy man is injustice. So, if your debt is transferred 
from your debtor to a trustworthy rich debtor you should agree’106. The consent of the transferee 
is not a condition for assignment; the transferee has to accept the assignment and pay the debt
107
.  
Normally, the effect of the assignment is to discharge the debtor from the debts owed to the 
creditor, meaning the contract between parties will be discharged by the assignment.  
 
3.8.3  Discharge by Mutual Agreement (iqalah) 
 
Following the conclusion of a valid contract—which is enforceable and binding—the parties 
must perform their contractual obligations. If any one of the parties wishes to revoke his part of 
the obligation in the contract, it is possible to reach the agreement that the contract is considered 
solved automatically once its commitments are not performed; this would not warrant a court or 
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judge decision. The two parties may agree that the contract should be considered dissolved when 
obligations are not met, or because of any other reason, where one party is not permitted to do so 
without the consent and approval of the other party. This principle may be justified in the sense 
that a contract, in this case, is made by mutual agreement; thus, it can be dissolved by simply the 
same mutual agreement. The parties do not have the right to unilaterally dissolve the contract if 
they cannot unilaterally form it as the contract is a shared right. Islamic law considers it 
permissible; however, if one or both of the contracting parties want to dissolve the contract with 
mutual consent, this procedure of dissolution is known in Islamic law as iqalah
108
. 
Iqalah
109
 is defined as, ‘termination of contract can come by mutual consent of the parties in 
order to one of them or both are regretted and want to withdrawal from the contract’110. The 
consent of the other partner is essential; a person cannot do it alone. The binding contract can be 
dissolved by iqalah
111
.  
There are two opinions of Islamic scholars on iqalah: the first opinion considers iqalah as a 
removal of contract and the discharge of a contract, which means that it brings the parties’ 
situation to their pre-contract status as if the contract never took place; thus, the contract is 
annulled, along with all its effects
112
. Accordingly, the contract must be at the same price and 
conditions of the original contract. This is the opinion adopted by the Shafi and Hanbali School, 
and various scholars from the Hanafi School
113
.  
The second view considers iqalah as a new contract as the subject matter is moved to the party 
by contract, and another party receives the price by the contract, and so they must to return by 
contract. According to this opinion, parties are allowed to establish a mutual agreement in order 
to dissolute the contract, encompassing a different price from the original contractual price. This 
is the view of the Maliki School and Abu Yusuf from Hanafi. 
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A different opinion is given by Abu Hanifa, where discharge by mutual agreement can be seen as 
annulment in regard to the parties’ relations because of the nature of iqalah; a new contract 
relating to the third party protects the rights of the third party
114
. 
The formation is the main element of iqalah in Islamic law, and is the offer from one of the 
contracting parties and the acceptance of the other. Therefore, the offer and the acceptance, 
expressed in words, induce iqalah. There is no dispute as to the issue that iqalah can be 
constituted by two words, both signifying the past tense. 
 
3.9  Application of Islamic Contract Law in the United Kingdom 
 
It is perhaps accurate to suggest that Islam has, in recent years, achieved a greater awareness in 
what has historically been referred to as the Western world. This can be attributed to both 
positive and negative factors. For those who were unaware of (or at least uninformed about) one 
of the three great monotheistic religions, such ignorance was shattered harshly on September 11, 
2001 when terrorist attacks were perpetrated against the perceived ‘West’, allegedly in the name 
of Islam. Awareness in the Western world has further increased for more positive reasons, 
however, and these have a more direct bearing on the current work. A dramatic increase in trade 
and commerce between Muslim and Western countries and entities in an increasingly interlinked 
and interdependent global economy has meant that the Muslim world and its laws have become 
impossible to ignore. As with all trade and commerce, these Muslim–Western commercial 
relationships have been underpinned by contract law. It has therefore been necessary for those 
involved in such trade and commerce to familiarise themselves with Islamic contract law in order 
to accommodate these commercial relationships. Daily Vatican newspaper, 'L'Osservatore 
Romano wrote that banks should look at the rules of Islamic finance to restore confidence 
amongst their clients at a time of global economic crisis. The ethical principles on which Islamic 
finance is based may bring banks closer to their clients and to the true spirit that should mark 
every financial service
115
. 
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Gordon Brown said in his speech at Islamic Finance and Trade Conference, London;  
Already, Britain is the largest European trader with many Islamic countries - the largest 
European investor in Oman, the largest non-Arab investor in Egypt, and second largest 
global investor in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia; Second, the foundation for making Britain 
the gateway to Islamic trade, is to make Britain the global centre for Islamic finance. 
Today British banks are pioneering Islamic banking - London now has more banks 
supplying services under Islamic principles than any other Western financial centre.
116
 
Islamic finance has become extremely popular in UK amongst Muslims in UK and with 
Muslims doing business in UK. London, as an international centre of banking with the 
City, means that the UK has also become a centre for Islamic as well as conventional 
finance. Many international corporate law firms with their head office in London also have 
strong expertise in Islamic finance.
117
 Companies and law firms which can offer Islamic 
finance are a huge lure for businesses from Islamic countries in North Africa, the Arabic 
world, and even in the Far East, thus attracting financial benefits to the economy. This 
means that the UK has been more welcoming of Islamic finance structures and indeed 
more innovative in developing the services that it offers to Muslims and those who wish to 
use Islamic financial products. 
The UK has a well regulated framework for Islamic finance which operates within the 
current system alongside conventional banks. All banks are regulated under the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000
118
 and regulated under the Financial Services and Markets 
Act (Regulated Activities) Order 2001.
119
However, there is no specific legislation, 
although this has been mooted, with the government intending to ‘showcase the UK’ as a 
basis for Sharia compliant business.
 120
  However, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
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has voiced concerns, notably about the challenges of allocating risk, and contract and 
documentation.
121
  
 
The challenges of regulating Islamic finance in the UK and indeed the likelihood that a UK 
court will not base its verdict on Sharia law was demonstrated in Shamil Bank of Bahrain v 
Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd. et al, concerning a Murabaha contract from which a party 
defaulted. The court held that Sharia would not be a deciding factor because UK law does 
not provide for the application of foreign law, and because the principles of Sharia law 
remain under debate even in Muslim countries.
 122
  Interestingly, however, in Investment 
Dar Company KSCC v Blom Developments Bank SAL
123
 the contract was wakala. Here, the 
contract’s governing law was English, but because the investor had a Sharia compliance 
department, the agreement was held to be valid.  
Now however, the UK government has launched its first Islamic Finance Task Force, 
which it hopes will make London and the UK the first choice in the West for Islamic 
finance.
124
 Regulation and case law demonstrate that the UK Government does not wish to 
either discriminate or to show favour to Islamic finance, but to regulate Islamic banks 
equally. However, there are signs that the UK is now moving to accommodate the 
structures of Islamic contract law in finance due to the growth in Islamic banking. 
There are Islamic banks in the United Kingdom, and some banks have established Islamic 
departments, such as HSBC, which founded Amanah bank, and applied various types of 
Islamic contracts, such as contract of Musharakah, contract of Mudarabah, and contract of 
Murabah
125
.  
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                                     CHAPTER FOUR   
                        Frustration of Contract in Islamic Law 
 
4.1  Introduction  
 
A contracting party is asked to fulfil the promises made, and is therefore not excused easily from 
his legal responsibility. Initially, the parties are obliged to perform their contractual liability. 
Although Islamic Law emphasises the need of parties to fulfil their contractual obligations, when 
circumstances render the performance of contract impossible or headship, this exception of non-
performance is referred to as the ‘frustration of contract’.  
In this chapter, we will discuss the frustration of contract in Islamic Law. In the case of the 
absence of theory of frustration of contract in Islamic Law, an attempt will be made to create a 
complete doctrine of frustration of contract. Thus, the views of scholars will be taken when they 
discuss the cases and provisions of termination of contract owing to the supervening events in 
separate, and the sparse details associated with different types of contract. For this reason, there 
will be the discussion, under many different concepts, of the frustration in the context of Islamic 
Law as the existence of doctrine and application, such as necessity, excuse, jawaih and force 
majeure; this will be done in order to reach a clear vision about the discharge of the contract due 
to frustration in consideration of Islamic Law. 
4.2  Existence of Frustration as a Legal Term in Islamic Law 
 
It is important to highlight that the majority of legal terms in English law  nac also be found in 
Islamic Law and Arabic language
1
, such as the term of contract in Islamic Law, which is called 
Aqd, which also has the same meaning and concept. However, there are some legal terms in 
English law in which there is no translation for the term in Islamic Law or Arabic language; this 
is referred to as functional equivalence translation, where the theory of translation is based on an 
                                                          
1
 Qur’an and the prophet Mohammed language.  
102 
 
understanding of two texts: a source text, which is to be translated, and a target text, which is the 
result of the actual translation process. The task of the translator is to establish a relationship of 
equivalence between the source and target texts. In examining the word of frustration
2
 of 
contract, we will find that there is no word in Islamic Law opposite frustration of contract as one 
word; the rules and provisions of frustration exist in Islamic Law without the word ‘frustration’, 
and so, when discussing discharge of contract by frustration, some writers of Islamic Law use 
long sentences in place of the term frustration, such as discharge of contract by those reasons 
beyond the control of the parties. Some writers use supervening events, whereas others use force 
majeure, excuse and natural disaster, all of which will be discussed later on in this paper.  
The term ‘frustration of contract’ is legal English, and thus this will be applied and used in order 
to establish theory of frustration of contract in Islamic Law.  
 
4.2.1  Classification of Discharge of Contract 
 
The textbooks, which were written about law of contract in English law, divides discharge of 
contract into discharge of contract by agreement, performance, breach and frustration, as will be 
mentioned in the sixth chapter. In Islamic Law, there is a difference in the classification of 
discharge of contract and the termination of contract. 
Discharge of contract comes after the formation of a valid (sahih) contract, whereas the 
annulment (Ibtal) of such refers to an invalid contract (ghayer sahih). 
The discharge of contract according to the opinion of some jurists in Islamic Law is divided into 
two types:  
First type: Cessation (zawal) is termination of a contract by performance of contractual 
obligations. This refers to the truth that a contract usually ends upon the performance of parties’ 
obligations arising out from it. A contract of loan, for example, ends as a result of the payback of 
the debt from the borrower to the lender. All obligations should be performed immediately 
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before the expiry of the time by which their performance is due. A contract bound by strain time 
may complete with the expiration of a fixed period of time because the period of time in such a 
contract may be extinguished with the extinction of the period because the period of time in such 
a contract is a fundamental element. Thus, a contract of work, for example, will be finished with 
the ending of the fixed period
3
.  
Second type: Dissolution (inhilal) is the termination of a contract following the conclusion of a 
valid contract, and before the performance of contract by mutual agreement, by frustration of 
contract, or by breach of contract. Accordingly, the first type is about discharge of contract by 
performance of contract, whereas the second type is about discharge of contract by agreement, 
breach of contract, and frustration.  
Dr Sanhuri
4
 excludes the ending of contract by extinction (inqida') and annulment (ibtal), and 
focuses on the ending of contract by dissolution (inhilal). He suggests that the difference 
between dissolution (inhilal) and extinction (inqida') is that dissolution comes before the 
performance of the contract or, in other words, before the performance of a contract is 
completed, and extinction after the contract has been performed. The difference between 
dissolution and annulment (ibtal) is that dissolution arises if the contract becomes valid contract 
and enforceable. Thus, Dr Sanhuri classifies the dissolution of contract into three types: 
1. Dissolution due to non-binding  
2. Dissolution by termination (faskh) 
3. Dissolution by mutual agreement (iqalah). 
Some Muslim jurists distinguish between the dissolution of contract and discharge of contract, 
and hold that the dissolution of a contract faskh follows the formation of contract but is before 
performance, but by demand of one party or both, or by judge if one party brings the case before 
the court. Moreover, discharge of contract infesakh is by frustration if a contract be discharged 
by supervening beyond the control of parties.  
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Although these divisions and classifications may, at first glance, show that there is a conflict 
between laws, these differences of classification lead to one result, and there is no difference in 
applying relevant law to the facts in each case. Some modern Muslim jurists adopt the new 
classification of discharge of contract after establishing the total theory of contract law.    
 
 
4.3  The Concept of Doctrine of Frustration   
 
The doctrine of frustration is in existence in contract law in almost all legal systems around the 
world. The doctrine of frustration in Islamic Law will be discussed in this chapter, with 
consideration directed towards English law later. It can be seen that, in many countries, law of 
contract has similar meaning in terms of frustration. Although the word frustration is not a legal 
term in Islamic Law, as mentioned previously, when considering the maiming of impossibility in 
Islamic Law and force majeure, or discharge of contract by reasons beyond the control of the 
parties, it can then be recognised that the term has been explicitly used in Islamic Law. 
Accordingly, when jurists use impossibility as wide-meaning, frustration can then be considered 
as being assigned the same meaning as frustration in English law
5
.      
Frustration is commonly used as shorthand for a technical term connoting frustration of a 
contract by a supervening event, which, without default of either party, renders the contractual 
obligation incapable of being performed. This may be owing to the circumstances where the 
performance called for would render it a thing radically different from that which was 
undertaken by the contract. 
Frustration is the main basis upon which to discharge a contract when expectable circumstance 
occur that make the contract impossible to perform, or otherwise when events take place that 
radically change the performance of the contract contemplated following the formation of the 
contract. Accordingly, the doctrine of frustration operates with the aim of discharging a contract 
where, following formation, something occurs that renders performance of the contract 
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impossible or illegal, or any circumstance that makes the contract radically different from that 
which was in the contemplation of parties at the time of entry into the contract
6
.  
The term ‘frustration’ is used here to indicate a situation in which a contracting party, through 
novel and unanticipated circumstances outside of his control, finds the performance of his 
contractual obligations either impossible to carry out or as otherwise comprising an unforeseen 
burden in the way of extra work or expenditure
7
. 
Every contract contains some risk of an event occurring that ultimately renders performance by 
one party more expensive or burdensome than originally contemplated. Many of these events are 
foreseeable when there is some degree of contemplation at the point at which the contract is 
made: prices may rise or fall, a special currency may devaluate, insurance premiums may 
increase, and general business depression may create financial difficulties. Such ordinary 
business risks are considered to be insufficient grounds for excusing parties from the 
performance of their obligations. In respect of such risks, losses simply lie where they fall. The 
party himself also understands that the risk of such difficulties and expense—even if 
considerable—is for him to bear. However, following the formation of a contract8, there may 
occur such unforeseeable events that fundamentally disturb the very basis of the parties’ 
contemplated estimates, and thereby radically change the obligation. In such cases, although 
performance can hardly be said to have become impossible, it would nevertheless involve 
something materially different from that for which the parties originally contracted. 
The doctrine of frustration addresses the problem of the frustration arising after the formation of 
contract, and where is no false premise at the time of contracting. However, events change 
drastically enough following formation to believe the original expectations of the parties. Thus, 
the frustration of a contract occurs when a contract becomes impossible to perform, or when it is 
capable of performance only in a manner substantially different from that envisaged originally 
by circumstances beyond the party’s reasonable control. When there is a circumstance in 
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existence before the formation of the contract, this case is not considered frustration but is 
discussed under the doctrine of mistake
9
. 
In actual fact, one can identify this approach in the term Aqd (Contract), which is to bind or tie, 
and identifies all agreements as enforceable, except that which is declared forbidden (in the case 
of frustration, this will generally be the contract that creates undue hardship). Therefore, this 
leads one back to the identification that the balance between pact sunt servanda and frustration 
in Islamic contract law will be defined by the specific fatwa, even when there is a clear indicator 
that promise-keeping is paramount, unless the contract does not comply with Islamic legal 
principles. Nevertheless, the primary principle is that all contracts must be fulfilled outside this, 
which is supported by the Qur’an itself in the statement, ‘O you who have believed, fulfil the 
contracts.’ 
 
4.4 Supervening Events  
 
Bearing in mind the discussion of the concept of frustration, in Islamic Law, the doctrine of 
frustration is activated when, between the formation of the contract and the date fixed for its 
performance, there are elements that exist and which need to be considered when the is contract 
frustrated. 
The supervening events must occur following the formation of contract and prior to the 
performance of the contract, wholly or partially. The circumstances supervene events if the 
events come before the formation of the contract. Islamic Law considers this as a frustration as it 
deals with this situation under the doctrine of the mistake Ghalat
10
. One example of such a case 
is in Saudi Arabia in Yosef Alorini vs. Nadek company
11
 where a contract was adopted between 
the parties. The plaintiff, as the contractor, promised to import specific types of air-condition 
system from the USA and install them for the Nadek company; however, the plaintiff delayed the 
delivery of the subject matter, and claimed that there was a frustration of contract through 
temporary impossibility owing to invasion in Kuwait and the second Gulf war, which made 
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importing the items on time impossible. Nevertheless, the Nadek company refused this 
reasoning, and applied the penalty clause for delay. The court considered there was no frustration 
of contract because the contract was made after the war, and there were no supervening events. 
As such, it was a mistake. 
Thus, the supervening event must not occur prior to the agreement being entered into. Indeed, it 
is logical: if an event occurs before an agreement is finalised, then the agreement can either be 
abrogated or amended. The doctrine of supervening events provides that the event complained of 
must have made the contract impracticable as a result of the event. If the contract was 
impracticable to begin with, then the doctrine cannot be utilised.  
The supervening must affect a fundamental or radical change of the neutrality of the contract. 
The change in circumstances is substantially different from that envisaged originally when the 
contract was freely concluded between them in the first place. The supervening events are not 
considered  
Perhaps what is more difficult is the requirement that an intervening event has to be general 
rather than specific. In essence, this means that the event must at least have the potential to affect 
a wide range of people rather than the person who is arguing the impracticability of the contract 
alone. Accordingly, a person seeking to escape obligations cannot point to a personal difficulty 
to escape an undertaking, such as losing money as a result of a bad business deal, which 
ultimately affects the ability to perform the said undertaking. On the other hand, losing one’s 
money as a result of the bank’s collapse is an event that affects all—or at least a wide variety of 
people—and so would satisfy the requirement of generality allowing the doctrine of supervening 
events to apply
12
. 
 
 
 
4.5  Effect of External Factors on Frustration of Contract in Islamic Law 
 
                                                          
12
 Muhammad  Al Amine, Risk management in Islamic finance: An analysis of derivatives instruments (Brill,  2008) 
174 
108 
 
Frustration of contract, in fact, occurs as a result of reasons that lead to the discharge of contract. 
Discharge of contract has two main causes: the first cause is the fault of one of the parties of the 
contract, or both, which has been excluded from this research, and which includes breach of 
contract; the second cause—which is the subject of this study—is the external factor or events 
that are beyond the party’s control. Some Islamic jurists use the external factor when talking 
about supervening, which affects the contract.   
In order to track the origins sources in regard to Islamic Law—or, to be more specific, the 
sources of the external factor—in the context of Islamic jurisprudence, the Qur’an is the origin 
source of all legal rules of Islamic Law. The source of the external factor concept and its impact 
on the contemporary legal jurisprudence can be identified through various Qur’anic verses, 
which adopt the form of general rules to be followed, such as ‘Allah task not a soul beyond its 
scope. For it is only that which it hath earned, and against it only that which it hath deserved
13
. 
This means that Allah commands us only with things that are within the human ability, and that 
man will not be responsible for things he cannot control. This verse states clearly that the debtor 
cannot bear the consequences of not fulfilling his obligations if this failure to perform is caused 
by something out of his control and his power. Another Qur’anic verse that can be considered as 
a source for the external factor concept is, ‘Allah commands person only within (the limits of) 
what He has given him’14. This verse completes the afore-mentioned verse, and together they 
constitute the same meaning. What Allah has given person in this verse is endurance and 
capability. The people are then not obliged to go beyond the limits of capability and endurance, 
and will not bear the consequences of things outside such capability
15
. The frustration of contract 
occurs outside the capability of parties through external factors, such as war, natural disaster or a 
change of law, etc. All of these are considered external factors. 
We can also find sources for the concept of external factors in the second origin of the 
legislation; the Hadith (sayings) of the Prophet orders a discharge of the contract by a-ljawaih
16
, 
with scholars agreeing on the interpretation of the word al-jawaih as every defect in the crops 
caused by things beyond the party’s control, such as draughts, floods, storms, etc., or things that 
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could be controlled but which were overtaken by surprise or supervening events, such as locusts 
that eat crops, for example. The term used in the Hadith is so extensive and comprehensive that it 
covers the concept of external factors
17
.     
Islamic jurists have not been afforded a comprehensive definition for external factors. Instead, 
they discuss this in the case of nominated contracts, such as contracts of sale, lease, mortgage, 
etc. However, external factors have never been considered as a general theory. Nevertheless, the 
general idea of external factors can still be derived by following the applications and examples 
assigned to such. Importantly, they did not limit or specify all kinds of factors or supervening 
events: jurists talk about natural disasters and impossibility, and write about the creditor’s fault 
and the third party’s fault as external factors. In Islamic Law, various jurisprudence rules lead to 
the application of external factors, such as ‘No liability for what is not avoidable’, which may be 
used as a base for the  application of the external factor. Nevertheless, jurists consider that 
external factors consist of three different kinds, as detailed below: 
 The first, the natural disaster, such as rain, hail, floods, earthquake, fire or hurricanes, 
etc.
18
. 
 The second relates to the third party, such as when the supervening events or external 
factor is the third party’s doing, which renders the contract impossible to perform, such as 
a thief who steals the subject matter delivery
19
. As well as when the government issues a 
law that makes the contract illegal, or if the subject matter is destroyed by a soldier in 
battle. 
 The third relates to the subject matter itself, where jurists provide the example of if the 
subject matter is an animal and destroys itself, such as running for hours until it falls 
down and dies or of the animal puts its head into a rope or into a very narrow place and 
dies as a result.   
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4.6  Theory of Frustration in Islamic Law   
 
In early Islamic Law there is no separate exposition of a general doctrine of frustration of 
contract comparable to that in English law or in western law. The natural result of AN absence of 
an independent theory of contract in Islamic Sharia law is early Islamic jurists dealing with 
nominate contracts. Hence, there are no theories that fall under the theory of contract, such as 
theory of mistake and frustration. Judge Abd elwahab Elhassan, from his point view of the 
absence of the doctrine of frustration in Islamic Law, makes reference to two key reasons: 
1- The doctrine of frustration usually exists in contracts that need time for executions, 
i.e. supply, tenders, hire etc.; these norms were not necessary in early Islamic history, 
but only after the Industrial Revolution. Early Islamic society was simple, and the 
transactions were generally far from complex. 
2- A Muslim, to be described as such, must believe in Allah, angels and Qada and 
Qadar. Qada means all the willed incidents and actions according to the dictates of 
the applicable laws and by the will and knowledge of Allah. Qadar means the 
unchanging law of Allah, which includes the Qur'an together with natural law and 
positive science, and constitutes the command of Allah, who gave them the quality of 
unchangeability. Thus far, as far as Qada and Qadar are concerned, people cannot 
influence events, and so Muslims must accept them and satisfy the law that it is 
outside the purview of both themselves and the other contracting party
20
. 
The reasons provided above by the judge are not true, especially the second reason because there 
is no interference in Islam between faith and the application of the rules of contract and 
frustration. It has been observed, however, that in a number of nominate contracts, many rules of 
frustration have been discussed by Muslim jurists not under full theory, but as separate cases and 
rules, such as in the contract of sale, for example, when parties agree on a sale of fruit by 
delivery, which may subsequently be rendered impossible by a misfortune from Heaven or an 
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Act of God (Afah samawiya) that destroyers the fruit, such as rain, drought or wind. The Islamic 
conception of impossibility of performance (istihalah al-tanfidh), due to the change of 
circumstances, is as wide as the common law doctrine of frustration included within it simply as 
a single rule. Amkhan maintains, ‘It is worth noting that traditional Islamic Law recognised a 
rule which is very much akin to the common law concept of frustration of purpose’21. 
However, jurists in Islamic Law have previously discussed specific cases, such as force majeure 
or cas fortuity, both of which would effect the performance of contract, and the distraction of 
subject matter. These will be studied later. As a consequence, the approach of Islamic Law 
towards the contractual effects by frustration is clear. The parties will be held to the contract 
unless performance has become impossible. 
 4.7  Basis of Frustration of Contract in Islamic Law 
 
It has been stated that the general principle rules of Islamic Law—as taken from the Qur’an or 
the Hadith—can be applied to certain cases. In this vein, there are verses from the Qur’an or 
sayings of the Prophet that can be applied as a basis of frustration of the contract. 
 4.7.1  Qur’an Principals  
 
In the Qur’an, there are verses that place emphasis on the belief that Allah will not put any one 
through difficulties. When the law enforces parties to perform their obligations in spite of 
difficulties, it is recognised that there are supervening events or circumstances that may render 
the performance of the contract impossible or illegal, and will thus mean the parties will 
experience difficulties. The verses below clarify that no imposed difficulties shall be placed upon 
an individual:   
1- Allah intends ever facility for you; He does not want to put to difficulties22; 
2- On no soul does Allah place a burden greater than it can bear23; 
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3- Allah has imposed no difficulties on you24; 
4- Allah does not burden a person beyond his capacity25. 
The above verses from the Qur’an explain that any human should not undergo hardships 
generally as this is consistent with the spirit of Islamic Law and with justice. Islamic Law 
encourages rulers, judges and scholars to adopt easier ways for people when they apply the 
law
26
. Accordingly, when the contract becomes impossible or problematic to perform, if the law 
bind parties to perform the contract, it will be considered as putting people through difficulties. 
In order to avoid so doing in such an instance, the doctrine of frustration of contract is applied.  
Frustration of contract is designed to avoid hardship and harm being inflicted upon the parties of 
contract. With this noted, the Prophet says, ‘la darar wala dirar fi alslam’27, meaning that there 
shall be neither harm nor the causing of unfair loss. If the parties are obliged to perform the 
contract even through hardships or in conflict with the hadith above, which is regarded as a 
general rule in Islamic Law, the frustration of contract should be adopted. Accordingly, a 
contract may be avoided if its performance becomes extremely burdensome for the parties. Ibn 
al-Hammam states, ‘a contract whose performance becomes burdensome as to involve great loss 
may be terminated’28. The most important legal maxim In Islamic Law relating to hardship is the 
one that provides that, ‘The hardship shall be eliminated (al-darar yuzal)29. Accordingly, in order 
to remove the hardship from the parties when the contract is impossible to perform, there is no 
better way than adapting a doctrine of frustration.    
 
4.7.2  Necessity Darurah 
 
Necessity is a new state of danger and severe hardship that comes to face a person and which, as 
a result, causes fear and injury to his life, his organs, his offspring, his reason, or his property. In 
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such a situation, committing an illegal act or neglecting or delaying an obligation becomes 
obligatory or permissible. On the grounds of strong probability, to commit such an act to ward-
off his injury is within the boundaries of Sharia
30
. This is a very important principle in Islamic 
Law, which surrounds the removal of an unusual hardship that has come to face any person 
during the implementation of some rulings in a particular situation, or the performance of 
contractual obligation. Unusual hardship is caused by external factors, and does not derive from 
natural of rules. Excessive hardship if doing something or performing any obligation induces 
impassivity unless there is a loss of life, damage to some organ or to another person. The parties 
must perform their contractual obligation; any breach of contract is forbidden or prohibited by 
Islamic Law. On the other hand, however, if there are unforeseen circumstances, the 
performance of contract would be made impossible. Notably, there are legal maxims in Islamic 
Law, which states, ‘Necessity permits prohibited things’ (Aldarurat tubih almahzurat). The 
necessity in Islamic Law makes unlawful lawful
31
, where the contractual parties must perform 
their obligation, and non-performance of the contract is considered unlawful. In this case, the 
doctrine of necessity can apply a frustration of contract, meaning the contract will be discharged 
by frustration owing to the necessity to allow the party to discharge the contract, and the party 
then being necessitated to discharge the contract
32
. Necessity is recognised as the exception to 
the rule of the right to avoid serious harm or hardship.    
 
4.7.3   Excuse udhr     
The doctrine of  under (a justifiable cause) was recognised mainly by the Hanafi School
33
, 
although this does not suggest that other schools of law completely ignore events that might give 
rise to udhr. Essentially, there are many cases and examples given by jurists of these schools
34
. 
Notably, udhr is defined as the circumstance that affects the contract after its conclusion in such 
a way that a contracting party cannot perform their obligation without harming himself or his 
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property
35
. The application of the excuse udhr traditionally applies to contracts of lease and hire, 
which comprise the following transactions: the lease of real property, such as buildings and 
lands; the hire of animals and chattels; and the contract of labour. The explanation for this 
limitation can be found in the hire characteristic of these transactions, where hire is recognised as 
belonging to a class of contracts known as bilateral contracts. Importantly, their validity depends 
on the presence of two commutative equivalents. Its features are established through analogy to 
the contract of sale, which is considered the model for all commutative contracts. Accordingly, 
jurists define the term as the sale of ascertained usufruct known to the parties in exchange for 
specific consideration. However, the contract of hire contradicts the analogy of the contract of 
sale since benefits derived from leased properties, and hired services are non-existing at the time 
the agreement is concluded as they happen gradually during the lifetime of the contract. The 
general rule is that hire contracts should not be permissible owing to a lack of contractual 
object.
36
 
In their efforts to justify the right to rescind for a justifiable reason, Hanafi jurists have, in their 
interpretation, set out to compare the accidental impediment that affect leases and contracts of 
service with latent defect that may occur after the sale and before delivery of goods purchased. 
This constitutes grounds for the rescission of the contract as it leads to an excessive damage not 
stipulated in the contract. In this vein, al- Kasani reports that, ‘hire is the sale of usufruct; it 
consists of several contracts which are concluded every time the benefit is rea1ised If an event 
occurs which affects what is left of the usufruct, the party which, as a consequence, suffers 
damage has the option to rescind the lease agreement, as the case when a hidden defect develops 
in the sold goods before delivery’37.  
Indeed, according to this tradition, there are three different types of excuse that a person can rely 
on as udhr to escape a contract in a lease contract. The first is where the lessee involved has 
experienced a change in circumstances to such a significant degree that he is no longer capable 
of performing the obligation: for example, if the lessee has become bankrupt, then the contract is 
potentially able to be discharged on the force of udhr. Another example of where udhr might 
apply in this instance is the lessor changing his profession. Udhr can also apply when hardship 
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might affect the lessee from complying with his obligations, which is the second type of udhr: 
for example, if the lessee agrees to lease the property with covenants placed upon him, at which 
point he might sell his lease or the property if he wishes to avail himself of the debts. 
Importantly, this might be an allowable event in the udhr
38
.  
The third type of udhr applies to the leased object. This is perhaps the category of udhr that is the 
lease controversial as it is subject to less discretionary elements than the other two categories. 
Article 443 of Al-Majallah provides, ‘If any event happens whereby the reason for the 
conclusion of the contract disappears, so that the contract cannot be performed, such a contract is 
terminated’. Indeed, it is this category that appears to be most akin to the common law concept 
of frustration that applies in English law in the current day
39
. Indeed, Al-Majallah goes on to 
describe examples of when this category of events can utilise udhr. The first of these examples if 
where a cook is hired for a wedding party, but one of the spouses dies and so the wedding, the 
subject of the contract, can no longer proceed, thereby automatically terminating the contract 
concluded with the cook. A second example is a person who has a toothache and makes a 
contract to remove the teeth, but then finds that the pain has gone. Since the subject of the 
contract—the pain in the tooth to be removed—is no longer present, the contract is then 
considered terminated.
40
 
Any udhr excuse that makes the performance of the contract impossible without damage being 
inflicted upon the contracting party in respect of either his person or his property constitutes a 
sufficient reason for the discharge of contract. Under the excuse, the events unforeseen by the 
contracting parties at the time of concluding the contract, and which ultimately render the 
performance of the contract dramatically  more difficult, allow contractual parties to be released 
from their contractual obligations.  
The existence of a legal udhr or legal impossibility resulting in the discharge of the lease or the 
contract of service means the contract is frustrated. The example given by Ibn Qiam is if a 
woman hiring herself out to clean a mosque menstruates whilst she is working, then the contract 
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is discharges automatically in accordance with Sharia rule that she is forbidden from entering the 
mosque
41
.  
In Islamic Law, the scope of the doctrine of the excuse of udhr is not the only impossibility of 
the performance of the contract, or even the frustration of contract such as in English law: this 
may also apply when supervening circumstances have been rendered different from the 
conclusion of the contract
42
. The udhr is wider, and the frustration of contract in English law
43—
the udhr in Islamic modern law—is used for frustration of contract, such as the doctrine of 
frustration in Western law. In this context, the judges in Saudi Arabia apply the frustration of 
contract, although udhr is sometimes used instead of the frustration term
44
.  
 
4.7.4  Al-Jawaih Natural Disaster  
 
Almost all the books of Islamic Law of contract talk about al-jawaih in detail, or at least make 
some mention to it. The Hanbali School, followed by the Maliki School, is the main school that 
recognises al-jawaih as one of the categories of frustration of contract, and which allows parties 
to terminate agreements without the usual repercussions. 
Al-jawaih is the discharge of contract between parties after a crop or fruit has been damaged by 
pest, epidemic or natural calamities. The application of al-jawaih is through the sale of the fruit 
on trees or crops when they are destroyed before they are picked or harvested as a result of no 
fault of either party. As highlighted previously, a great deal of Islamic Law derives from the 
early days when trade in crops was common
45
. 
Al-jawaih means the contract is discharged by frustration when the subject matter of the contract 
is destroyed for a reason beyond the control of either party. In relation to the Maliki School, al-
jawaih can only be applied as part of the doctrine of intervening contingencies to terminate a 
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contract if the promisor of a contract has lost at least one-third of the total sum of the contract. 
Thus, if the promisor has lost a quarter of the subject of the contract, it is not considered 
sufficient enough damage for there to be reliance on al-jawaih
46
. The Hanbali School does not 
set a minimum level of damage to occur in order for al-jawaih to be relied upon; therefore, an 
event defined as an act of God or epidemic beyond human control might be capable of 
terminating a contract—even if the damage caused was less than one-third. 
The Maliki and Hanbali schools refer to al-jawaih by making reference to the Prophet hadith: 
‘Allah may prevent the fruit from maturing, so how can you take payment from your brother for 
it’47. 
The legal effect of al-jawaih means the seller is required to bear the risk of accidental loss of the 
crops sold. Thus, the value is reduced in proportion to the damaged fruit: if the fruit perished, the 
contract becomes invalid and the purchaser is entitled to recover the price paid.
 
In order to understand the position of the different schools of law regarding al-jawaih, it is 
important to analyse the legal status of the sale of crops from its sources and the jurisprudential 
controversy surrounding its validity. A consensus exists amongst the different schools of law that 
the sale of fruit that has not yet appeared is void since the object of the contract is not in 
existence. The said transaction will fall under the forbidden category of uncertainty (Gharar). 
Similarly, all schools recognise the sale of fruit before it becomes ripe on the condition of the 
immediate harvesting, and provides that the produce is beneficial and constitutes the property of 
some specific value
48
. 
Hanafi and Shafi schools do not recognise al-jawaih because, in their views, the sale of fruit on 
trees is considered delivery of the subject matter as the seller gave the buyer permission to take 
possession. This is a kind of performance of contract. Thus, the buyer should bear the risk
49
. 
 
4.7.4.1 Is the application of al-jawaih extended or restricted?  
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Although al-jawaih is not restricted under the Maliki and Hanbali schools to the general 
phenomena of natural disaster, there are different views amongst schools in regard to when crop 
damage results from human acts. The first opinion sees that al-jawaih is limited to natural 
disasters to discharge the contract
50
. The second opinion considers that a human destruction as 
al-jawaih means that, if the crops and fruit are damaged by human acts
51
, parties will then be 
discharged from the contract. One example of this is the destruction of fruit or crops resulting 
from troops in a war zone, or if the crops are stolen
52
. 
The question arises here: is al- jawaih limited to fruit on trees and crops or does it include all 
subject matter of contract? In other words, does it include all kinds of contract or just those in the 
contract of sale of fruit on trees? Muslim jurists discuss al-jawaih where fruit on trees and crops 
is concerned, stating that al-jawaih applies only in the case of the contract of sale of fruit, whilst 
jurists do not mention limitations of al-jawaih in the sense of the contract of sale of fruit. It is 
true that the majority write just about al-jawaih in the context of fruit being destroyed by natural 
disaster; however, the ruin of any subject matter of contract is considered al-jawaih. 
Accordingly, it may be seen that al-jawaih applies in the case of all kinds of contract and all 
kinds of subject matter, such as contract of sale, hire or work—whatever the subject matters is, 
i.e. fruits, goods or buildings
53
.  
Islamic Jurisprudence Council
54
 decided that it is possible for the application of al-jawaih in any 
contract, such as the contract of sale, hiring, construction, tender, and the contract of import. 
Moreover, al-jawaih is restricted in terms of destroying the subject matter; it does not include the 
illegality or parties if there is impossibility by death of party in employment contract
55
.  
Contracts are distinguish into executed and executory contracts. An executed contract in which 
both the parties performed their contractual obligation. When a contract has been completely 
performed, there is nothing remains to be done by either party. , as where an object matter of the 
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contract is delivered, and payment therefor is made. An executory contract is a contract in which 
the contractual obligations of both parties have not performed yet. In other words, where one or 
both the parties still have to do some future act. Frustration makes sense with respect to an 
executory contract.
56
 
   
 
4.8  The Doctrine of Force Majeure in Islamic Law 
 
Traditional Islamic Law does not provide for a unified doctrine analogous to the concept of force 
majeure
57
; however, Muslim jurists identify certain doctrines, as discussed previously, such as 
udhr, Act of God, and Al-jawaih natural disaster, all in a number of contractual clauses that may 
be viewed as akin to force majeure clauses
58
. Nevertheless, the doctrine of force majeure has 
been incorporated within modern Islamic Law, and corresponds to the concept of Quwah 
qahirah
59
, although it appears to be wider than the concept of frustration in English law
60
. 
Generally, Islamic Law may consider a breach of any promise, including that of a contract, as a 
mortal sin. As the Qur’an states, ‘O, ye who have believed, fulfil [all] contracts’61. However, this 
rule is not absolute because Islamic Law also grants relief from liability where the ability of the 
parties to perform their contractual obligations is undermined by an unanticipated event or an 
unavoidable disaster
62
. Furthermore, also in the context of Islamic Law, force majeure seeks to 
establish a balance between the rights and obligations of the contracting parties
63
.  
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Islamic Law recognises any Act of God or unforeseen condition as falling within the ambit of the 
force majeure (quwah qahirah)
64
, which includes any unforeseen changes in circumstances that 
are outside the control of either of the parties and which, through no fault of the parties, may 
constitute unfair loss or harm to the affected party
65
. Therefore, the failure of a contracting party 
to perform his obligation may render him liable for breach of contract unless he can prove that 
the non-performance was due to an event of force majeure
66
. Examples of events that will lead to 
a force majeure include an unavoidable destruction of ascertainable goods in contracts of sale, a 
total loss of the subject of pledge which is not attributable to the parties, and death or a 
permanent incapacitation of either party to the contract
67
. However, this general rule must be 
distinguished from the specific laws and regulations currently in force in many Muslim states, 
which result from a very long history and the national traditions of each individual state
68
.  
The primary legal effect of a force majeure event, if successfully proven, is to exonerate the 
party invoking it from liability in damages. If the force majeure event touches a certain part of 
the contractual obligation and makes the performance only partially impossible, the obligation 
may either be terminated in its entirety or otherwise be extinguished partially
69
; however, a force 
majeure caused by an intervening impossibility can invalidate the contract so long as the 
impossibility exists
70
. Thus, when the force majeure ceases to exist, the contract redeems its 
validity and can be enforced
71
.  
Importantly, force majeure should also be distinguished from another doctrine prevailing in 
Islamic contract law referred to as intervening contingencies (nazariyyah al-hawadith al-tari'ah). 
Intervening contingencies signify occurrences that radically disturb the equilibrium of a 
contractual obligation, thus making the performance excessively onerous for one of the 
contracting parties
72
. Moreover, the force majeure and intervening contingencies also share a 
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number of common features but are fundamentally different: for example, for an event to qualify 
as an intervening contingency, it must be general in character (affecting a number of people), 
whereas the force majeure can be particular in nature (affecting a single contracting party)
73
. 
Furthermore, force majeure makes the performance of the contractual obligation impossible, 
with intervening contingencies leading only to severe hardship if performance is allowed to 
continue in its original form
74
. The force majeure, if proven, may lead to a termination or 
suspension of the contract, whereas intervening contingencies make it possible for the court to 
modify the onerous contractual obligation
75
. In addition, the force majeure does not fall within 
the domain of public order, as does the doctrine of intervening contingencies
76
.  
Saudi labour law makes mention to force majeure in the termination of work contract Article 74 
paragraph (5), which provides that a work contract shall terminate by force majeure, with Article 
86 providing that the worker shall be entitled to the full award if he leaves work due to a force 
majeure beyond his control
77
.    
 
 4.8.1  Force Majeure Clauses in Contracts  
 
A force majeure clause in a contract excuses a party from contractual obligations due to the 
drafting of a list of specific events that may be triggered by natural, human or other factors. 
These events may include Acts of God, insurrection, riots, war, flood, thunderstorms, 
earthquakes, explosion, terrorism, etc. Generally, force majeure clauses list the specified events 
that will excuse a party from performing his contractual obligations; However, force majeure 
clauses not only provide for standard unforeseen event, but are also tailored to the specified 
nature of the contract and the type of business involved. Thus, the nature and extent of 
application of the force majeure is dependent on the nature of the contract, the type of the 
business, and the interpretation of the clause providing for it.  
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Many commercial contracts contain force majeure clauses that excuse the non-performance of 
contractual obligations when certain unforeseeable events—such as such as war, riots, and Acts 
of God—occur. The force majeure is not a principle of public policy78; this means that 
contracting parties can agree, at the time of the conclusion of the contract or even at the time of 
its performance, to neutralise, redefine, expand or limit the effects of a force majeure event
79
. In 
addition, contracting parties can agree to reallocate the risk arising from a force majeure event. 
The parties can agree to discharge contract if events render the contract impossible or a hardship 
to perform obligations, or if the agreement is made to extend the time of performance or to delay 
the performance.  
In Islamic Law, parties are free to put any stipulations in a contract. The Prophet states that, 
‘Muslims are bound by their stipulations except for a stipulation which makes the unlawful 
lawful or makes the lawful unlawful’80. This saying of the Prophet gives permeation to parties 
for the drafting of clauses or terms in a contract, such as the force majeure clause. The principle 
of incorporating clauses or stipulations within a contract facilitate the discharge of the contract in 
Islamic Law, such as in regard to khiyar al-naqd (option of payment), where the condition 
detailed in the contract gives the seller the option to terminate the contract if the buyer does not 
pay the price by a certain agreed date under any circumstance. 
There is no doubt that the freedom of the stipulations of the contract in Islamic Law give the 
parties the right to draft a force majeure clause in the contract because such a stipulation will 
bring benefit for both parties and well reduce the dispute between parties.  
In the case of Saud Ibn Mohammad vs. United Instalment Sales Co. Ltd, the plaintiff signed a 
contract with the defendant to take a car under the lease purchase
81
. The plaintiff paid 10% from 
the whole price as a deposit, and paid a monthly fee of 1700 Riyals. After fourteen months, the 
car was damaged due to fire. The defendant terminated the contract, the plaintiff paid 33,800 
Riyals, but the plaintiff claimed that there was a contract between himself and the company, 
meaning the company was obliged to give him a new car instead of the damaged car, or to 
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otherwise return the amount paid in advance as a result of the leasing contract. The court refused 
the plaintiff’s request as there was a force majeure clause, stating that if there were any 
supervening events that led to the damage of the car, the contract would be terminated without a 
refund of the money paid by the lessee
82
.   
 
4.8.2  Exemption Clauses in Contract in Islamic Law  
 
An exemption clause is an agreement in a contract that stipulates that a party is limited to or 
excluded from liability. The exemption clause may appear to have a similar effect of a force 
majeure clause; in actual fact, however, there is a difference. The force majeure clause is lawful 
stipulation in Islamic Law; it is not limited liability of one party of contract but brings the 
contract to end, whereas the exemption clause is excluded from liability. This clause contrasts 
with Islamic Law. Any stipulation making the trustee responsible for any loss in the property 
entrusted to him is considered an unacceptable clause, and the contract remains valid. 
Accordingly, a stipulation that the tenant should bear the loss resulting from the destruction of 
the subject matter of the contract as a result of an Act of God is not permitted as it goes against 
natural contract
83
.  
In an Islamic sales contract, the seller bears all the risks of loss of the subject matter until it is 
transferred to the buyer, who in turn takes on the full risks, including the risks of defect, damage 
and depreciation arising thereafter. In an Islamic leasing arrangement, the lessor assumes all 
risks of loss (not caused by the lessee) and the risks of maintenance
84
. With this taken into 
account, any exemption clause in the sale of contract means the buyer bears the risk of loss 
before the delivery of the subject matter will be considered a void condition. The maxim al-
kharāj bi-dhaman—which can be roughly translated as ‘the profit belongs to him who bears 
responsibility’85—means that, if the subject matter is destroyed, such as by an Act of God, prior 
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to delivery, the seller will bear the loss—even if there is a condition that means the buyer should 
bear the loss. 
4.9  Frustration of the Purpose of Contract  
 
In some cases, as a result of a surprising event, a party may be incapable of achieving the final 
purpose for which he is contracted in the transaction. Frustration of purpose (also referred to as 
commercial frustration) is a motive behind the enforcement of the contract. The doctrine of 
frustration of purpose is applied when, as a result of supervening events, the purpose of the 
contract for the party to whom the contract has to be rendered is frustrated, and the other party’s 
performance is no longer of any use to the recipient for the purpose for which both parties 
intended it to be used. In fact, in the case of the frustration of purpose, the supervening events do 
not render the contract impossible to perform, but rather impractical or as inducing hardship. 
Within Islamic Law, there is the view that many jurists believe that the validity of a contract is 
not impacted by purpose frustration if such a purpose simply constitutes the intention of one 
party entering into the contract, and if the contract can still be performed. The jurists provide the 
following example: if one party enters into a contract to rent a camel for the purpose of carrying 
him to Makkah to perform Pilgrimage (hajj) but the tenant loses his travel funds, meaning he is 
unable to travel, in this cases, the purpose causes the contract to be frustrated as it is not 
impossible to perform, i.e. the parties and subject matter still exist. The camel hired may well be 
used for another purpose or for re-rent to another individual
86
. 
However, the Hanafi School and Ibn Taymiyyah from the Hanbali School
87
 do not agree with the 
aforementioned view, but rather consider that the frustration of purpose affects authority of the 
contract, thus meaning the contract will be frustrated. The Hanafi School deals with the 
frustration of purpose under the doctrine of udhr, whilst Ibn Taymiyyah considers the frustration 
of purpose as part of al-jawaih
88
. One example is if someone rents a shop from a landlord for the 
purpose of selling a certain type of goods but when, following the conclusion of contract, the 
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goods are destroyed. In such a situation, there is no impossibility: the subject matter, i.e. the 
shop, is not destroyed, although the purpose of the contract is no longer available, i.e. to sell the 
goods. As such, according to the Hanafi School and the opinion of Ibn Taymiyyah, the contract 
will be discharged because the motive of the tenant is to sell the goods, and he does not want the 
shop for any other purpose
89
.  
Another case was provided by jurists: if a man makes a contract with a dentist to pull his tooth 
out as he is experiencing pain, after the conclusion of the contract, if the pain has disappeared, 
they see the contract will be discharged because of a frustration of purpose. Other jurists who do 
not apply the frustration of purpose agree with the Hanafi School and Ibn Taymiyyah School: in 
this case, the contract must be discharged because no other reasonable benefit can be expected 
from the contract. Thus, a contract comes to an end if frustration extinguishes its objective
90
. In 
the first and second cases, the contracting party can use the camel or shop for another purpose, 
whilst in this case, no purpose can be achieved through removing the tooth. 
In the case of Hamid vs. Salem, the plaintiff rented land from Salem in order to be an exhibition 
of local products in Taif city; however, local authorities postponed the exhibition for another 
time, and so the plaintiff demanded a termination of the contract because the purpose of the 
contract no longer existed. The view of the defendant is that there is no impossibility of 
performance: the plaintiff can use the land. On the other hand, however, the court held that the 
contract should be discharged because the purpose of the contract, as expressed term in the 
contract, the unexpected event is beyond the parties’ control91.   
The court in Saudi Arabia and Islamic Jurists are very careful and reluctant to apply this doctrine 
because they do want to make the frustration of purpose an escape for any party if the contract is 
subsequently recognised as a bad bargain. Moreover, in order for frustration of purpose to be 
applied, the intended purpose must be an expressed or implied in the contract and known to the 
parties. 
                                                          
89
 ibn Abidin Vol 6 ( n 35  ) 81. 
90
 Islamic Law concurs with English law in holding that the contract comes to an end ipso facto upon frustration of 
its purpose. 
91
 Taif General Court, Judgement No 312/11 on 11/04/1422AH 2001. 
126 
 
In the case of Yosef Ibn Abdurrahman vs. Abdullah Ibn Mohammad, Yosef hired a shop from 
Abdullah with the aim of using the shop as a bakery. However, the Municipality refused to give 
permission, and so he asked the court to discharge the contract under frustration of purpose. The 
court refused because the purpose of contract is not to use the shop for a bakery, but as the 
parties expressed in the contract, the tenant can use it for many activates, even a supermarket
92
.   
 
4.10  Impracticability and Hardship  
 
The concept of impracticability is used in several ways: economic hardship, hardship, economic 
frustration, economic impossibility, commercial hardship, commercial impracticability, and so 
on. Impracticability is a situation where the performance of the contract, as a result of 
unforeseeable supervening events, though remaining physically possible, has become 
economically excessively burdensome to an unexpected level beyond the control and 
contemplation of the parties and, as a result, the obligations of the parties are quite out of 
proportion by comparison with those initially agreed. 
The doctrine of impracticability of performance of contract might be considered akin to that of 
frustration in common law, albeit a slightly less extreme version.  
The doctrine of frustration governs the events that occur when a contractual obligation is 
considered impossible to perform. One example might be where a chartered voyage that is the 
subject of a contractual obligation is prevented from occurring as a result of war
93
. The Islamic 
Law concept deals with less extreme circumstances, such as when a situation arises where it is 
impracticable (rather than impossible) to fulfil a contractual obligation. Impracticability is 
considered to have arisen when the obligation imposed upon one party is much more onerous 
than was originally envisaged at the time at which the contract was entered into and the 
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obligation accepted. When looking at whether an obligation has become impracticable, however, 
courts look at the intervening events that lead to such impracticability
94
. 
Islamic Law, on the other hand, has traditionally opposed hardship in all aspects of religion
95
. 
Thus, the Qur’an sets out, ‘there is no hardship in religion’, which is commonly relied upon by 
parties to provide the rationale behind the doctrine of intervening contingencies
96
. Article 18 of 
the Majallah of the Ottoman civil specifically sets out that the only solution to hardship is that of 
‘tolerance’. In essence, the idea is that, if a supervening event occurs, the burden should be 
shared between all parties rather than just one
97
. 
In Islamic Law, impracticability has been discussed under the rule of the negation of hardship 
and the principle of ‘no unfair loss in Islam’. Consequently, a contract may be terminated if its 
performance becomes extremely burdensome for the promisor. Ibn al-Hammam states: ‘a 
contract whose performance becomes so burdensome as to involve great loss may be 
terminated’98. 
Samora Ibn Jondab had one palm tree in a house belonging to one of the residents of Medina, 
whose house was in the middle of the garden. To visit the tree, Samora used to enter the house 
without permission. The owner of the house told him to ask permission when he came, but 
Samora refused. He brought his complaint to the Prophet who asked Samora to seek permission 
if he wished to enter, but he refused. The Prophet proposed he exchange his tree with another, or 
even several trees, in another place, but he did not accept this either. Prophet addressed him and 
said, ‘You are a man who wants to cause loss’. Then the prophet said to the house owner that he 
should uproot the tree and throw it in front of Samora’s house99.In this case, there is no 
impossibility because Samora can enter a man’s garden, but it causes hardship for the man. 100 
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Accordingly, In Islamic Law, the contract can be discharged because of an unfair loss or harm 
for any party, even when the contract is not considered impossible to perform. The rule ‘no 
unfair loss in Islam’ is a corner stone of Islamic Law in many cases. It has frequently been 
invoked by traditional Muslim jurists to explain their opinions on the unacceptability of causing 
excessive losses or the termination of contracts because of a change of circumstances.  
The Islamic Figh Council sees that, if there is a change in circumstances that cause the contract 
to be viewed as impracticable to preform, such as radical changes in the prices of goods, for 
example, then the contract may be discharged, especially in the case of a long-term contract
101
.   
According to Islamic Law, not only the natural difficulties or a regular change of price can lead 
to a discharge of contract, such as the party receiving less than the profits expected upon entering 
into the contract; impracticability must result from supervening events, and the events must have 
made the performance of the contract excessively onerous for the disadvantaged party. In other 
words, impracticability is relevant if the hardship leads to a fundamental change in the 
equilibrium of the contract, and brings about a substantial imbalance. The parties generally enter 
into a contract with a reciprocal balance in their contractual relationship. 
In fact, the dispute appears in terms of the estimates of the degree of hardship. The question 
arises here as to the degree of impracticability needed in order for it be regarded as legally 
relevant. This is a complicated question. Impracticability is a relative concept that differs from 
one case to another. The writer would argue that the most difficult aspect of impracticability is 
this aspect of the concept, which makes it a very difficult and complex subject for judges and 
scholars. In consideration to a normal range of events, which cause normal and acceptable 
consequences in the course of performance of the contract to impossibility, there are different 
degrees of impracticability ranging from not making benefit to nearly impossibility. For 
example, in a contract for construction, the disadvantaged party, as a result of an increase in the 
price of building materials, would not make any profit as a result of the construction of buildings 
if he has to perform the contract in accordance with its original terms. Also, as a result of very 
drastic rises in the prices of building materials, he would even suffer a loss, which would ruin his 
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commercial enterprise if he were obliged to fulfil his contractual obligation within the original 
terms of the contract.  
However, determining the degree of hardship is a matter that depends mainly on the individual 
circumstances of each contract. Moreover, the general state of contractors might be considered 
relevant in this regard, and the impracticability or hardship that leads to discharged contract is 
not fixed by a specific percentage of loss. Accordingly, in Islamic Law, if there is dispute 
between parties about supervening events, i.e. whether it is considered impractical or not, in such 
a case, this may be subject to the discretionary power of the judge.
102
 In the case of Alsalem vs. 
Alhamdan, the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant to build houses. The plaintiff 
demanded the termination of the contract because of the increased price of rebar
103
. At the time 
of the formation of contract, the price per ton was 3,000 riyals; during the performance of the 
contract, the price per ton was 5,000 riyals. Accordingly, the plaintiff claimed that would cause 
him a great loss; however, the defendant refused this and said that there would be only a small 
amount of loss, which should not affect the contract. The court refused the claim of the plaintiff 
because the loss was not considered a hardship leading to impossibility or impracticability. 
Moreover, such a rise in prices is anticipated when parties enter into a contract because the price 
of construction materials is often unstable
104
.   
 
4.10.1 Currency Fluctuation 
 
This element considers the impracticability of the performance of contract under Islamic Law, 
and how this applies to the phenomenon of currency fluctuation. The issue of currency inflation 
has been considered in-depth by a number of jurists in mind of the disuse of currency. Notably, 
after clearly differentiating between adulterated pieces and gold and silver coins
105
, Ibn Abidin 
states that, should there be a change in the value of currency in question, there then needs to be 
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an amendment made to the contract. On the other hand, it is argued by Shafi and Hanbali laws 
that the contract be changed as a result of currency value-related changes
106
. 
The situation envisaged in this regard is that, when there is a drastic change in the currency of a 
particular country, thus meaning that it is much more expensive for a party to perform his 
obligations under contract. In a similar vein, a decrease in the value of currency may also make 
the price that the other party receives valueless. This context is also the subject of hardship 
because the severe change in the value of a certain currency distorts the balance between the 
contracting parties
107
. 
Such a situation was recently encountered by a country that applies Islamic Law as a matter of 
course—the Islamic Republic of Iran—which suffered a five-fold fall in currency following the 
US announcing the imposition of sanctions on the country as a result of strained foreign 
relations
108
. As well as the collapse of the Iraqi dinar after the second Gulf War, Iraqi Dinar in 
1988 was valued at 3.30 for one US Dollar; afterwards, a USD equalled more than three 
thousand Iraqi Dinars. In fact, currency changes form a large part of the case law surrounding the 
subject area of impracticability of contracts in Islamic Law. Most often, currency changes come 
about as a result of inflation, which is a normal course of events and could be considered 
foreseeable. As such, normal inflation in currency has not generally been regarded by courts to 
amount to a supervening event; however, where there has been exceptional rises in inflation, 
impracticability has been seen to occur, such as in a case where inflation leads to a rise in the 
price of currency by a high percentage. The particular rise is considered to be exceptional, as 
well as unforeseeable, and thus meets the requirements that need to be satisfied in order for an 
intervening event to have occurred
109
. 
 The problem with changes in currency and their tendency to result in the impracticability of 
contract is that currency is very time-sensitive. As set out above, the doctrine of intervening 
contingencies provides that any intervening event that renders a contract impracticable must 
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occur following the conclusion of the contract. Fluctuations in currency can therefore only lead 
to impracticability, where such changes occur following the entering into of an agreement. 
However, more complex situations can arise. 
In fact, the frustration of the contract due to fluctuations in currency should be discussed, 
although adjustment of prices, especially after the completion of the performance of the contract 
in the case of the loss of one of the parties of the contract, such as due to the change in the 
currency, also warrants attention. Moreover, if the parties cannot terminate the contract, such as 
the contract of loan, such as if one party borrows money from another, but before reneging the 
loan the value of the currency falls sharply, is also an instance that should be discussed. The 
precedents in Saudi courts support the role of the court in terms of modifying the price in order 
to achieve equality and justice
110
. 
 
4.11  Legal Effect of Frustration of Contract 
 
The effect of frustration is to discharge the contract totally. It must be pointed out and clarified, 
however, that, at all times, the doctrine of frustration occurs not in regard to impossible events, 
but to events that make the performance of a particular obligation hardship or impractical. As 
abovementioned, this means that judicial determination is often required to determine whether or 
not performance is, in fact, rendered onerous by a particular event; one party may disagree with 
such an allegation and accordingly put forward the idea that the hardship is not excessive nor 
disproportionate, but is simply a risk that is part and parcel of the whole agreement that 
concludes between the parties. Thus, courts have to state that any loss that must be suffered must 
be an ‘onerous’ one, and it is not assessed according to what profits were expected to be gained 
and are now lost, but where damage is actually caused. Thus, if as a result of a supervening event 
a party does not make profit as envisaged but neither does it make an excessive loss, the doctrine 
of supervening events cannot be relied upon to overrule the contract. 
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4.11.1 Retrospective Effect of Frustration 
 
There are different legal effects that can be seen in common law jurisdictions as well as those in 
Islamic contract law. When discharging, there are two theoretical legal positions: one can take 
the contract back to before it was agreed, placing both parties in the position they would have 
been in had the contract never been agreed in the first place; or on the other hand, one can take 
the contract forward in time to the position the parties would have been in had the agreement 
been performed. In common law jurisdictions, the latter amounts to awarding expectation 
damages to parties, whilst the former is viewed as rescission, and parties are granted reliance 
damages, namely the expenditure they have incurred as a result of entering into the agreement in 
the first place
111
.  
However, there are nuances to this legal position. The rescission of a contract means that, 
effectively, an event that renders the performance of a contract impossible and where its legal 
effects of frustration of contract apply retrospectively, they go back in time to when the contract 
was agreed and make it as if the contract was not agreed. However, this can only apply to 
contracts that are relatively short-term and which take place on an instantaneous basis
112
. 
However, this raises questions of damages, and this is one of the most contentious areas of 
frustration of contract. Where a contract is terminated retroactively, the rules of unjust 
enrichment are used to determine the damages to be paid. Where unjust enrichment is not 
possible, however, damages are ascertained according to the value of the subject matter of the 
contract. 
Islamic contract law operates so as to discharge the contracts prospectively; thus, any further 
agreements that are to become in the future are terminated, and so the frustration operates only as 
grounds of discharge of future obligations. With this noted, the discharge of contract by 
frustration in Islamic Law does not operate retrospectively
113
, with the example given by jurists 
relating to the subject matter in a tenancy contract being destroyed after the tenant used the 
subject matter, but when the ruin occurs before the end of the time of the contract. The 
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frustration operates in the remaining time of the contract only, meaning the tenant is obliged to 
pay for the time before the destroying of the subject matter
114
.  
This position is well illustrated by the case of Abdul Latif Jameel Company vs. Fahd Alshamiry, 
where the judge ruled that the defendant must pay money outstanding before the burning of the 
vehicle, meaning the frustration did not bring parties back in time to when the contract was 
agreed
115
. 
 
4.11.2  Automatic Discharge of Contract 
 
The effects of frustration on both parties of the contract are automatically excused in general 
from the future performance of the contract after the occurrence of frustrating events. In the 
contract of agency in Islamic Law, jurists agree that the death of either the principal or the agent 
automatically brings the relationship to an end. By the death of the principal, the agent’s 
authority is discharged. Thus, the agent can no longer bind the principal by acts he purports to 
perform in the principal’s name. Also, the agent cannot bind his dispositions on the heirs of the 
principal because they did not authorise him to do so
116
. 
In the contract of sale, if the subject matter is destroyed prior to delivery, the contract will be 
discharged immediately and automatically without any election by either party or no need to a 
judicial decision. Importantly, however, this is not the opinion of all jurists in Islamic Law, with 
some jurists
117
 considering that the contract is not discharged automatically, but rather needs a 
discharger to terminate the contract. The discharger will be a party or judge, with the party’s 
election declaring its termination of contract, or the judicial decision declaring that the contract is 
discharged
118
. Accordingly, if there are supervening events that render the performance of the 
contract of tenancy impossible because of the subject matter being destroyed, in this opinion, the 
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tenant has the right to terminate the contract or to otherwise remain in order to continue until the 
end of the contract time
119
.  
However, there is a need to differentiate between frustration and breach of contract, which gives 
the victim the right of option in terms of whether or not the contract should be considered 
discharged. The nature and principal of the frustration of the contract are also a purpose of 
frustration, which cause the contract to be discharged immediately and automatically. However 
in Islamic law the frustration is not always automatic discharge, the party may has the option to 
discharge the contract or perform the contract such partial impossibility.  
 
4.11.3 Accrued Obligations Remain 
 
As mentioned above, the contract is discharged not at the option of one or other of the parties but 
is brought to an end automatically, releasing both parties from any further performance of the 
contract. However, the legal rights or obligations already accrued and due before the frustration 
event occurred still remain. As such, if one party made a payment in advance of the performance, 
in Islamic Law, the money paid is recovered in the event of frustration, such as when a buyer 
purchases a car and pays the seller, but the car is destroyed before delivery, at the fault of the 
parties. In such a situation, the seller must return the money to the buyer and he must bear the 
risk of the occurrence of the frustrating event.  
The obligations that matured prior to frustration remain to be performed. Jurists provide an 
example
120
 where, if one party rents a house from another party for one year, after five months, if 
the house is destroyed by an Act of God, the tenant must pay the rental of five months to the 
landlord because it was agreed as due prior to the occurrence of frustration
121
. The reason of rule 
is the failure of the party to complete performance because of a supervening event, meaning he 
has the right to be paid for his achievement of work and if the obligation did not recover 
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anything in partial performance, this can lead to an unjust enrichment of the other party, who 
gets benefit without payment for it
122
.  
This position is further illustrated by the case of Bafail vs. Alsowat, during which the plaintiff 
rented out two shops to the defendant for 40,000 Riyals each year with the aim of them being 
used as workshops for fixing cars. The length of the contract was three years but, after one year 
and seven months, the local authority removed all shops in order to expand the street. The 
defendant paid just for one year and refused to pay for seven months as he believed that three 
years was the duration of the contract, and that the termination of the contract was not the result 
of his fault, thus meaning the cancellation of the contract. The court considered that the price of 
rent for a period of seven months was due before the impossibility of the performance of the 
contract, and that the defendant received a benefit in that period. Therefore, the court ruled that 
the defendant must pay the plaintiff 23,333 Riyals
123
.
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                                                      CHAPTER FIVE 
 Frustration of Contract by Impossibility of Performance of 
Contracts in Islamic Law  
 
5.1  Introduction 
  
In the previous chapter, the frustration of contract in Islamic law was discussed, with the 
impossibility of performance of contract considered the main part of frustration of contract and 
one of the most contentious aspects of frustration of contract in Islamic law. This is recognised 
owing to the fact that most cases of the application of frustration fall under the doctrine of 
impossibility. Impossibility can be regarded as taking place ‘when there supervening events 
without default of either party and for which the contract makes no sufficient provision which so 
significant changes the nature (not merely the expense or difficulty) of the outstanding 
contractual rights and/or obligations from what the parties could reasonable have contemplated at 
the time of execution that it would be unjust hold them to the literal sense of its stipulations in 
the new circumstances/ in such a case the law declares both parties to be discharged from further 
performance. Accordingly, there is the need to undertake an analysis centred on whether or not 
there can, in fact, be a doctrine of impossibility of performance in Islamic contract law. 
Importantly, the difficulty may lie in actual frustration to be found; Islamic contract law, 
however, treats matters differently. Thus, all cases and issues relating to impossibility—which 
are discussed separately under different contracts in Islamic jurisprudence to form a whole 
unified doctrine of impossibility of performance of contract in Islamic law—will be gathered.  
As we will see in this chapter, impossibility of performance of contract occurs because of 
supervening events relating to the subject matter ‘objective impossibility’, such as the 
destruction of the subject matter after contract formation but prior to delivery. Whether it 
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absolute impossibility, partial or temporary impossibility. Impossibility also occurs relating to 
parties of contract ‘subjective impossibility’, such as death, the illness of one party, or one party 
becoming bankrupt. Such issues will be discussed in the following sections.   
 
 
5.2   Concept of Impossibility   
 
When we look in-depth at the rules of termination of the contract in Islamic law, it may be seen 
that the jurists sometimes use different legal terms for one doctrine: for example, in the case of 
the impossibility of performance of the contract, some jurists use the term ‘force majeure’, whilst 
others use ‘impossibility’ and others use ‘supervening events’. Nevertheless, all terms possess 
the same meaning and the same effects. 
In Islamic Law, it should be recognised that, if performance is entirely impossible at the time the 
contract is made, it is considered as a void contract, where such an impossibility may result from 
either the impossibility for the contract to be fulfilled, such as in the instance of the sale of a bird 
in the sky or a fish in the sea, or otherwise a complete lack of contractual subject matter.
1
 
Impossibility in this sense refers to the mistake not to involve frustration. The distinction 
between the concepts of ‘impossibility’ and ‘mistake’ within Islamic law engages additional 
consideration of the related concepts of ‘intention’, ‘consent’ and ‘motive’. The ‘operative 
intention’ refers to the state of mind of the parties at the time at which the contract is established, 
with ‘motive’ recognised as the underlying and enduring purpose for the contract and its 
completion.
2
 
In Islamic legal history, the ‘sanctity of contract’ has long been recognised that, in some 
contractual circumstances, such as the death of a contracting party, it was impossible to insist on 
performance. Islamic impossibility reflects the pursuit of the optimal balance between fairness 
and justice as one collective ideal, and the sanctity of contract on the other. It is of interest that 
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this dynamic mirrors the classic understanding of common law rigidity and the ameliorating 
effect of equity.
3
 Impossibility has taken on an even greater importance given the seemingly 
limitless range of potential intervening acts that might threaten the ability of parties to complete 
a contractual bargain. War, insurrection and natural disasters are traditional examples; Islamic 
impossibility and its emphasis on the broader net cast by impracticality leads to the further 
possibility that the defence extends to circumstances where the event that triggers the 
impossibility claim may pose undue hardship, such as currency fluctuation, as opposed to a 
contract that simply cannot be completed.
4
 
Rayner notes that any act of God or unforeseen condition is recognised under Islamic law as 
force majeure. The key distinction is the unforeseen condition; these may include changes in 
parties’ personal circumstances, such as a significant loss of income, personal illness, or a similar 
event that may have a subjective component.
5
 The nature and extent of the change relied upon to 
establish Sharia compliant force majeure may trigger differing opinions as to what is truly 
‘unforeseen’. Further, meteorological events that fall short of being classed natural disasters are 
commonly associated with force majeure, such as events of rain, cold or drought that may affect 
a crop yield, as opposed to its destruction. Such instances may permit the affected party to rely 
on the impossibility of performance doctrine in order to avoid further obligations.
6
  
As has been seen through the previous debate, the concept of impossibility of Islamic law is 
termed in various phrases, namely force majeure,
7
 supervening events, exceptional 
circumstances and impossibility. However, frustration has been discussed in the previous chapter 
as having various applications, such as frustration of purpose and impracticability. In this vein, 
we will discuss the impossibility of performance of contract, which is regarded as the main field 
of application of frustration of contract. Moreover, the concept adopted will be that where it is 
considered impossible only through physicality or illegality. The impossibility (istihalah) of 
contract which will be discussed here and recognised in Islamic law is when a party may be 
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released from a contract on the grounds that a supervening event occurs after the conclusion of 
the contract but prior to the performance of the contract, where this renders the performance 
physical impossible or legal impossibility without the fault of parties. In this regard, it is stated 
through Islamic Law that there must be absolute impossibility, although it is noted that non-
performance may be defended through relative impossibility, i.e. when there is a link between 
impossibility and one of the contracting parties.
8
 
In Islamic law, in order to consider the change in circumstances as impossibility, the following 
elements must be included: 
 A supervening event (unexpected) occurs, causing a fundamental and radical change to 
be imposed upon the nature of the contract.  
 The circumstances render the contract physically and legally impossibility—not only 
inflicting hardship.  
 The circumstances must be out of the control of the parties, and neither party should be 
responsible for it. 
 
5.3  Applications of Impossibility of Performance of Contract  
 
Before looking in further detail as to how this rationale has been translated into applications of 
the doctrine of impossibility, one must first consider how Islamic law treats different events. In 
the case of Islamic law, some parts of impossibility and supervening events are discussed under 
the contract of sale, and sometimes some of the details fall under the lease contract or fall under 
al-jawaih and so on. In this research, applications of impossibility will be classified in a different 
way from what which can be seen in the books of Islamic law; this ensures clarity for the reader. 
Firstly, a contract is rendered impossible because the subject matter has been destroyed before 
delivery, or the delivery of it is impossible, or the method of performance is rendered impossible, 
or there has been a death or illness, bankruptcy or insolvency that subsequently renders the 
delivery of a subject matter impossible and/or illegal. In Islamic law, these are all considered to 
                                                          
8
 Amkhan, ‘The Effect of Change in Circumatances in Arac Contract Law’(n 4). 
140 
 
be events that fall under the doctrine of supervening contingencies, and are therefore covered 
below. Accordingly, the impossibility is related to the subject matter of contract or to relining to 
the parties of the contract.  
Islamic law considers that the contract is frustrated by impossibility if the impossibility is 
objective or subjective. The difference between objective and subjective impossibility is the 
difference between ‘the thing cannot be done’ and ‘I cannot do it’. Subjective contract refers to 
the failure of the party to perform the contract because of impossibility for causes personal to 
him only, in personal contracts such as agency contract or contracts with a doctor to treat patient. 
In Islamic law, the individual must be the same person performing the contract himself: for 
example, if someone agreed with a skilled jeweller to make a ring, Islamic law obliges the 
jeweller himself to perform the contract, and not to give the job to another maker. If there any 
subjective impossibilities preventing the jeweller from performing the contract, such as illness or 
if he has died, the contract will then be frustrated.
9
  
Accordingly, it is very clear that the rules of frustration in Islamic law are liberal, meaning that 
almost any kind of subjective impossibility can release a party from their obligations. Coulson 
states: 
‘either party to a contract of hire of premises may revoke the contract because of a changing in 
personal circumstances - the owner, for example, because he incurs a debt which he can pay only 
by the sale of the premises or the renter because, for example, he becomes bankrupt and leaves 
the market, or wishes to undertake a journey, or changes his profession or craft’.10  
Saudi courts recognise the subjective impossibility in personal contract the case of Ibn huweml 
vs. Gaze.
11
 In this case, the plaintiff entered into a contract with Gaze, who is the owner of a 
home decoration workshop. The job was to fix the decoration in the house of the plaintiff. There 
was a clause in the contract that specifies a particular worker to do the job. However, prior to 
starting the work, the police arrested the worker. He was sent to jail and subsequently deported 
from the country for breaking immigration law. The plaintiff wanted to discharge the contract on 
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this basis, whilst the defendant wanted to keep the contract and claimed that he had another 
worker of the same ability. The court held that the contract was frustrated owing to the absence 
of the worker.       
In contrast, other events may affect the performance of a contract, such as the destruction of a 
subject matter after delivery, partial impossibility, temporary impossibility and impossibility by 
illegality. The analysis of Islamic law shows that all of these are treated differently; these will be 
analysed in further detail below.  
Thus, one of the first frustrating events that must be taken into account is the destruction of a 
subject matter of contract, which depends on the time at which such destruction takes place. This 
classification is particularly relevant when dealing with the same or similar contracts: 
1. Destruction of the subject - matter after the formation of contract but before delivery; 
2. Destruction of the subject matter after delivery; 
3. Destruction of the subject - matter after part performance. 
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5.4  Impossibility Relating to the Subject Matter of the Contract 
 
The most common case of impossibility is where it relates to the subject matter of the contract. 
This impossibility will typically take one of two forms: firstly, as a fact unknown to the 
contracting parties, the contract subject matter may not have existed at the time of contract 
formation; secondly, the subject matter may be lost or destroyed prior to contract completion. 
The former circumstances are similar to those found when the parties are operating under a 
mutual mistake. Where the subject matter does not exist or never existed, and such facts are 
known to both parties, Islamic law regards the suggested contract as one that was never formed, 
given the parties could not have been serious in their intention to create legal relations. With this 
noted, the destruction of the subject after the contract is formed is discussed. 
  
5.4.1  Destruction of the Subject Matter after Contract Formation but Prior to Delivery  
 
In Islamic law, the subject matter of the contract must be in existence at the time of the contract 
and must be in the possession of the party,
12
 such as the seller, hirer or loaner, etc. Also, the 
subject matter must be able to be delivered to another contracting party.
13
 In Islamic law, when 
the subject matter of the contract is destroyed following the formation of the contract and prior to 
delivery or risk being passed to the buyer, the contract will be discharged if the destruction 
occurred during supervening events. If the parties enter into a contract to sell a specific subject 
matter but prior to delivery to the buyer it is destroyed, the contract will then be frustrated. 
Importantly, the buyer is not bound to pay the price, and the seller will bear the risk of loss. 
Islamic Law emphasises that property and risk are not passed together. Accordingly, the 
destruction of goods that have been sold but not delivered and the risks related with such are 
endured by the seller, which would then cause contract frustration unless the seller has asked the 
buyer to take the possession of the goods. However, a distinction must be drawn here: if a 
supervening event occurs during the performance of the contract, the only reason the event 
occurred during this period of time was owing to one of the parties delaying the performance of 
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the contract to such an extent that if the delay had not occurred the supervening event would then 
have occurred subsequent to the performance of the contract. In such a situation, the party that 
caused the delay is precluded from arguing that a supervening event should have affected the 
agreement.
14
  
Under Islamic doctrine, it is possible to extend the impossibility that arises when the contract 
subject matter is destroyed after the point of contract formation to circumstances where the 
subject matter has either ceased to be useful due to natural circumstances or the effect of a 
specific intervening act. An example is where parties agree that land will be used by two parties 
where one will develop the land for agriculture and the owner receiving a percentage of 
harvested crops. The Arabic expression muzziraah—notably translated as the act of sowing 
seeds—is the essence of the agreement; where the land ceases to be productive, Islamic law 
deems the contract impossible to perform.
15
 Malik ibn Anas
16
 provides a case of individual 
purchasing oil from a bottle, but the bottle break and the oil becomes missed prior to delivery to 
the purchaser. In this circumstance, the purchaser then wants his money to be refunded, and the 
transaction between the two is then frustrated.
17
  
The destruction of the specific subject matter by supervising events, such as fire, earthquake, 
wind, cold or flood, for example, could render the contract frustrated without any disagreement 
amongst scholars in Islamic law, but only if the subject matter is specified in the contract. As 
such, when the parties agree that A shall sell his own car to B for a fixed price, if the vehicle was 
stored elsewhere and destroyed by fire, the contract is rendered impossible to perform. This 
example is distinct from the contract where the car company agrees to sell B a vehicle of the type 
described, where the intended vehicle is destroyed; however, the contract is not impossible to 
perform as the company can provide another vehicle of the same type, which would satisfy A’s 
obligations.
18
  
Another situation may be in regard to when a third party is responsible for subject matter 
destruction. In this case, it is held by Islamic law that such a person is then regarded as 
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responsible for any damage or loss incurred. On the other hand, there is another opinion in 
Islamic law that states a third party should be held responsible; he shall be liable to the buyer 
with the buyer then liable to the seller.
19
 However, the majority of scholars consider that the 
contract is frustrated and buyer is released from any liability, with the third party responsible for 
paying the seller. In actual fact, this opinion is consistent with the principles of Islamic law 
because the third party is a foreign cause, which is similar to a supervening event in the sense 
that both are outside of the control of the parties.
20
 
If the seller is responsible for subject matter destruction, it is held by Islamic law that such a 
person is then regarded as responsible for any damage or loss. However, whether or not the 
contract is discharged is viewed by jurists differently: if it is not discharged, the duty of the seller 
is then to provide a substitute (mettle) comparable to it, i.e. goods that are able to be replaced by 
something similar and in an equal quantity, such as a car. In the event of anything dissimilar 
(qimee), i.e. goods that cannot be replaced by something similar, such as a house, for instance, 
the seller is then bound to pay for their value.
21
 Nevertheless, the majority of jurists see that the 
contract, in such a case, is discharged, and the seller bears the loss; if, on the other hand, the 
purchaser has caused the destruction, the contract is not discharged and purchaser shall be 
responsible for the payment of the agreed price. In this latter case, the perspective is adopted that 
the subject matter had been delivered to the purchaser.
22
 
This impossibility will typically take one of two forms: firstly, as a fact unknown to the 
contracting parties, the contract subject matter may not have existed at the time of contract 
formation; and secondly, the subject matter may be lost or destroyed prior to contract 
performance. The prior circumstances are similar to those found when the parties are operating 
under a mutual mistake.  
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In Islamic law specifically, many cases of the impossibility of performance are discussed under 
the doctrine of Al-Jaihah;
23
 thus, the rules of distraction of the subject matter apply to all kinds of 
contract, such as contract sales, lease, loan, transportation and construction, etc.  
The essential requirement in order for a supervening event to qualify as frustration is that it must 
make the performance of the contract impossible; thus, the destruction of the subject matter of 
the contract must make the performance of the contract impossible to frustrate the contract. If 
there is minor damage of the subject matter and the contract can be performed, this does not fall 
under rules of frustration. In the case of Alotaibi vs. ALJ Instalment and Leasing Company, the 
plaintiff took a car from the defendant by a lease purchase contract. A fire burned a small part of 
the car, and the plaintiff demanded the contract be terminated; however, the defendant refused 
and stated that the car was still in working condition, and minor damage could be repaired by the 
defendant on the basis of the contract. The court held that there should be no discharge of the 
contract because the contract could still be performed.
24
 
In regard to the amount of damage that would qualify for frustration under Islamic law, Maliki 
School
25
 recognises this is possible if the supervening event destroys one-third or more of the 
subject matter. However, there is no minimum damage required in order for the doctrine of 
impossibility by destruction of the subject matter of contract to operate under. Through the 
Hanbali School, Ibn Qudamh states, ‘the Prophet order[ed] the reduction of the price in the event 
of crop damage, whether the loss is one-third of the fruit sold or less’.26 More specifically, this 
refers to if the damage means the performance of the contract is impossible—even when the 
destruction if one-third of the subject matter or less.  
The possession of the subject matter by the seller means that it must be in the physical or 
constructive possession of the seller when the item is sold to another person. Constructive 
possession refers to a situation where a possessor has actual control over the subject matter 
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without actually having physical control of it; however, the subject matter has come into his risk, 
and all rights and liabilities, including the risk of destruction.
27
  
 
 
5.4.1.1 The reasons for the application of the rule: 
 
Importantly, a statement was made by the Prophet Muhammad, as follows: ‘If you were to sell 
fruits to your brother and these is a stricken with Calamity, it is not permissible for you to get 
anything from him. Why do you get the wealth of your brother, without justification?’28 Such an 
expression provides for the rule that, if the subject matter of the sale is destroyed prior to 
delivery, this is a risk that should be shouldered by the seller. Looking in future detail at the 
rationale behind this, it is a common feature of Islamic religious law that all regulations are to 
apply to persons unless they are to cause hardship. Thus, the Quran, the religious scripture of 
Islamic law, specifically states, ‘there is no hardship in religion’.29 Moreover, the verse is seen to 
mean that any obligations—spiritual or otherwise—imposed on persons do not have to be 
performed if they would cause disproportionate hardship to a person.
30
  
With the aforementioned taken into consideration, Muslim jurists have sought to establish the 
answer behind why, when the property has been transferred, the seller continues to shoulder the 
risk of the goods when considering that their subsequent destruction would ultimately cause the 
contract to be terminated. Such jurists argue that the overall nature of a non-gratuitous contract 
necessitates that an individual who does not receive what was promised to his side of the contract 
should not be required to fulfil his own responsibilities concerning the other party.
31
 
Accordingly, such individuals state that, when a situation of destruction of the subject matter 
arises during the time of sale prior to delivery, it should be required that the ownership of the 
goods is returned to the seller prior to destruction. As such, it is the seller’s property that is 
destroyed, and thus it is the seller who should shoulder total destruction risk. Essentially, 
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although it may be seem that such a situation is unjust to the seller, it remains logical when 
considering the aforementioned argument.  
Under Islamic law, when the subject matter of a given contract is still in the possession of the 
debtor, such a seller utilises warranty (daman al-aqd), which refers to the rules that allocate 
risk.
32
 When the subject matter of the contract is destroyed, as in the case where the sold 
property has been destroyed prior to delivery or when the hired subject matter is destroyed whilst 
in the possession of the hirer, the concept of warranty (daman al-aqd) applies.
33
 This means that 
the holder of the subject matter in question in warranty (daman al-aqd) will be responsible for the 
destruction of the subject matter.
34
 
 
 
5.4.2  Destruction of the Subject Matter after Contract Formation but After Delivery 
 
The most important requirement for the purpose of these discussions is that any supervening 
even that occurs must occur during performance. If a supervening event occurs before any 
agreement, the Islamic law deals with this case as mistake. A supervening event that occurs after 
the contractual obligations have been performed, such as the destruction of the subject matter, 
there is no substantive effect on the contract—no frustration of contract in this case. Indeed, this 
can be considered a logical corollary of the fact that the contract has now been performed and 
cannot be affected by subsequent events. Indeed, such a position affirms the fact that any 
supervening event that occurs subsequent to the contract being performed cannot affect the 
contract.
35
 As a result, one can see that any destruction of the subject matter of the contract that 
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occurs after the delivery of the agreement cannot affect the contract. Thus, the subject matter is 
at the buyer's risk because the subject matter of the contract has been delivered to the buyer, thus 
becoming his responsibility, just like any other property in the possession of the buyer. More 
specifically, the seller has performed his contractual obligation, meaning the buyer must pay the 
price to seller. However, there is one situation where the contract may be discharged after 
delivery: if the destruction of the subject matter occurred as a result of the seller’s actions, the 
contract will be discharged; however, this does not fall under the doctrine of impossibility but 
rather under the breach of the contract.
36
    
In the case of a lease contract, this deals with a continuous performance. In such cases, delivery 
is only a pre requisite for performance and, therefore, destruction of the subject matter even after 
delivery may ultimately cause the contract to be discharged because the subject matter is still in 
the possession of the lessor. At this point, it needs to be recognised that, should the lease be 
centred on unascertained goods, the destruction of the item given by the lessor could be 
considered within the context of Islamic. For example, if one party agrees to rent his vehicle to 
another and the vehicle is destroyed, the contract will then be discharged, with both parties free 
from fulfilling any future responsibilities imposed by the agreement. In contrast, however, 
should one party agree to rent his vehicle to another party and the vehicle end up damaged prior 
to the contract being fulfilled, the lessor may then be obliged to offer a substitute owing to the 
fact that one of the alternatives selected by the obligor has, whilst conducting his contractual 
obligation, perished. Importantly, however, a contract centred on unascertained goods cannot be 
described as having routinely changed into an agreement concerning specific goods owing to the 
exercise of choice implemented by the obligor.
37
 
If one party has the right to terminate the contract, khiygr al-shart takes place in cases where the 
item sold is destroyed after delivery but during a period within which one or both parties have 
the right to terminate the contract or to continue: for example, if after three days the subject 
matter is destroyed, the destruction of the subject matter does not frustrate the contract; therefore, 
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the buyer must pay the price to the seller
38
 because the subject matter is delivered to the buyer 
according to the contract and it in the seller’s hands.39  
 
5.4.3  Partial Impossibility 
 
The destruction of the subject matter is not necessary in order for complete destruction. If there 
are supervening events that cause part of the goods sold to be destroyed, without the fault of 
either party and before the risk of the loss passes to the buyer, the seller is then under obligation 
to carry out the performance achievable and possible; however, if the subject matter of the 
contract is partially destroyed by a supervening event, the rule is that, if the loss reduces the 
amount of quantity stipulated in the sale of items, as estimated by measure of capacity, weight or 
enumeration, the sale is discharge in respect of what has been damaged, and the purchaser has 
the option of discharge the whole contract because the deal is partitioned and consequently 
cannot be performed as was agreed originally.
40
 Alternatively, the purchaser may take delivery 
of the remainder for its share in the price. The option of price reduction, however, is only 
available and viable if the presumption can be made that a certain portion of the price can be 
attributed to the part of the goods damaged or destroyed. 
For instance, should an order of wheat be in the process of delivery when half of the rice is 
damaged by rain, the non-damaged half should be assigned 50% of the price. Another example is 
if there is one hundred kilos of oil sold but twenty kilos were destroyed before delivery. 
Accordingly, the purchaser would then be able to choose whether or not the contract should be 
performed for the remaining part of the subject matter, with this accepted at a rate to be agreed 
upon. If the contract is to be discharged completely, the buyer may exercise his option of 
discrepancy. In Islamic law, this is referred to as partition of the transaction (tafaruq al-safaqa) 
due to partial destruction of the sold subject matter. If part of the subject matter sold is destroyed 
whilst in the possession of the seller prior to delivery, the sale may be cancelled in proportion to 
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the destroyed part or the whole contract may be discharged. The buyer has the option of either 
accepting the remainder for its share in the price or altogether avoiding the whole contract 
because the transaction is partitioned, and accordingly cannot be performed as was originally 
agreed.
41
 
The rationale for this is provided owing to the fact that every part of the subject matter of the 
contract covered by the agreement and every part of the subject matter of the contract is equal to 
a part of the price; destruction of part of the subject matter leads to discharge of the contract and 
the reduction of the price of the part. The reason behind the option of the buyer to discharge the 
contract is explained because the part of the goods may not be useful to the buyer; rather, he 
needs all the goods together. This situation can be seen in the example where a buyer requires a 
factory to make seats with the same specific shape and a certain colour in order to put these in a 
ballroom; however, before delivery, a large number of the seats are burned. This goes against the 
specifications of the buyer as he wants all the hall seats to be the same; thus, he may choose to 
discharge the contract. 
If, on the other hand, partial destruction causes absence in the description of the purchased 
subject matter, which are things that are included in the sale without being mentioned explicitly, 
such as trees on land sold, the purchaser has the option to accept the sale for the fixed price or to 
discharge the whole contract, in which case the seller bears the loss.
42
 
Markedly, much the same principle is seen to apply to leases. For instance, if a property is being 
leased and is partially destroyed, the lessee is then afforded the option of either claiming rent-
reduction relating to the loss incurred, or otherwise entirely discharge the lease from the time at 
which the destruction occurs. It should be recognised that, should decline be of a type whereby 
the contract can no longer be viewed as suitable for its normal purpose, for example if there is 
the destruction of the wall, for example, and the flaw cannot be fixed, the contract is then 
discharged from the date at which deterioration occurs, without the lessee afforded any option in 
this.
43
 On the other hand, if the lessor is happy to fix the issue without inflicting any damage 
upon the lessee, the contract can then not be discharged by the lessee. With this noted, it is 
                                                          
41
 M Ibn Abidin, Radd al Muhtar ( vol 4, Dar Al Kotob Al Ilmiyah 1992) 566 
42
 al-Kasani, Badai al-Sanai ( vol 5, Dar Al Kotob Al Ilmiyah 1986) 239 
43
  M Islam ( n 27)  
151 
 
believed by some Muslim jurists that the right of avoidance that notably arises following the 
subject matter’s decline or destruction cannot be described as terminated by the subsequent 
repair of the lease subject matter.
44
 
When there is a partial destruction of the subject matter of the contract after delivery, the 
contract is fully performed and the buyer cannot discharge the contract; the subject matter 
becomes the buyer’s responsibility, thus meaning he also has to bear the loss. 
 
5.4.4  Destruction of Subject Matter after Partial Performance 
 
Before impossibility arises, if a part of the contractual obligation has been performed and if only 
part of the subject matter was delivered to buyer but another part of the subject matter still not 
received is destroyed by supervening event, the buyer would have the right to reject the partial 
performance and discharge the contract with return of the delivered part to the seller. The buyer 
can also accept delivery of a quantity less than agreed, but is then liable to pay for the part 
actually delivered. 
45
 
The buyer does not always have the option to reject or accept partial performance; there are types 
of contract that will be discharged if the subject matter is destroyed after partial performance, 
one example being where the lease subject matter is destroyed following the lessee’s partial use 
of the subject matter. In this circumstance, as held by a Muslim jurists, the contract should be 
considered discharged; however, in order to perform the stipulations of justice and thereby avoid 
any undue losses, the party receiving partial performance receives a quasi-contractual
46
 
obligation, which stipulates the payment of a fair rent. The discharge of such a contract from the 
time at which destruction occurs—with the rent then needing to be accordingly reduced—would 
mean, in this case, that the contract is automatically brought to an end at the time of the 
frustrating event, and that the effect of frustration is to release both parties from any further 
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performance of the contract. Moreover, any monies payable before frustration remain due. In this 
regard, Ibn Qudamh states: ‘if one hired a particular riding camel or the letting of a property with 
payment taken in advance’. He emphasises that, ‘should an accident occur that causes the death 
of the camel or damage to the property, the camel or house owner would then be required to 
return the funds to the individual who had paid in advance, with such a situation then meaning 
that the situation would then be settled’.47  
 
5.4.5  Unavailability of Subject Matter  
 
A contract may be considered frustrated even if the subject matter of the contract is not 
destroyed, where contractual obligations may also be discharged due to the unviability of the 
subject matter, such as if it has been seized, stolen or is no longer in existence in the market. The 
scholars give an example of the unavailability of subject matter if the parities entered into a 
salam contract:
48
 when the buyer pays the price to sellers to buy kind of goods, such as cotton, 
and before the due time of delivery there is no availability of cotton in the market or in farms 
because of an increase in demand, the contract would be frustrated and the seller would need to 
return the price back to buyer.
49
 Another example would be if someone bought a slave
50
 but 
following the conclusion of the contract but before delivery the slave escaped. In such a case, the 
contract would be frustrated due to the unavailability of the subject matter. There is a case that 
illustrates the discharge of contract by the unavailability of the subject matter: that of Saleh Al-
shehail vs. Abu Salah compant.
51
 In this case, the parities signed a contract whereby the 
defendant would import specified lifts from Italy to fix them in the building of the plaintiff 
within a six-month period. However, because of unavailability of the lifts from the factory in 
Italy, the factory needed to make new lifts, which would take a longer period of time. 
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Accordingly, the court held that the contract would be discharged due to the unavailability of the 
subject matter in the due time of delivery, and that the defendant must refund the price paid.   
Accordingly, the unavailability of the subject matter makes the contract impossible to preform 
because the circumstances are beyond the control of the parties. It is similar to the distraction of 
the subject matter as the seller cannot deliver the goods.    
 
5.4.6  Destruction of an Essential Thing or Person   
 
There may be cases where a specific item itself is not to be sold or transferred in any other way, 
but the contract requires—to enable its performance—the continued existence or coming into 
existence of that specific thing. In such cases, the non-existence, destruction or unavailability of 
that thing will bring about the end of the contract. For example, should a particular factory or site 
require the installation of equipment, the destruction of the location would mean the discharge of 
the contract—irrespective of the fact that the subject matter of the contract is not the site. In this 
same way, an agricultural partnership agreement (muzirah), i.e. when the farmer makes a 
contract with landlord to rents the land for the growing of seeds, the contract would be 
discharged should the means of irrigation, i.e. an underground water channel, not be able to be 
used or if there is a lack of water in the well.
52
  
Sometimes, it may be that the essential person has died or is otherwise unavailable.
53
 The jurists 
provide an example where a father pays a woman to feed his baby milk, but after the conclusion 
of the contract, the baby died and the contract was discharged;
54
 as another example, the death of 
the child may discharge the contract between the child’s father and the hospital for the child’s 
treatment. In the contract of suretyship (Kafalah), this is a contract whereby the surety 
undertakes a creditor to produce or bring a debtor person before the police or the court.
55
 In a 
contract of suretyship, the contract will be brought to an end and the surety (kafil) discharged 
from his obligation to produce the principal when the debtor has died.  
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In the above cases, the availability of the essential thing or person is necessary to the 
performance of contract, thus meaning the contract must be discharged if the thing or person is 
not available because of effect of the purpose of the contract. In the case of Almajdouie group vs. 
al gabr transportation, the parties signed a contract of carriage of goods, where the defendant 
would carry the goods from Jeddah to the plaintiff in Riyadh; however, after making the contract 
but before loading the goods, two drivers escaped with the two trucks. Accordingly, the plaintiff 
brought his goods through the use of another company; however, the defendant demanded a 
delay penalty. The court rejected the plaintiff’s claim because of the absence of drivers and 
trucks, which were recognised as essential for performance, combined with the escape being 
beyond the parties’ control.56   
 
5.5  Impossibility of the Contract Relating to the Parties 
 
This section considers a number of different circumstances wherein contract performance is not 
possible owing to a number of conditions being apparent, for either one or more of the parties 
involved. Notably, a number of different types of impossibility will be addressed, namely 
interdiction, bankruptcy, insolvency, death, illness, inability, and the refusal of one party to 
perform or receive the agreed performance. In actual fact, the impossibility of the contract 
relating to the parties is less in application than the relating subject matter. The objective 
impossibility has more applications and cases than the subjective impossibility.   
 
 
5.5.1  Death of the Party 
 
The death of one party of a revocable contract, or personal contract, has the result of discharging 
the contract in the sense of requiring personal performance. In contrast, however, when 
considering irrevocable contracts, an obligor’s death does not impact the contract’s validity, nor 
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does it mean the liability of the estate is no longer applicable. Overall, the general rule is that, 
upon the death of a party, contractual liabilities pass to that person's personal representatives. 
Importantly, it should be recognised that, overall, the obligations and rights afforded by Islamic 
Law are on-going and continuous—even following death. For instance, in the view of Ibn 
Qudamh, should there have been the setting of a snare during the lifetime of the deceased, the 
estate then owns any animals caught following his death. Equally, the estate of the decreased is 
held responsible for any damaged caused if, for example, during his lifetime the deceased dug a 
well that subsequently caused injury to an individual.
57
  
However, in consideration to agreements comprising a ‘personal element’, i.e. where the 
individual in question is required to conduct a personal act of some kind, the death of the 
individual induces the termination of the agreement within the contexts of Islamic law . For 
instance, an author make an agreement with a publisher to write a book. If the author died, this 
would render the contract impossible to perform. The agency contract is discharged by the death 
of either party; also, the employment contract is discharged by the death of the employee.
58
 
Markedly, Saudi Labour Law considers that the death of employees will cause the contract to be 
terminated, whilst the death of the employer does not lead to the termination of the contract in 
general.
59
  
If the contract does have a personal nature, the death of either party will not render the contract 
discharged. For example, if there is a contract to sell a car, if one party died after the conclusion 
of the contract, the contract must be performed if the contract was made between two people. 
However, if the sale of the subject matter relies on the personality of the seller or his reputation, 
such as in the case of a contract of manufacture (Istisna), the death of the seller would bring 
about the end of the contract.
60
   
With this taken into account, it is not easy to draw a line between a personal contract and other 
contracts; sometimes the differences are clear, but sometimes it is not easy to establish the 
differences. Moreover, it may not be enough to have a contract with a company. For instance, if 
there is a contract with a decoration company for fixing the decoration of a home but there is the 
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demand in the contract for a particular employee to do the job, the contract would be discharged 
if the employee detailed were to die.  
One last point is worth mentioning: although death usually affects contractual obligations in a 
negative sense, it may also have the reverse effect in terms of activating a contractual obligation 
in Islamic law. Thus, a valid declaration or offer of bequest becomes binding only upon the death 
of the testator. Similarly, immediately upon the death of a debtor, all his debts mature.
61
 
 
 
5.5.2  Illness  
 
In contracts involving personal services, Islamic law regards illness in the same manner as that 
revealed in the ‘temporary impossibility’ examples: contract performance is temporarily 
defeated, and at the option of the opposite party, further delays will compromise their interests, 
and the contract may then be discharged. In the case of all other contracts, illness does not 
necessarily frustrate the contract; however, an important qualification is introduced. If the ill 
person might cause a further health risk to others by endeavouring to complete the contract, this 
additional circumstance might be sufficient to apply the doctrine of impossibility of 
performance.
62
 The illness of an obligor does not constitute the discharge of the agreement if the 
obligation is not personal. In such an instance, the individual is required to organise the 
performance to take place, which may be through the employing of an agent, for example. 
Notably, the contract should be interpreted in consideration to all applicable circumstances, 
namely utilisation and custom, so as to determine whether or not the obligation may be viewed 
as personal. In the situation of continuous performance, a temporary illness does not mean the 
promisor is freed from agreement with the exception that the performance is prevented as a result 
of the illness. 
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Various elements that should be taken into account in terms of measuring whether or not a 
contract of employment will be frustrated by long-term absence due to the illness of the 
employee.
63
 In the Quran, ‘charges no soul with more than it can bear’64 can be said to support a 
discharge of obligation due to illness as, if the ill employee is obligated to perform the contract, 
it would be considered more than he can bear.  
It must be added that even dangers to life and the health of third persons who are not parties to 
the contract may discharge a contractual obligation. A pilot may be discharged if the 
performance of his obligation to fly passengers sees the airplane endangering his life—even if 
the latter are not parties to his contract. Whether or not he is discharged, however, is a matter of 
degree depending on how serious the danger if the contract were to be performed. Muslim jurists 
have expressly provided that a contract of agricultural partnership (muzirah) may be brought to 
an end by the illness of the party if the planting season will be missed and the party is still sick.
65
 
This applies to short-term personal contracts, and requires immediate performance; illness leads 
to the discharge of the contract.  
 
5.5.3  Bankruptcy (iflas) and Interdiction (hajer)  
 
Interdiction can be classified as ‘prohibition of any meticulous person from embarking upon his 
own property. Under Islamic law, any contract entered into by an insane person is null and void 
(bitil). Evenly balanced with minors without prudence, such a person is devoid of all aptitude. 
The reason for this is that he cannot have the intention to produce legal associations, which 
forms the source for the legality of all contracts in Islamic law. 
Bankruptcy forms the basis for interdiction consistent with all schools of Islamic law. It has been 
considered as a special rather than a ‘general’ type of interdiction; it is a prohibition offered for 
upholding the interests of others, rather than the welfare of the interdicted person himself. 
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Consequently, bankruptcy only influences those contracts that can be potentially damaging to the 
benefits of others. 
The corollary to the Islamic rule that all contracts must be the product of autonomous parties 
freely agreeing to enter into a relationship on specific terms is that all contracts may be 
terminated on consent.
66
  
Bankruptcy is universally accepted in all Islamic legal schools as a lawful impossibility basis for 
contract termination. There is a division of opinion concerning whether the bankrupt that 
subsequently purports to enter into contracts with third parties has created a void contract or 
whether, as with a minor as discussed above, the contract is voidable at the instance of the 
opposite party.
67
 It is noted that bankruptcy is a defined legal state under Islamic court, although 
its pronouncement confirmed by final order can determine that the person is bankrupt. The 
nature of personal debts, combined with the relationship between debt and available assets that 
may trigger a bankruptcy, may vary across jurisdictions; the order itself is determinative of 
status.
68
 
In contrast, Islamic law separates bankrupt status from the concept of insolvency the inability of 
a party to meet their on-going financial obligations as they come due
69
. Islamic law regards 
insolvency as determined with reference to individual circumstances; unlike bankruptcy, an 
insolvent person cannot rely on this circumstance as triggering an impossibility of performance-
finding. For this reason, contractual obligations continue for insolvent persons. This approach is 
consistent with the Quran passages that stress the importance of honouring one’s obligation 
freely assumed by the contracting parties.
70
 Moreover, Saudi Arabia Regulations provide that, as 
opposed to treating the circumstance as an inevitable impossibility that must terminate the 
agreement, a party that fears it may be about to become unable to pay its debts, may seek 
amicable conciliation with creditors to avoid bankruptcy. Alternatively, the party may apply to 
the Saudi Commercial Court in Board of Grievances for an order to convene settlement 
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procedures with creditors under the supervision of the Board of Grievances to avoid the possible 
operation of the Commercial Court Law.
71
 However, the Commercial Court may issue a decision 
that the debtor became bankrupt, and may prevent him from using his money and assets. 
Where an insolvent person enters into a contract with another that is unaware of their financial 
circumstances, the contract may be terminated if the opposite party can establish this requisite 
lack of knowledge.
72
 If insolvency arises during contract performance, the obligations may be 
suspended until it has determined whether or not the contract remains commercially practicable. 
The discharge of contract by bankruptcy in Islamic law is discussed if it arises after conclusion 
and before performance, such as in the case of a sale where, if the seller delivers the subject 
matter to the buyer but before he receives the price the buyer becomes bankrupt, the contract 
would then be discharged and the seller would have the right to recover the goods if they were 
still in existence with the buyer.
73
 The Prophet stated: ‘if a man finds his same things with a 
bankrupt, he has the right to take them back than anyone else’.74 In the contract of assignment of 
debt, if the debtor transfers the creditor to a transferee in order to get his payment but after 
agreement of the assignment the transferee becomes bankrupt, in Islamic law the contract would 
be considered discharged because of the impossibility of the contract due to the bankruptcy.
75
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5.6  Temporary Impossibility 
 
Temporary
76
 impossibility arises where the subject matter of a contract or an essential person for 
the performance of the contract becomes unavailable in the short-term because of circumstances 
beyond the control of the party. In such an instance, the question is then posed as to whether such 
a lack of availability should constitute the termination of the contract. Notably, Islamic Law is 
decidedly flexible in regard to performance impossibility: in contrast to the rules and the 
approach of ‘all or nothing’, the termination of the contract is not always necessary. With this 
noted, however, it is important to understand three different situations when considering the 
impacts of temporary impossibility within the context of Islamic Law. 
Temporary impossibility may occur due to the objective impossibility related to the subject 
matter of the contract or subjective impossible related to the parties of the contract. There are 
some examples of temporary impossibility where the impossibility can end either in the short- or 
long-term; this means that the obstacles may exist for a certain period with the hope that it will 
eventually end. Heavy rainfall, as an example, can temporarily stop work at a site, causing the 
fulfilment of various obligations to be temporarily impossible. Authorities' decisions sometimes 
may lead to temporary impossibility if they cause the work to stop for a period of time. 
Occupation or mandatory authorities intervene to stop projects by preventing their supplies or by 
arresting their owners or a major number of their workers. Illness of the worker is also 
considered temporary impossibility since illness is supposed to be a transient state that can 
eventually end. The outbreak of epidemics amongst the contractor's workers and technicians, 
which subsequently leads to temporarily stopping the project works, is also considered 
temporary impossibility. Temporary impossibility may also exist when work stops owing to the 
temporary lack of materials required for fulfilment if those materials are specified in the 
contract.
77
 
Temporary impossibility does not lead to the discharge of the contract generally, whilst 
temporary impossibility is not, of itself, a ground of frustration; however, in obligations that are 
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supposed to satisfy an immediate need, or if the contract specifies a time for performance, 
temporal impossibility is not applicable as it does not need a particular duration for 
performance.
78
 
Also, the cause of temporary impossibility may not be removed, such as if temporary turns into 
permanent impossibility, as in the case of the illness of a worker, when it takes a long time 
instead of being a transient condition. In this case, if illness is presumed to stay longer, by then 
the contract will be discharged as the impossibility was converted into a permanent impossibility 
as opposed to a temporal one. The purpose of this is to prevent both parties of the contract from 
facing a long wait; thus, as a result, the discharge of the contract becomes subject to the request 
of one of the parties.
79
 Moreover, if the delay is so significant that the transaction’s worth in a 
commercial sense is no longer justified, thus rendering the agreement invaluable and making it 
unreasonable for the parties to be forced to continue with the contract, justification may be seen. 
If the contract cannot be completed immediately due to intervening events, such as a labour 
dispute involving cargo handlers at a specific port, which could prevent vessels from unloading 
cargo in accordance with contractual terms, only where the delay defeats the overarching 
commercial purpose will impossibility be deemed to defeat its operation. Notably, Islamic law 
does not demand that parties’ contractual rights be suspended indefinitely. 
The long duration of illness gives the employer the right to terminate the contract. On the other 
hand, the employer’s right to terminate the contract is not established unless the worker stays 
absent during this long period of illness. The contract will not even be terminated because of a 
medical report that says that the worker needs a long period of sick leave. If the employer does 
not use his right to terminate the contract for any reasons, despite the existence of the reason that 
gives him this right, such as a long period of sickness, the contract will remain suspended. 
Furthermore, when the worker recovers and decides to resume working, the employer can no 
longer exercise this right, meaning the contract will come back into effect.
80
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5.6  Impossibility of Contract by Illegality 
 
There are two types of illegality of the contract: the first exists before the contract is made; this 
type is discussed under the formation of contract and the doctrine of the mistake. The second 
type relates to supervening illegality; in other words, cases where the performance of the contract 
is legal at the time at which the contract is entered into but which becomes illegal after formation 
and before the time of performance. Legal impossibility is not based upon the implied will or 
intention of the parties, but rather rests on the requirements of public policy.  
Alcohol was allowed at the beginning of the Islamic era, and so there was a widespread presence 
of alcohol trade and factories. Moreover, there was also commercial exchange between people 
and cities.
81
 Afterwards, however, Islam forbade the consumption of alcohol,
82
 as well as its 
purchase and sale.
83
 Accordingly, all contracts dealing with alcohol were discharged as they 
became illegal by reason of the passage of prohibition law. Moreover, when Islam forbade 
usury
84
 and riba, and the Quran and the Prophet cancelled all contracts containing such 
elements.
85
 The first deals the Prophet discharged were those of his uncle Alabbas.
86
 The 
supervening event occurred, which caused the contract rendered incapable of performance 
because such a type of transaction, namely usury or dealing in a particular commodity, such as 
alcohol, became banned by Islamic law. 
A subsequent law, known as the Orders of the Sultan in Islamic Law, may actually forbid the 
performance of the contract, such as when dealing with a certain commodity, or the exportation 
or sale of a commodity, and which therefore needs to be avoided. However, this does raise an 
interesting question: what if the entering into a contract is not, in itself, at the time, illegal, but is 
rendered illegal by the performance of the contract? Thus, for example, a contract cannot be 
performed unless an illegal act is performed? In the analysis and research of this topic, specific 
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Islamic laws on the matter have not been identified; this may be simply due to the fact that this is 
a hypothetical and/or theoretical scenario, and not one that is likely to exist in true life. Indeed, if 
one delves further into the analysis, a contract which is rendered incapable of being performed—
save by being continued by an illegal act—must have contemplated the committing of an illegal 
act in the first place (in which case the contract would not be enforceable by Islamic law). 
However, Muslim jurists have made legal rules and principles relating to changed laws and 
rulers’ orders, and lead to the discharge of the contract, with the principles able to be applied at 
any time.
87
 
At the present time, considering the existence of parliaments and legislative bodies, as well as 
the changing of laws for political or economic reasons, contracts will be affected. For instance, 
imports may be prevented from particular countries, or certain commodities may not be 
exported. Furthermore, the production of a particular commodity may be preventing or building 
permits in a specific place may be revoked. Moreover, an employment contract may be in place 
for a young individual, although a new act may increase the age at which people are able to 
work, thus rendering the contract void as the employee is under the age of legal employment. As 
can be seen from this example, the conditions fundamental to the contracting parties may be 
altered through the implementation of a new law. A case that illustrates the illegality of 
performance is that of Fahed Mohammad vs. Al Mesharaf Recruitment Office.
88
 There is a 
contract between the parties where the defendant is obligated to bring three housemaids from the 
Philippines. After signing the contract, the plaintiff paid 45,000 Riyals, but before bringing them, 
due to a dispute between the Business Ministry in Saudi Arabia and authorities in Philippines 
about labour issues, Saudi Arabia banned contracts with housemaids from the Philippines. 
Subsequently, the plaintiff demanded the discharge of the contract, and his money needed to be 
recovered by the defendant as he could not perform the contract; however, the defendant refused 
on the grounds that the government might allow it soon. The court held that the contract should 
be discharged due to the impossibility of performance by the law, which had been issued by the 
government. Many cases arose in Saudi Arabia following the government’s decision to free all 
slaves and banned slavery.
89
 There were many contracts for the sale of slaves; the contracts were 
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not performed after the conclusion of the contract, and sellers wanted to discharge the contracts 
in order to take compensation from the government owing to the fact that compensation was 
more than the price of the slave; buyers, on the other hand, wanted to the contract to be 
performed and were recognised as having the right to get such compensation. However, the 
courts held that the contract in such a case would be discharged because the performance of the 
contract was then considered illegal through the new law.
90
  
Alteration in the law is not necessary in order for the performance of the contract to be rendered 
legally impossible, although it is enough to cause performance hardships for one of the parties, 
such as through high increases in taxes or customs imposed on a specific commodity. In this 
case, the contract is considered discharged.
91
  
 
5.8  The Doctrine of Impossibility as it Applies to Administrative Contracts 
 
In the beginning, a distinction must be made between private law contracts and public law 
contracts. Private law contracts are those that are concluded in a private realm, and which can 
take the form of either civil law contracts or commercial contracts. The difference is important as 
a different set of regulations applies to each different type of contract, and thus the rules 
governing the impossibility of performance differ between the two different types of agreement. 
Public law contracts are those that are concluded with a governmental or administrative agency, 
and are also referred to as administrative contracts. In talking about the impossibility of 
performance, the analysis above has refereed to private contracts—those that are governed by the 
civil and commercial codes—rather than administrative ones. Indeed, considering that the 
majority of contracts that are applied fall into this area, one can consider the above portion to be 
the most important part of this analysis. However, this is not to ignore the second distinctive type 
of contract—that of administrative contracts; consideration should be directed towards how 
frustration would apply in such a situation.  
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The major importance placed on the former type of contract may be simply due to the fact that 
administrative contracts are relatively new in nature, arising mostly in the 20
th
 Century. 
However, they are distinctive to private contracts. Perhaps the most distinctive feature is that the 
most important principle with these contracts is that they are made for the public interest, and 
that the public interest is the paramount underlying principle of the contract. Amkhan describes 
that:  
‘writers and courts are unanimous that a contract is administrative if:  
(1) one of its parties is a public authority (administration)  
(2) It has been concluded with the intention of managing or participating in the function of a 
public service; and  
(3) It contains certain features which are not usually found in private law contracts’.92 
Whilst of each of these criteria can be delved into in further detail, this part of the paper focuses 
on the way in which frustration applies to such contracts. Indeed, to do so is more important 
given that the doctrine of supervening events, whilst still applying to Islamic administrative 
contracts,
93
 is said to hold many differences in the way it applies to administrative contracts.  
In principle, the above has shown the legal effects of the doctrine of impossibility effects 
applying to a private contract, whilst the separate requirements have been satisfied. Both of these 
principles are however adapted when administrative contracts are involved. Where the doctrine 
of intervening contingencies apply—in other words, frustration applies to the contract—the fact 
that the public welfare is paramount means that the supervening event has different legal effects. 
Thus, a private party is considered to have to continue performing the obligations he holds under 
contract law so that public welfare is not affected by the non-performance of the contract—
irrespective of the event that has occurred.
94
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However, in order to counter what might otherwise be a very heavy obligation on the private 
party, any loss incurred by the party that has suffered the supervening event has to be shared 
between the public body—even if it has not suffered the loss—given that the doctrine of 
supervening events does not apply with full effect to the private party. In fact, based on this 
principle, it is usually the public body that is burdened with suffering the majority of the losses 
that occur as a result of the supervening event.
95
  
Nevertheless, it must be noted at the outset that there are two specific principles that apply to 
administrative contracts, namely the principle of economic or physical hardship and the principle 
of administrative risk. The principle of administrative risk applies when the actual administration 
that has entered into the contract makes a change that could bring about the doctrine of 
supervening events and which renders a contract impossible of performance. If the 
administration undertakes an unlawful act that contravenes a contract that is not considered 
lawful, it must then bear the liability for any loss suffered as a result of the act that was 
undertaken and the contract being rendered impossible.
96
  
The doctrine of economic or physical hardship applies differently. Normal hardships are 
considered part of the usual contractual risk undertaken by the two parties when they enter into 
the two contracts. However, where there are hardships considered to be unforeseeable in nature, 
they are then capable of amounting to events that trigger the doctrine of supervening events and 
which allow a losing party to claim compensation. These are not limited to events that amount to 
acts of God, and might even be previous events that have occurred but have not been 
experienced by, and/or are otherwise unknown to, parties. Thus, for example, if the parties 
contract to construct on a particular site and the site is then discovered to be geologically difficult 
or impossible to build upon, impossibility might come into play. Where it does, however, there is 
a general right of compensation by any affected contracting party, meaning that the doctrine is 
much more limited in nature than how the doctrine of supervening events usually applies; most 
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likely as a result of the fact that public welfare is considered paramount in such situations, rather 
than the welfare of a private contracting company.
97
 
Furthermore, there is a distinction to be made between the type of loss that is covered as a result 
of the supervening event occurring. For private contracts, the losses that would be covered would 
be the losses that would occur during usual circumstances. As shown above, some schools of 
thought impose a minimum limit to the loss that would have to be suffered; the Maliki School, 
for example, states that at least one-third of the total sum of the contract would have to be lost 
before the doctrine of supervening events could apply.
98
 However, for other schools of thought, 
the general rule is that profits that could generally be made as part of the contract, or when 
calculating future contracts into account when considering the losses made to contracts. With 
public administrative contracts, however, the schools that recognise such contracts consider that 
the loss has to be abnormal in order for the doctrine of supervening events to apply. 
Administrative Justice in Saudi Arabia does not consider that the loss is limited, but rather when 
loss becomes abnormal according to commercial practice
99
. As such, future losses are not taken 
into account, and a loss is not considered a loss of profit; rather, it has to be an actual pecuniary 
loss borne by some party.  
The fact that public law applies different principles also introduces other problems. Thus, the 
rules are relatively clear with regards to how the impossibility of a contract is treated in private 
contract law, albeit with different nuances introduced by the different schools of thought. Such 
nuances are exaggerated when the compensation to be granted to a party as a result of a contract 
being rendered subject to the doctrine of supervening events is calculated where public contracts 
are concerned. This is simply due to the reason that such compensation is assessed whilst taking 
into account the equity and fairness of a situation, and each school of thought has different 
accounts of equity and fairness. Thus, Shafi3i’s pay more attention to the formalities of a 
contract made, whilst Hanbali pays less heed to the formalities and looks instead to whether or 
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not a contract has been concluded.
100
 Such circumstances will be taken into account when 
determining how the doctrine of supervening events will apply. Furthermore, assessing cases 
according to equity and justice will always be subject to a discretionary element; this discretion, 
in itself, is exercised in different ways by judges. The no-system of precedent in Islamic contract 
law—which, as abovementioned, is applied in accordance with convergence of opinions between 
writers on the subject rather than the establishment of case-law as is seen in some common law 
and civil law systems—means that the discretion is ever the more important when determining 
matters. In addition, this discretionary assessment does not only impact whether or not a contract 
be rendered to be frustrated upon intervening contingencies; rather, equity will also come in 
when the judiciary decide what portion of loss should be borne by a public party and the private 
party.
101
  
In this regard, one must distinguish between supervening events that exist only temporarily and 
those that subsist. Thus, a party is considered liable to compensation for any loss incurred whilst 
performing a contractual obligation as the result of an event only whilst the event is subsisting. If 
the difficulty ends and the losses are no longer incurred, the administration then no longer pays 
the contracting party compensation. Such treatment can be seen to be quite different in regard to 
the treatment of supervening events in private contract laws, where contracts are generally 
terminated. Moreover, there is little distinction to be made between on-going and succeeding 
difficulties in the performance of contracts.  
As a result of the above rules, rather than the doctrine of intervening contingencies being 
considered a norm of contractual law with regards to private contract, the doctrine of 
supervening contingencies is seen to be a matter of public policy when it comes to public 
contracts.  
One might question whether this is, in fact, an actual distinction, as seen above. Whilst the 
doctrine of supervening events is governed by specific rules in private contracts, there is a large 
element of discretion involved—especially since it is judges that must determine relevant maters. 
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In fact, the distinction between administrative and private contracts applying the doctrine of 
supervening events is, in effect, a matter of public policy for both realms of contract.
102
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                                             CHAPTER SIX  
               A Discussion of Discharge of Contract in English Law  
 
6.1 Introduction:  
 
In chapter three we discussed contracts in Islamic law, but contract in English law offers a very 
obvious theory. There are many books, theses and articles that discuss contracts in English law, 
so there is no need to discuss it here. We will just discuss the points which are related to 
frustration of contract.    
Discharge of contract occurs in four forms, which are: performance; agreement; operation of 
law; and breach of contract
1
. This discussion will focus on performance, agreement and breach, 
in order to illustrate how the contractual relationship comes to an end. The fundamental element 
of discharge is that, under the principle of pact sunt servanda (i.e. all promises must be kept), the 
contract should be fully performed. The failure of full performance of all of the contractual 
elements results in breach
2
. The problem in complex contractual relationships is when 
performance occurs, which unlike high street sales of contracts is very unlikely to be 
instantaneous. This means that to understand discharge it helps to ascertain if performance has 
been completed or circumstances arise to determine if there is breach and a right to damages
3
. 
The separation of performance and breach is fallacious, because they are mirror images of one 
another (i.e. either there is full performance or breach). However, it is important to highlight that 
it is plausible that there are alternative approaches to discharge, though English law is reluctant 
to allow these other forms as pact sunt servanda is a primary concept that must be maintained 
throughout
4
. This means that there either has to be performance or agreement in order to 
discharge the contract. If neither of these aspects is present then there is breach, unless the high 
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threshold of frustration can be met
5
 or there is illegality of contract
6
. Therefore, this paper will 
examine the various aspects of discharge of contract in order to understand their interaction with 
performance, agreement and breach. Finally, it will discuss the findings in correlation with 
frustration. 
6.2 Concept of Discharge of Contract: 
 
The concept of discharge is simply the identification that the contractual relationship has come to 
an end. The impact of this is that there is no longer any contractual obligation between the 
parties
7
. This is prima facie, a simple concept, albeit there is a far more complex issue, which is 
when discharge occurs. In normal high street sale formation, performance and discharge are 
instantaneous (i.e. A offers y for sale, B picks up y and takes y to the till, and money passes from 
B to A for y). The consequence is formation and performance passes with the money, in which 
the discharge occurs with the sale. On the other hand, it may be that there is a construction 
contract, in which A promises to B to build y. The nature of the contract will identify the 
specifics, which may result in failure to meet all of the requirements. The consequence of this is 
that there is a prima facie breach. Will this repudiate the contract or will rectification be the 
correct response
8
? These are all elements that point towards discharge of the contract.  
Generally, part completion of the contract will give rise to breach and award of damage; this is 
because specific performance is only applied in exceptional circumstances (i.e. it must be the 
most appropriate remedy
9
). The exceptional nature of specific performance is identifiable in its 
rejection, as the case of Cohen v Roche
10
, which held that specific performance in regards to 
buying a set of chairs was refused because they were “ordinary articles of commerce and of no 
special value or interest”. On the other hand, the case of Posner v Scott-Lewis11 maintained that 
the injustice would not be satisfied by damages; thus, it was stated that required discharge could 
only happen through performance as opposed to the traditional application of damages. The 
application of Beswick v Beswick can result in an application where it is plausible to enforce a 
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more liberal approach, which provides that there must be full performance before the contract 
can be discharged
12
. As Treitel identifies:  
“The availability of specific performance depends on the appropriateness of that remedy 
in the circumstances of each case”13. 
The remedy of specific performance in the case of breach is problematic, because rather than 
breach creating discharge, the courts require full performance
14
. The implication of this is breach 
and performance is no longer a necessitated mirror image of discharge. Also, the alternative 
reasons for discharge illustrate an exception to the rule of discharge through agreement, 
performance and breach. Therefore, this discussion will now examine the various aspects of 
discharge, in order to determine if the traditional mirror image application of breach and 
performance remain as the prevalent approach to this concept.  
 
6.3 Discharge of Contract by Performance: 
6.3.1 Definition:  
 
The prima facie definition of performance is that the party to the contract requires that he/she 
must perform exactly the obligations provided within
15
. The consequence of this is the primary 
question to determine if the performance is sufficient to discharge the contract
16
. The link 
between performance and breach can be reiterated at this point, because if performance is not 
sufficient then there is breach. The question is whether this will result in discharge, because of 
the potential of specific performance. The indicators for the court to determine concern the 
nature of the obligations
17
, i.e. what is the primary obligation, what are the secondary and tertiary 
obligations. The nature of the obligation is determined by the law
18
. The contract is considered 
and the legal test of the nature and terms of the contract are applied in order to determine what 
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the primary obligation is (i.e. the purpose of the promise)
19
. This will be applied to all of the 
contractual obligations, albeit some will be lesser obligations that will play an important role in 
determining if there has been substantial performance or not. In the case of Herbert Clayton and 
Jack Walter Ltd v Oliver
20
 an obligation with an element of discretion was identified, in which 
the actor was to be given “one of the three leading comedy parts in a musical play”. The 
implication of this is that as long as one of the leading parts is given it does not matter which 
one. The test that is applied is an objective one, in which the wider consideration of the contract 
will be utilised in order to identify the primary obligation(s)
21
.  
The second part of the test of performance is to ask whether the performance is sufficient. As 
Chitty on Contracts (Chitty) identifies: 
“[T]he court must first interpret the contract in order to ascertain the nature of the 
obligation (which is a question of law); the next question is to see whether the actual 
performance measures up to that obligation (which is a question of “mixed fact and law” 
in that the court decides whether the facts of the actual performance satisfy the standard 
prescribed by the contractual provisions defining the obligation)”22. 
The first element to the objective test has already been discussed, but the second element 
highlights the contextual application of whether performance has been met. The mix of fact and 
law is important, because there are times where the exact specifications (i.e. lesser obligations) 
may not be performed due to potential defect in design or change in the contractual context
23
. In 
the case of contractual context change, it is unlikely that frustration will be conferred; rather, the 
lesser obligations will be struck out and the party can perform in a manner to meet the primary 
obligation
24
. In Turiff v Welsh National Development Authority it was held that: 
“[T]he real issue is as to the construction of the words physically impossible in the light 
of those authorities, which establish the common law position”25. 
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The meaning of impossibility it seems is that there has to be an exceptional failure of the 
contractual design, in order for performance of the primary obligation to be frustrated
26
. The 
implication is that there will not be frustration of the primary obligation if it means that 
secondary obligations can be removed and/or changed, in order to ensure that the contract can be 
completed.  
The contextual ascertainment of performance can also be seen in the case of the subcontracting 
of an obligation. In the case of Margaronis Navigation Agency Ltd v Henry W. Peabody & Co of 
London Ltd
27
 it was identified that, when two parties enter into a contact, and then a party sub-
contracts performance to another, then how is the performance determined? This case identified 
that performance is linked to the facts and circumstances of the context, as well as the specific 
circumstances of the case. The consequence of this is that it may be that the initial perception of 
how the obligation is to be met differs, but as long as sufficient performance of the primary 
obligation is completed then the courts will determine that the contract is fully performed. 
Therefore, performance and discharge has two elements (i.e. the obligations and the actual 
circumstances and context of performance).  
 
6.3.2 Complete Performance: 
 
Complete performance is the simplest of the types of performance to understand, because it 
relates to performance where the contractual obligation(s) are carried in full. This form of 
performance meets the general rule where the parties perform the contract by precisely adhering 
to all of the terms of the contract’s primary, secondary and tertiary obligations28. The problem 
with this rule is that it can create hardship, due to circumstantial change
29
; albeit there are 
incidents where there has to be natural variation of contracts that do not harm the primary 
obligation, but create ease in respect to the circumstantial changes. Thus, this creates the concept 
of substantial performance, which will be considered next. 
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6.3.3 Substantial Performance: 
 
Substantial performance is an important concept, because it creates the right of discharge even if 
not every obligation in the contract is met. The prima facie test is that if a party has only partially 
performed the obligation then there is no right of payment, because the terms of the contract 
have not been met
30. This application illustrates the consideration link; whereby “the court has 
no power to apportion consideration”31. The problem with this application is that it fails to take 
into account the commercial context, which will be utilised to determine if the primary 
obligations have been met due to circumstantial change
32
. There have been a number of cases 
that support the plausibility of substantial performance, in which payment can be given for the 
performance
33
. This means that substantial performance does not necessarily mean that the 
primary obligation is fully met, or it may be that this obligation is met and some of the lesser 
elements are not. The consequence of this is that there needs to be a fair reason for 
apportionment.    
The role of substantial performance makes sense in a complex world, especially in complex 
contracts. This has been most recognised in construction contracts, where intervening forces will 
create natural changes in the contract, which may result in substantial performance being the 
only option
34
. The legitimacy of substantial performance has been challenged, which can be seen 
in Treitel’s commentary: 
“It is based on the error that contracts, as opposed to particular obligations, can be entire 
… To say that an obligation is entire means that it must be completely performed before 
payment becomes due … In relation to ‘entire' obligations, there is no scope for any 
doctrine of ‘substantial performance”35. 
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This application may be true in a simplistic understanding of contract law, though this is 
obviously not an appropriate application in complex contracts. The most notable area is that of 
construction contract law, in which substantial performance will occur due to design defects or 
change in circumstances. Therefore, payment for works done is clearly an appropriate 
application.    
 
6.3.4 Tender Performance: 
 
Tender performance occurs when A needs B to perform the task, in which A makes an offer to B 
and this is stymied by B’s refusal36. The reliance on the other party for performance can create 
difficulties, because the refusal by B will mean that A cannot complete the contract with C
37
. The 
reliance on tender performance means that there is a right of defence if there has been a refusal 
by the third party. To claim this defence it is essential for A to have proof of an unconditional 
offer to B, in order to ensure that there is performance
38
. The application of tender usually relates 
to the issue of money (e.g. subject to contract for a home, awaiting mortgage approval). 
However, it is possible to extend to other elements, such as delivery of goods
39
. The consequence 
of this is that there is defence of excuse, as long as there has been an appropriate tender that has 
been refused. The time of tender is important, because it illustrates whether there has been an 
appropriate act of acquiring the tender
40
. It is appropriate to offer a tender on the due date, as 
long as it has the possibility to ensure that there is effective performance
41
.  
It is important to note that if the creditor who has accepted the tender demands payment, and the 
party that has to perform the duty refuses, which results in the tender being invalidated, then 
there is no valid tender
42
. The consequence of this is that there is no right of excuse. The same is 
true if the tender is after the due date for performance, which includes the payment at a future 
date
43
. This means that there are a number of limitations on a valid tender, in order for the excuse 
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to apply. The additional tests are that the tender must be unconditional, but this does not mean 
that it is not applied to the right of monies due. The very basis of effective tender is that there has 
always been a readiness for Party A to perform the contract, but due to the third party’s refusal it 
cannot be met
44
. Therefore, on this basis, the defence of tender is an important application, 
because it would be unfair to force performance in these circumstances.  
 
6.3.5 Personal Performance: 
 
The traditional application of contract law is that the parties agree to complete the contract 
personally in a manner that mirrors its terms. The failure to do this will mean that the intention of 
the parties is not met. This stems from English common law, which is aptly identified in Butler 
Machine Tool Co Ltd v Ex-Cell-O Corp Ltd
45
. This means that the fundamental principle of 
personal performance will prevail, unless the contract indicates that there will be a tender 
performance. The other element is if there is a subcontracting element, in which there may be an 
argument for substantial performance
46
. In Albright & Wilson UK Ltd v Biachem Ltd a mix-up by 
a subcontractor in the delivery of goods gave rise to the question of whether the sub-contractor or 
the contracting party was in breach. This case held that the contractor was in breach, because the 
contract did not provide for a subcontracting. This means that the concept of personal 
performance has to be applied. Therefore, the rule in this is that, if there is not meant to be 
personal performance to be applied, then the contract reflects this because the mirror image rule 
will not force the breach on the contracting party; rather, it will be the sub-contractor. 
 
6.3.6 Place of Performance: 
 
The place of performance is very much the same as the personal performance. It is necessary that 
the place reflects the contract, as opposed to another place for the convenience of the contracting 
person performing the act. The only exception to this is if the contract allows for an alternative 
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place of performance. If there is no place of performance stipulated then the place of business 
will apply, which is seen under the Sales of Goods Act 1979: 
“Apart from any such contract, express or implied, the place of delivery is the seller’s 
place of business if he has one, and if not, his residence; except that, if the contract is for 
the sale of specific goods, which to the knowledge of the parties when the contract is 
made are in some other place, then that place is the place of delivery”.47 
The place of performance is applied in a simple straightforward manner to what will be the place 
of business, or in the case of consumer their personal address
48
. In other words, it is a place that 
will be the most appropriate to the given contract. If the place of performance is not as in the 
contract or the common sense application then it is plausible to argue non-performance
49
. 
On the other hand, the Australian approach identified in Wiskin v Terdich Bros Party Ltd
50
 held 
that delivery to the buyer regardless of place is sufficient. The implication of this is that as long 
as the other party has received the benefit it does not matter where. The English application is 
more formalistic than this, because performance (in respect to the delivery of goods) has to be at 
the appropriate place of performance and to a respectable person, in order to discharge the 
contract
51
. As the case of Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v Burnhope
52
, it was held that the basis 
of the English contractual interpretation is: 
“… not to probe the real intentions of the parties, but to ascertain the meaning of the 
relevant contractual language. Intention is determined by reference to expressed rather 
than actual intention”.  
This means the mirror image application of performance takes precedent, which is simply the 
application of the parole rule. The parole rule is seen in both the English and Scottish systems; 
for example, the cases of Brown v Rystaffe Trustee Company (CI) Limited
53
, Chartbrook Ltd v 
Persimmon Homes
54
 and Aberdeen City Council v Stewart Milne Group Limited
55
 reaffirmed that 
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there should be maintenance of contractual interpretation within the “four corners of the 
contract” (i.e. the traditional parole evidence rule)56. As Gloag argues: 
“[W]here the parties have reduced the terms of their agreement to writing, the obligations 
they have undertaken must be ascertained from the terms of that writing without the aid 
of extrinsic evidence”57.  
The result of this is that there is a strong indication that the place of performance must meet the 
basis of the contract, unless the contractual terms provide for alternative applications. It is also 
plausible that performance can be in another place when there are intervening acts that make the 
specified place impossible, which can be seen in the safe delivery of goods when at sea into a 
safe port when the nominated place of performance becomes impossible (i.e. unsafe)
58
. Thus, the 
commercial context can be important to implying a different place of performance (which is also 
possible in the case of time of performance). 
 
6.3.7 Time of Performance: 
 
The time of performance must meet the date provided in the contract; otherwise, there will be a 
breach of contract. This gives the right for the contract to be discharged for breach and non-
performance. However, there are contracts that provide for delay, especially in the case of 
construction law; whereby intervening events will give a right to extension and the right of 
compensation. It is important to note that these are built into the contract. The approach to delay 
in the construction context is explored in the case of Trollope
59
, which is the traditional model of 
apportionment of delay and the right in extension of time. In other words, the time of 
performance is extended due to intervening events. The argument in this case was that the end 
time of performance should be extended, because each of the phases was extended. This 
argument was rejected by Lord Denning, because there was not a good reason for an overall 
extension (i.e. supporting the traditional contractual model of time of performance). This results 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
55
 Aberdeen City Council v Stewart Milne Group Limited [2010] CSIH 81 
56
 Stephen Woolman and Jonathan Lake, Contract Law (3
rd
 edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2001) 105 
57
 W M Gloag, The Law of Contract, (2
nd
 edn, W Green 1929) 365. 
58
 Aegean Sea Traders Corporation v Repsol Petroleo SA and Another (The Aegean Sea) [1998] 1 Lloyds Rep 39  
59
 Trollope & Colls Ltd. v. North West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board [1973] 2 All E.R 
180 
 
in the core application that extension of time should not occur in a manner that will allow the 
breaching party to benefit from his/her misdeeds
60
; and there has to be the direct interpretation of 
the contract (i.e. putting the four corners of the contract before the realities of the construction 
project)
61
. The consequence of this is that the contract recognises that there may be events that 
require an extension, which is reflected within the framework of the contract.  
The application of time and delay links to the principle that a person cannot benefit from an 
existing default, which is identified in the case of Walter Lawrence v Commercial Union
62
. This 
case held that there should be no further extensions, unless there is a delay caused by a relevant 
event as stipulated by the contract. Once again, time of performance is mirrored in the contract, 
though there will be incidences where the time can be changed; however, this must be reflected 
in the contract. There has been a liberalisation of this application in the construction contract 
context, which can be seen in Balfour Beatty v Chestermount
63
. 
The Balfour Beatty Case held that for every contractual event that allowed for extra time should 
be treated separately, in which an extension is added to the final date of performance. This 
application has been confirmed in the case of Motherwell v Micafil
64
, which required that there 
should be a common sense and fair application in the determination of the cause of the delay
65
. 
In other words, if 10 days is added to a phase due to an event in the contract then 10 days must 
be added to the overall contract. As the case of Great Eastern Hotel Co Ltd v John Laing 
Construction Ltd
66
, it was held that there is a: 
“… common sense to guide decisions as to whether a breach of contract is a sufficiently 
substantial cause of the Claimants’ loss. The answer to whether the breach is the cause of 
the loss, or merely the occasion for loss must “in the end” depend on “the court’s 
common sense” in interpreting the facts”. 
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Once again, one can see that the contract is the main determinant of time of performance (i.e. the 
legal obligation); however, this does not mean that this should be applied without context. In 
other words, the determination of performance is both legal and fact-based (i.e. the commercial 
facts must be considered).  
The role of context in determining appropriate performance (even if the time is later) is 
dependent on the complexities and nature of the contract
67
. This means that the traditional view 
of performance and time is not always appropriate. For example, the case of Alguhussein 
Establishment v Eaton College
68
 held that no party should be able to gain from his/her own 
breach of duty
69
 (i.e. the clean hands doctrine). Thus, the application of any clean hands doctrine 
should be carefully considered, especially when determining fault and the liabilities of the 
parties
70
. The application of this model, in respect to the traditional model of performance, 
illustrates that performance should be on time, unless there is a clear stipulation in the contract. 
This is the mirror image approach; however, once again the realities of the commercial context 
are not understood where breach or frustration becomes more prevalent. This means applying a 
common sense approach in a rationalised model
71
. The implication of this approach is that it 
gives greater flexibility to the judiciary to determine the cause of the late performance, in order 
to determine if the contract is completed. This is important, because the complexity of the law 
indicates that there needs to be variations through fact (as opposed to the pure adherence of the 
law)
72
. Thus, there has been a move away from a simple contractual application, which may no 
longer be appropriate due to the realities of the obligations to be performed
73
. The consequence 
of this is that there needs to be a system of fairness and common sense to determine if there is: 
performance; normal breach with damages; or repudiatory breach. The main test that needs to be 
identified is that the pure application of law will fail, as well will the full application of fact 
(which can result in palm tree justice). Rather, the obligation of performance stems from the 
contract; however, its construction and the commercial realities will affect interpretations of time 
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(and extension if provided for in the contract). In the same sense, if these commercial elements 
cannot be balanced and it would be unfair to infer breach, then frustration may be construed
74
.  
 
6.3.8 Payment: 
 
The final aspect in performance that has to be examined is payment, though due to the scope of 
this discussion only the general aspects of this topic will be explored. Once again, the basis of 
payment is identified by the contractual form (i.e. the mirror image rule)
75
. The rules of payment 
are: 
1) The payment is to be made in legal currency; 
2) There is a right through novation, variation or waiver to substitute a different obligation 
than the one originally provided for under the contract
76
. This can be applied through the 
payment of a cash balance of goods or services if agreed
77
. 
The consequence of this is that the role of payment is generally set in the contract, but it is 
possible for payment to be varied to ensure that it is completed. The application of damages, 
however, is a legal remedy that is distinguishable from payment; the result of this non-payment 
of damages is not the same as non-payment of debt, i.e. the monies for completion of the 
contractual obligation
78
.  
A third party can match the payment of the debt, as long as the person is acting as an agent, 
unless the third party is jointly liable
79
. A payment can be made to a third party or an agent, as 
long as they have been appropriately commissioned by the party that the payment is meant to be 
paid to
80
. The nature of the payment should be reflected in the form provided in the contract, 
which may be cash, cheque, bank transfer, credit card etc.
81
 The most important aspect of the 
payment is that it reflects the form in the contract. Also, the amount of the payment must be in 
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full, otherwise there is not adequate consideration and there is a breach of contract
82
. The 
exception to this is if there is variation of the contract, or if the application of promissory 
estoppel applies
83
. The case of D & C Builders Ltd v Rees
84
 identified that promissory estoppel is 
allowable if there has been a part payment of debt where there has been acceptance by the 
creditor and reliance by the parties. The general application of promissory estoppel is fairness, 
which means that the commercial context will be applied to determine if consideration can be 
inferred or not. Therefore, once again the exceptions to the general mirror image rule are centred 
in the application of the fairness rule, in order to ensure that the intentions of the parties are met 
due to the modification of circumstances similar to the complexities that can arise in time and 
place. The complexities of performance and the balance that the courts have to apply illustrates 
that it may be far more appropriate for the courts to infer an application of discharge by 
agreement on new terms. 
 
 
6.4 Discharge by Agreement: 
6.4.1 Definition: 
 
Discharge by agreement allows the parties to end a contract in its current form. This may be that 
neither has performed the contract, in which the necessary consideration is identifiable by the 
parties no longer having the right to compel the other to their obligations. In most cases, 
agreement discharge is considered during contract formation and is then included as a 
consideration element
85
. Release by either party for obligations not performed is considered as 
discharge by agreement or consideration. In some cases, discharge by agreement may require 
one of the parties to settle some of the obligations before the contract is discharged by 
calculating an estimated value. The only time consideration becomes an issue is where one party 
has fully performed their part of the contract when the other has not. The non-performing party 
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must then provide consideration to make the agreement binding. Also, if the agreement is made 
by deed there is no requirement to provide consideration.
86
 
 
It is clear that discharge by agreement is reliant on the need for consideration, i.e. if the 
agreement by the parties is not enough. McKendrick identifies that if one of the parties has fully 
performed the contract, but the other has not completed anything, then discharge by agreement 
will not be supported unless: 
1) The agreement is by deed; 
2) The party who is owed performance is estopped from forcing the necessary acts (cf. part 
payment of debt); 
3) The parties have waived their rights under the contract87; and 
4) “A contract may be discharged by the operation of a condition subsequent which has 
been incorporated into the contract. A condition subsequent states that a previously 
binding contract shall come to an end in the occurrence of a stipulated event”88. 
Therefore, it stands to reason that the role of agreement is not enough; rather, there needs to be 
an application that is fair or provided for under the contract.  
 
6.4.2 The Requirement of Consideration: 
 
The role of consideration has been discussed in respect to the part payment of debt, in which 
there must be a factor that ensures that there is fairness to discharge the contract. The simplest 
application is where neither party has relied on the contract. Another application is when there is 
partial performance and payment, in which the remainder of the contract is discharged on 
agreement, i.e. there is equal consideration on both sides
89
. It is far more complex when there is 
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not equal consideration, the part payment of debt and estoppel, as in D&C Builders, which is one 
application. Therefore, the tests of consideration include: 
1) Release and replacement;  
2) Accord and satisfaction; 
3) Variation; 
4) Waiver 
 
6.4.3 Release and Replacement: 
 
The role of release and replacement (rescission and substitution) is simply the act whereby the 
parties rescind the initial contract and replace it with a new one, an example of which is partial 
performance and payment. Also, the example of part payment of debt and reliance (i.e. through 
estoppel) can be applied in a similar manner. The role of consideration is important; because it is 
important there is not an act of unjust enrichment
90
. This means that the rescission and 
replacement has to be fair in the commercial context or the courts will not accept it.    
 
6.4.4 Accord and Satisfaction: 
 
Accord and satisfaction is where the parties have a desire to rescind the contract (i.e. there is no 
replacement). The aim is to simply release one another from obligations without replacement of 
any other contractual duty. This is simple in the case of non-performance by either party (i.e. a 
bilateral discharge). The problem is when there is unilateral discharge, which is the case when 
one of the parties has completed their duties, and the result is the other party having to give up all 
their rights. The consequence is that it is unlikely it will be upheld, unless the agreement is 
deeded (i.e. accord) and adequate consideration for the performance (as agreed by parties) is 
allowable
91
. The implication is that there needs to be focus on assuring that there is adequate 
restitution to ensure that there is not unjust enrichment
92
. This is why in the case of rescission 
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that there is a right to a personal restitutionary claim
93
 (i.e. satisfaction). The amount of 
restitution depends upon the circumstance that has given rise to the discharge to agreement, in 
which the payment of restitution fits into the context of a value that only needs to be sufficient
94
.       
6.4.5 Variation: 
The concept of variation is similar to release and replacement of contract, though it may be as 
simple as reducing the obligations and payment in order to release the obligations of the parties. 
The most important factor is that this consideration is attached through benefit to either of the 
parties and the contract is discharged
95
. It is arguable after Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls 
(Contractors) Ltd
96
 infers that consideration is no longer necessary, albeit it is more than likely 
that there has to be some benefit to both parties (i.e. benefit to one party is not enough to be 
variation). Thus, fairness in the commercial context of the contract is once again essential to 
apply.
97
  
 
6.4.6 Waiver: 
 
The final element to consider is a waiver, which is where one party voluntarily accepts a request 
by another to forego the right to strict performance of the contract. This model is not supported 
by consideration; rather, it is a contractual agreement to allow for partial performance
98
. There is 
waiver by estoppel, which has been discussed in relation to part payment of debt; thus, this 
ground will not be gone over once again. Rather, waiver by election will be briefly identified
99
. 
The case of Hickman v Hayes
100
 is a prime example of waiver:  
1) The contract had a specified time of performance; 
2) The other party asked for extra time; 
3) The accepting party agreed; 
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4) At the time of delivery the goods were rejected; 
5) The court held that the time of performance had been waived, which meant the goods had 
to be accepted and the contract was discharged. 
It is identified that waiver is a full and knowledgeable acceptance that rights have ceased and 
cannot be reclaimed without reasonable notice before reliance. Therefore, discharge by 
agreement is a complex application that in most cases is based on commercial realities and 
fairness. The final element of this discussion is to consider discharge by breach, which will be 
briefly explored. 
 
6.5. Discharge by Breach of Contract: 
6.5.1 Definition of Breach through Failure to Perform:  
 
A breach of contract is committed when a party without lawful excuse fails or refuses to perform 
what is due from him under the contract, performs defectively or incapacitates himself from 
performing
101
. A contract can be discharged due to breach of contract. In this case, the innocent 
or injured party has the right to discharge the contract, though they are first required to inform 
the party that has breached the contract. 
Any legal obligations that developed due to the breach of contract will bind the concerned party 
and they will be required to settle them before the contract is considered discharged
102
. 
There are different types of breach, which relate to primary and secondary obligations. It is 
through a breach of primary obligations (purpose of the contract) that there will be discharge of 
the contract (i.e. a repudiatory breach). Therefore, a repudiatory breach is failure of performance, 
which means the contracted is rescinded and damages and losses have to be paid to the harmed 
third party to prevent unjust enrichment by the breaching party
103
. This is to be distinguished 
from a contractual right to interpret the contract in a bone fide manner
104
. Therefore, a 
repudiatory breach is simply a failure to perform the contract in manner that meets the primary 
obligation.  
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6.5.2 Effect of Anticipated Repudiation and Acceptance of Repudiation: 
 
Anticipated repudiation is when one party identifies that an obligation of the contract cannot be 
performed and may request a variation (e.g. an extension of time). The other party may elect to 
accept the repudiation through waiver or variation (similar to Hickman v Hayes) and the contract 
on this aspect is changed. The alternative right is that the party who is notified of an anticipatory 
breach can refuse and demand performance
105
. There is no right to terminate the contract at this 
point; rather, this cannot occur until there is an actual breach. There are qualifications to this 
rule, in the interests of fairness
106
. This means that if the refusal is wholly unreasonable given the 
commercial context then there will be an implied variation/waiver
107
. Therefore, election is the 
acceptance by the party to accept a breach, which results in a waiver/variation, whereas 
anticipated repudiation is the non-performance of a contractual obligation
108
. An appropriate 
consideration is that there should be, which states that variation/waiver can be imputed by the 
courts on the basis of fairness.   
  
6.5.3 Claim of Damage as the Core Consequences of the Breach of Contract: 
 
Claim of damages is the most appropriate test for breach of contract, which is identified in 
Hadley v Baxendale
109
. This case held that when: 
“… two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which 
the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as 
may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, according to the usual 
course of things from such breach of contract, or such as may reasonably be supposed to 
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have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the 
probable result of the breach of it”110. 
The consequence of this is that breach is being countered by appropriate restitution, as opposed 
to forcing performance. It is through the payment of damages that the contract will be wholly 
discharged. In the initial discussion, specific performance may be required to discharge the 
contract, but this is only applied in exceptional circumstances
111
.   
  
6.6 Relationship and Differences between Discharge by Performance, and Breach with 
Frustration of Contract: 
 
The application of the tests to allow an extension of discharge by performance to be broadly 
construed is important, because it creates a greater malleability in the commercial context of the 
contractual parties. The greater extension infers that unreasonableness does not result in a case 
where the contract has to result in breach and/or frustration. It is important to note that frustration 
is an exceptional right, which stems from the narrow rule applied in Paradine v Jane
112
, which 
applies a traditional application of pact sunt servanda (i.e. all promises must be kept). This 
means that it does not matter that circumstances have intervened to render an act impossible: 
there must be performance. This is an unfair application, especially when the application requires 
that performance mirrors the contract, and as Simpson argues these two elements together are 
manifestly unfair and illogical
113
. There have been developments of the frustration model, in 
order to create fairness, which is best seen in the case of Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham UDC, 
who limited the application of the doctrine of frustration. It was held that: 
“[Frustration] occurs whenever the law recognises that without the default of either party 
a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because the 
circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a thing radically 
different from that which was undertaken by the contract”. 
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This means that once the contract is made impossible on a common sense basis then frustration 
will be allowed
114
. This application remains a very narrow approach, which illustrates that 
frustration is only applied in exceptional circumstances. On the other hand, the application of 
performance is far broader, which is illustrative of the aim of the modern law of contract to 
ensure that there is a general right that contractual obligations are met (as opposed to allowing 
for draconian breaches in complex commercial realities). Therefore, it stands to reason that there 
is greater malleability in discharge by performance (including variation and the various forms of 
agreement) than creating unfairness through a limited model of performance and frustration. 
 
6.7 Mistake as a Factor that Vitiates a Contract: 
 
There are some factors that tend to defeat contractual liability and lead to voided contracts, such 
as incapacity, misrepresentation, duress and mistakes. This section is concerned with mistakes 
because there is a relation between a mistake and the formation of a contract and it is important 
to understand the difference between a mistake and frustration. 
During contract formation, a mistake can be defined as an erroneous belief by either both parties 
or one party that certain ideas or facts are true. It can be used as grounds to invalidate an 
agreement according to English law. Mistakes at law may affect the validity of the formation of a 
contract. The effect of a mistake on the validity of a contract depends on the type and nature of 
the mistake made. The general rule is that, where the parties have made a mistake, at English law 
the contract may be deemed void, as if the contract had never existed. Equity takes a more 
flexible approach in that contracts containing certain mistakes may be treated as voidable, where 
either party can terminate the contract
115
. However, a fundamental mistake, often referred to as 
an ‘operative’ mistake, may render a contract void. 
There are three types of mistakes that can occur during a contracting process, which are 
unilateral mistakes, common mistakes and mutual mistakes. 
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6.8 Unilateral Mistake: 
Unilateral mistakes occur when a party wrongly interprets the terms of contract. In this form of 
mistake it’s assumed that the other party knew that the mistaken party has wrongly interpreted 
the contract terms. Unilateral mistakes in English contract law are quite common and can be as a 
result of mechanical miscalculation or business error. If the unilateral mistake is as a result of 
mechanical calculations, the courts may decide to uphold the contract as long as the other party 
does not take advantage of the mistake to breach the offer contract, especially by making the 
mistaken party enter into a contract they never intended to or that doesn’t match their bargain. 
For a court to uphold a contract, they have to ensure that the mistake does not have much effect, 
positive or negative, on one of the concerned parties
116
. The case of Hartog v Colin & Shields 
[1939] 3 All ER 566 is an important English contract law case regarding a unilateral mistake. 
The defendant mistakenly offered to sell a large quantity of hare skins, at a price to be 
determined at a certain sum per pound, and the plaintiffs accepted the offer. In fact, they meant 
to offer them at a reduced price per piece. This meant that the price was roughly one third of 
what it should have been. The court held that the contract was voided because of this mistake. 
Hare skins were generally sold per piece and given the price the claimant must have realised the 
mistake.  
If a unilateral mistake is as a result of a business error then, in most cases, the contract is 
terminated. Business error mistakes allow a party to agree to an offer that has been wrongly 
represented by the seller. An example of a business error mistake occurs when an advertisement 
contains content that a buyer considers to be a valid offer yet it was wrongly typed or 
communicated. As a result, an individual enters into a contract with the advertising company 
only to realise that the offer was invalid. As such, the company that made the business error is 
expected to pay for the injuries caused
117
. 
A contract may become a nullity where a party is mistaken as to the identity of the person 
contracted with and the other party is aware of that mistake
118
. Where a mistake as to the identity 
of the other party to the contract is made, the contract will be deemed void if the identity of that 
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person is central to the contract; a related case of mistaken identity is found in the case of Shogun 
Finance v Hudson [2003] 3 WLR 1371.  
 
 
6.9 Mutual Mistake: 
Mutual mistakes in contract law development occur when all parties are mistaken about a 
particular fact in their contract
119
. This type of mistake occurs where the parties of contract are at 
cross-purposes over the contract’s meaning. The two parties have entered into a contract in 
which both have mistaken the ideas. In this case, the contract is termed as invalid. Mutual 
mistakes result in nullification of the contract only if the mistaken idea is material. Restatement 
of the ideas can be used as a way of settling the contract. For a mistake to be termed as mutual 
there should have been mutual acceptance and agreement between the two parties. The court will 
consider independently what each party reasonably would have thought the other party was 
intending in the contract
120
. 
The principles of mutual mistakes can be seen in the case of Raffles v Wichelhaus (1864) 2 H & 
C 906, where the plaintiff entered into a contract to sell 125 bales of cotton to the defendant. The 
goods were to be shipped from Bombay to Liverpool, on a ship called “Peerless”. There were 
two ships named Peerless arriving from Bombay, one departing in October and another departing 
in December. Wichelhaus thought he had purchased the cotton arriving on the October ship, 
while the plaintiff thought he was contracting for the cotton on the December ship. When the 
December Peerless arrived, the plaintiff tried to deliver it, and the defendant refused to accept 
delivery of the cotton. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract and it was held that the contract 
was void because of a mistake. 
 
6.10 Common Mistake: 
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A common mistake in English law is a mutual mistake where both parties have made a similar 
mistake concerning a particular fact. A common mistake in contract formation can occur as 
result of a mistake regarding a decision where the two parties have options to choose from but 
they both make a wrong decision. It can also be as a result of ignorance where the two parties 
choose an idea without knowing the true affairs of state of the idea they are creating a contract 
for
121
. 
The mistake can concern either the existence of the subject matter, and where the subject matter 
of the contract does not exist the contract will be void, or its quality, at which point the contract 
will still be valid in English law. It can also involve a case where the contract transfers property 
from one person to another but the second person in fact already owns the property; if neither 
party was aware of this then the contract will be void
122
. 
The leading case on common mistakes is Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161. 
The general English contract law mistake doctrine is readily grasped; it is the nuances that often 
prove vexing when the overarching legal objectives of certainty and clarity are considered
123
. 
The distinction between common and mutual mistakes is an example. Where the parties make 
the same mistake with respect to their intended contract (for e.g. a shared buyer/seller belief that 
a clock offered for sale is an antique, and not in fact a replica), their mistake is deemed 
‘common’124. A mutual mistake arises where the parties misunderstand the other’s intentions and 
are left at cross-purposes. A common mistake reflects an enduring tension in English law 
between the respect for sanctity of contract (and associated freedom of contract principles) and 
the desire to give effect to reasonable commercial expectations of honest persons
125
. Since 
Raffles v Wichelhaus
126
, an overriding mistake doctrine mindset encouraged by the cases and 
academic commentaries is to pursue a reasonable contract interpretation before declaring the 
contract void as unenforceable
127
. 
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A common mistake has three potential legal outcomes. It can prevent a binding agreement from 
being consummated, where the parties’ fail to reach consensus on essential matters. If invalid, 
they share an error with respect to an important contextual circumstance
128
. In the second 
instance, a contract may exist; the issue to be determined is whether it has been vitiated to any 
extent. Three potential remedies exist – the mistake goes to the ‘root of the matter’129, 
sufficiently undermining the contract to render it void; the contract is voidable at the instance of 
either party, with rescission available; or the mistake is not sufficiently serious to warrant legal 
intervention
130
. Great Peace Shipping confirms that English contract law endorses an ‘all or 
nothing approach’ to these questions, which are consistent with the first and third remedies 
described
131
.  
 
6.11 Mistakes and Frustration – an Overview: 
 
The event must be supervening, which did not exist at the time of conclusion of the contract. The 
relevant frustration event should be something which has happened after conclusion of the 
contract. If the event existed at the time of the conclusion of the contract, which the parties were 
unaware of, it is not regarded as a subject for frustration but instead would be classified as 
raising an issue regarding a mistake and the rules would then apply. 
In contrast, the equitable frustration doctrine evolved as a judicial device to improve the 
otherwise rigorous common law enforcement of literal promises
132
. In Lauritzen, this 
philosophical underpinning is explained variously as the need to give effect to the demands of 
justice, to achieve a just and reasonable result, and to do what is reasonable and fair, “… as an 
expedient to escape from injustice where such would result from enforcement of a contract in its 
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literal terms after a significant change in circumstances”133. With these features in mind, the 
cases are examined in greater detail. 
In Great Peace Shipping Ltd. the Court of Appeal explained a common mistake and its 
contractual consequences in refreshingly clear and succinct terms. The Court stated that a 
mistake sufficient to render the contract void must result in “impossible performance”134. It is 
suggested that ‘impossible’ has finite quality; where the mistake makes the contract merely 
difficult, or less financially unattractive, the contract will be upheld.  
Great Peace specifically adopts the position by Steyn in Associated Japanese Bank
135
 and the 
conclusion made is that for a mistake to vitiate a contract, it must render the subject matter “… 
essentially and radically different from the subject matter which the parties believed to exist”, as 
an extension of the principle that the law ought to uphold rather than destroy apparent 
contracts
136
. In Kyle Bay
137
, the Court of Appeal reflects how English appellate authorities 
coalesced around the Great Peace distinction and reaffirmed between the impossibility of 
performance, and all lesser circumstances
138
. Where a compromise position reasonably 
determined relative to the facts remained ‘performable’, it was thus distinct from the “… 
impossibility of a contractual venture”139.  
The equitable purpose of frustration described above generates distinctly different outcomes than 
those yielded when mistake principles are operative. As reiterated in Lauritzen, frustration 
operates clinically and automatically to “… kill the contract and discharge the parties from 
further liability under it”140. This definitive frustration characteristic carries the corresponding 
limitation that its power is not “lightly invoked”, and its operation is narrowly limited and non-
extendable
141
. In contrast to common mistakes shared by contract parties that may be sufficient 
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to establish absolute performance impossibility, an operative frustrating event must occur “… 
without blame or fault on the side of the party seeking to rely on it”142.  
 CTI Group v Transclear SA
143
 provides a useful bridge between mistake and frustration 
doctrines. In CTI, the Court of Appeal held that a sale of goods contract could not be frustrated 
because it was impossible to perform
144
. In its confirmation of the very narrow boundaries within 
which frustration is permitted to operate, only where performance of the new contract would 
fundamentally differ from that originally contemplated is frustration invoked. Where a supplier 
chooses not to make goods available for shipment, thus rendering performance by the seller 
impossible, such a decision is not of itself sufficient to frustrate such contracts
145
. Only a 
‘supervening event’ that renders the seller’s obligation performance impossible or 
“fundamentally different in nature” envisaged when the contract was made can suffice. In all 
other instances, the courts will hold a party to their promises if they choose, as a matter of 
contract freedom and party autonomy, to make an unqualified promise to another
146
.  
The Sea Angel offers an additional compelling example of this firm doctrinal limit
147
. A 20-day 
vessel charter was not frustrated where vessel redelivery was the result of an unlawful three-
month detention by port authorities
148
. One might argue that the parties to such a charter contract 
might reasonably expect port authorities to obey the law, thus rendering their unlawful action an 
external and sufficient frustration contract force. The Sea Angel suggests that the prudent party 
negotiating a contract where a potentially frustrating event is even remotely contemplated ought 
to expressly capture this risk within the contract terms.
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                                 CHAPTER SEVEN  
            The Doctrine of Frustration of Contract in English law 
 
7-1   Introduction 
 
This chapter will provide a wide-ranging overview, commentary and criticism on the doctrine of 
frustration. It will begin by examining the general concept of frustration, and its development 
over time and through case law. It will then turn to analysing the different reasons for which 
frustration may be claimed or not claimed, involving the analysis of various decisions of the 
courts and some academic criticism. It will also look in some detail at the limitations and narrow 
scope of the doctrine of frustration, and also discuss contractual parties’ sometimes preferred 
alternatives, such as drafting force majeure clauses and hardship clauses, in endeavours centred 
on avoiding the harsh consequences of the doctrine of frustration. It will then conclude by 
examining the legal effects of the doctrine of frustration—both under old common law and under 
the new regime provided for by statute. Overall, this chapter aims to be an all-encompassing 
review of the very specific area of contract law, known as frustration. Relevant case law, 
applicable statutory authority
1
 and pertinent academic comment is considered, integrated and 
challenged in arriving at conclusions concerning the current state of the law in this field.  
 
7-2  The Concept of Frustration of Contract 
 
Frustration is a doctrine of English common law relating to risk allocation in a given contract. It 
covers situations where a contract has been signed, and perhaps even part-performed when 
intervening events occurred, which renders the performance of the original contract impossible, 
illegal, or something radically different from that which was in consideration of the parties upon 
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entering into the contract.
2
 In English law the first time, the word ‘frustrated’ appeared in statute 
when the law reforms (Frustrated Contract) Act 1943 was passed. The frustration was not 
defined by the Act but referred to it with impossibility of performance.
3
 Lord Radcliffe defined 
the modern concept of frustration in Davis Contractors Ltd vs. Fareham Urban District Council: 
...frustration occurs whenever the law recognises that, without default of either party, a 
contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because the circumstances 
in which performance is called for would render it a thing radically different from that 
which was undertaken by the contract.
4
 
The courts have likened the doctrine to that of mistake, where a mistake occurs before the 
contract is signed and a frustrating event occurs afterwards. Lord Phillips stated that both the 
mistake and frustration doctrines were based on ‘a rule of law under which, if it transpires that 
one or both of the parties have agreed to do something which it is impossible to perform, no 
obligation arises out of that agreement’.5 Mistake and frustration are therefore interlinked aspects 
of contract law, which allows for the conclusion or dissolution of an agreement when it is clear 
that it has become something different from that which was intended originally.  
EwanMcKendrick gave more details in the definition of frustration, stating that ‘a contract is 
frustrated where, after the contract was concluded, events occur which make performance of 
contract impossible, illegal or something radically different from that which was in the 
contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into the contract’.6  
Frustration is a very specific doctrine, and will only apply in certain circumstances. Notably, 
courts have also very narrowly interpreted frustration cases, making it difficult to claim that a 
contract is frustrated. It is known as a residual doctrine; therefore, the doctrine cannot apply 
where parties have made express provision in the contract for the intervening event that occurs 
subsequently. If one party causes the frustrating event, they will be barred from relying on the 
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doctrine of frustration. The doctrine will also not apply where the intervening event was a risk 
that was foreseeable but not provided for by the contract.
7
 
It is important to recognise that the doctrine of frustration is not used to relieve parties of ‘bad 
bargains’ made. A reduction in prices or bad currency exchange, for example, will not frustrate a 
contract as the doctrine is ‘not likely to be invoked to relieve contracting parties of the normal 
consequences of imprudent commercial bargains’.8 This is perhaps a significant reason for the 
restrictive approach to the doctrine of frustration as the courts are clearly wary of parties 
attempting to use the doctrine in order to escape their liabilities under a contract when the 
situations become unfavourable to them.  
If the doctrine of frustration is argued successfully, the contract will then be brought to an 
immediate end. This is the only real decision-making power the court holds with regards to a 
remedy; this leaves parties free from obligations from the date the contract was deemed ended, 
although they will still be required to perform obligations due before this date. Of course, in 
certain situations, such a discharge of contract may be as unsatisfactory as holding the parties to 
the contract.
9
 Treitel argues that it would be useful if the courts had the power to modify the 
contract where necessary, which could result in a more pleasing outcome for both parties. Treitel 
also argues that there is another problem associated with the law of frustration, and that is that 
the allocation of risk often being unsatisfactory. As mentioned, the parties will still be bound by 
the obligations that occur before the date the contract is ended, and one or both parties may have 
gone to considerable expense. Treitel argues that the loss suffered by the parties should be better 
apportioned, and that the measures contained in the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 
are ‘general but limited’.10 Essntially, therefore, it would seem that frustration is a limited and 
not always fair doctrine, which is commonly used as a last resort.  
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7-3  Development of Doctrine of Frustration of Contract in English Law  
 
The doctrine of frustration was developed in the mid-19
th
 Century, and prior to this there lacked 
a general doctrine with the ability to excuse parties from the performance of a contract. The law 
was reluctant to excuse a party from the performance of a contract even in cases where 
supervening events rendered that performance difficult or impossible. The rational of this rule 
was that the party could always make express provision for unforeseen events, and if the party 
did not do so, he should be bound by his contractual obligation. This is known as the ‘absolute 
contracts’.11  The case of Paradine vs. Jane12 was the leading case asserting this, and concerned 
rent due on a piece of land, which the defendant had not paid. The defendant argued that he had 
not been able to take possession of the land because of the action of an enemy army; Prince 
Rupert was commander of the armies of his uncle, King Charles I. Forces on both sides often 
looted the estates of the nobles for the purpose of gaining supplies. However, the courts showed 
no sympathy, and declared that the contract was still enforceable and that the defendant still 
owed rent. The court held that, if the defendant wanted to be excused from the contract in certain 
circumstances, those circumstances should have been accounted for in the contract. This 
approach fails to recognise that some events are simply unforeseeable, and, whilst others may be 
remotely possible, in order to provide for eventualities should these numerous possible events 
occur is ludicrous as the drafting of such a contract would clearly be impractical.
13
  
At the time, the courts were very much inclined to leave contracting parties and their contracts to 
themselves, and felt that it was not the role of the court to interfere with such contracts. This goes 
to explain to some degree the apparent reluctance of the court in these times to forge a doctrine 
such as frustration. Eventually, however, the courts became more disposed to assisting parties in 
such situations, and the law began to change with the case of Taylor vs. Caldwell,
14
 which was a 
case concerning the hire of a music hall for a concert for a duration of four days. The music hall 
burnt down before the use, and the plaintiffs were left without a concert location and sued the 
hall owners for the recovery of their loss. The court held that the contract could be excused, 
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rather specifically by stating that the existence of the hall was an implied term of the contract. 
Judge Blackburn stated:  
The parties must from the beginning have known that it could not be fulfilled unless… 
some particular specified thing continued to exist. 
It was decided that the implied term was so obvious that there was no need for it to be mentioned 
specifically in the contract, and thus, by implying such a term in the contract to enable frustration 
to occur, the courts were only confirming the intentions of the parties at the time of contracting. 
The implied term theory relied on the ‘officious bystander test’,15 whereby the parties would 
react with an ‘oh, of course’ response if told that a term should have been in the contract.16 
Undoubtedly, this was a method of enabling the courts to interfere with these frustrated contracts 
at a time where there was a belief in non-interference with contractual relations.
17
  
Once created, the doctrine of frustration then expanded somewhat, eventually encompassing 
situations where performance was impossible for other reasons, and even where the purpose of 
the contract was held to be frustrated. Indeed, the doctrine expanded so much that the concept of 
‘implied term’ frustration became a fallacy.18 This was confirmed by Lord Radcliffe in Davis 
Contractors. 
It may be considered that frustration—at least in most cases—depends not on adding any implied 
term but rather on the true construction of the terms included in the contract and read in the light 
of the nature of the contract and of the relevant surrounding circumstances when the contract was 
made.
19
 
This approach, often known also as the ‘radical change in obligations’ approach, recognises that 
the implied term approach had become artificial, and allowed courts to look at the intervening 
event in the light of the contract to assess whether performance was impossible or radically 
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different in nature.
20
 Under the new approach, there is no need to attempt to infer an implied 
term into a contract in order to justify the use of the frustration doctrine.
21
 
Whilst modern courts have criticised the implied term foundation of the doctrine of frustration
22
, 
nevertheless there has been no real annihilation of the theory altogether, and Lord Wilberforce 
has declared that the theory has simply blended into the modern test. Moreover, there are still 
grounds for frustration based on an implied term theory, but usually the term concerned will have 
been implied by law rather than fact.
23
  
After this clear widening and expansion of the doctrine of frustration, there is arguably less use 
of the doctrine. Treitel explains the decline in use as being down to several reasons, namely the 
courts’ reluctance to excuse bad bargains, and also that modern contracts make their own 
provisions in terms of dealing with obstacles to performance. Nevertheless, clearly the doctrine 
is still very important where it is necessary.
24
 
 
7.3.1  The Effect of Frustration on Absolute Contract in English Law  
 
The doctrine of absolute contract is expressed clearly in Paradine vs. Jane,
25
 and is this doctrine 
that has held the development of the doctrine of frustration for so long. As discussed previously, 
courts were often reluctant to interfere in private contractual relations, but rather preferred to 
hold parties to their contracts wherever possible. A contract was considered ‘absolute’ and there 
was no arguing that external factors could alter performance unless they were provided for in the 
contract: 
When the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to 
make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he 
might have provided against it by his contract.
26
 
If this doctrine, where all contractual obligations had to be honoured in nearly all circumstances, 
had been held to have applied in the Taylor vs. Caldwell case, the defendants would have been 
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held as liable for the loss to claimants, even though the hall had burnt down through no fault of 
their own. This certainly would have been a most unfair decision, and clearly there was a need 
for an alternative to this doctrine. The doctrine of absolute contract was not completely 
encompassing; there were some extreme exceptions to the rule, which allowed exceptions in 
extreme circumstances.
27
 The principle would likely not apply if one party died or also if there 
were an illegality involved.
28
 Whilst these would not apply in the majority of circumstances, the 
sheer existence of them paved the way for Blackburn in Taylor vs. Caldwell to create the 
doctrine of frustration, and assisted him in laying its foundation.  
Whilst the absolute contract rule was considered too rigid, as discussed above, subsequently 
leading to the development of the doctrine of frustration, the doctrine of absolute contracts does 
still apply in limited circumstances. For example, it will still apply where it would have been 
reasonable to provide for the intervening event, usually because it was foreseeable due to the 
nature of the contract.
29
 Today, this doctrine is based on the premise that one party guarantees 
that they will perform the contract irrespective of all potential risks and, although uncommon, 
there are still contracts agreed on this basis.
30
 Therefore, the case of Paradine vs. Jane has not 
been overruled as such; however, it is now recognised that it is limited to ‘positive and absolute’ 
contracts, and not all contracts will be of this type. Indeed, these types of contract are now very 
much an exception in modern contract law.
31
 
 
 
 
7.4  Supervening and Antecedent Events: Related to frustration or mistake  
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There is a difference between events that occur before the contract is agreed and events that 
occur afterwards, with such events having an effect on the continuation of a contract. Generally, 
frustration will only be concerned with events that occur after the contract is agreed. The contract 
is agreed and has begun, and then an event occurs that frustrates the contract, causing the 
contract to come to an end.  
If the intervening event actually occurred before the contract was agreed, this will usually not 
amount to frustration; rather, the contract will be considered void for mistake. This is because the 
unknown event that occurred before the creation of the contract made the conditions radically 
different, causing the contract to be formed upon conditions that were not in fact truly a mistake. 
Whilst the two doctrines are interlinked and have a common ground, there is a very important 
difference between the two: with mistake the contract will be held to be void ab initio,
32
 meaning 
that the contract is to be considered as if it was never entered into; with frustration, the contract 
is held to have existed but will be ended from the date of the frustrating event. In cases of 
coronation where the contract is discharged by frustration, such as in Krell vs. Henry,
33
 the 
cancellation of the coronation procession causes the contract for both parties to be frustrated 
because the event occurred after the formation of the contract. However, in one of these cases, 
namely Griffith vs. Brymer,
34
 a room was rended to view the coronation procession. The legal 
treatment was different because in this case the cancellation was unknown to both parties, who 
entered into the contract when the processions had already been cancelled. The contract was 
found void for mistake.
35
 
Issues of supervening and antecedent events are also considered when considering the effects of 
illegality upon a contract. In line with the above principles, if before the contract was agreed 
there was actually a law or prohibition that rendered the performance of the contract illegal, this 
would not amount to frustration but would ultiamtely render the contract void for illegality. 
However, if the law that renders performance illegal comes into force after the contract was 
made, this will be a supervening event and can amount to frustration. In these cases, it is said that 
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neither party could have assumed the risk that the contract would become illegal; therefore, it is 
simply terminated owing to frustration.
36
 
The case of Avery vs. Bowden
37
 concerned supervening illegality. The contract was for cargo to 
be picked up from Odessa. However, due to the Crimean war, a subsequent law was passed 
prohibiting the loading of cargo at an enemy port. It was therefore found that the contract had 
been frustrated due to supervening illegality. Had this law been passed without the parties 
knowing prior to the agreement of the contract, the contract would likely have been void for 
mistake
38
 rather than frustrated.  
 
7.5  Foreseen and Foreseeable Events and the Application of Frustration 
 
Ewan Mckendrick says, ‘given that a frustrating event is a supervening, unforeseen event, the 
doctrine ought logically not to apply to an event which is within the contemplation of the parties 
at the time the contract is concluded’.39 Jill Poole states that frustration ‘only applies to contracts 
affected by events which have not been foreseen, in the sense that they have not been expressly 
provided for in the contract’.40 Foreseeability not only includes elements that have been foreseen, 
but also those elements that a reasonable man should have foreseen. It will be for a court to 
decide whether an event which was unforeseen by the parties should have been foreseen by a 
reasonable man. This test for frustration is confirmed by Vaughan Williams L. J. in Krell vs. 
Henry: 
The test seems to be whether the event which causes the impossibility was or might have 
been anticipated
41
 
Generally, therefore, it is considered that, if the supervening event was foreseen by the parties or 
even by one party, this would bar the use of the frustration doctrine. In the case of Walton 
Harvey Ltd vs. Walker & Homfrays Ltd,
42
 hotel owner entered into a contract with an advertising 
agency, enabling them to display advertising signs for seven years on the roof of the hotel. The 
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hotel was then compulsorily purchased by the Local Authority and demolished. The advertising 
agency claimed breach of contract, and the hotel argued the contract had become frustrated. The 
contract was not frustrated as the hotel owners were aware that the Local Authority was looking 
to purchase the hotel at the time at which they had entered into the contract. 
 If an event is actually foreseen by the parties and yet they make no provisions for it in the 
contract, it can be, and is usually, assumed that the parties have assumed the risk of the event 
occurring, thus meaning the contract will not be held as frustrated. On the same lines, if the 
intervening event is mentioned and provided for in the contract, frustration will not usually 
apply, and the contract should continue. Usually, frustration will not apply where parties have 
envisaged such an event occurring and have made contractual provisions for it.
43
 This is all 
evidence of the narrow construction of the doctrine of frustration. 
However, there are certain circumstances where frustration may still apply in the case of a 
foreseen supervening event. A supervening illegality will usually still frustrate the contract, 
despite the fact that the possible future illegality could have been foreseen. There have also been 
instances where the parties to a contract have foreseen a possible frustrating event but disagreed 
on how to apportion the risk, and therefore left this out of the contract, presuming that lawyers 
would ‘sort it out’ if necessary, as in the Suez Canal case where the parties were aware of, and 
had made suggestions to deal with, the probable closure of the Suez Canal; at the time of 
contract, however, there were no express stipulations.
44
 Failure to come to a subsequent 
agreement may well result in a decision that the ending of the contract due to frustration is 
necessary.  
Indeed, in 1964 Lord Denning declared that the foundation of the frustration doctrine was not 
necessarily based upon the notion that the frustrating event was unforeseeable: 
It has frequently been said that the doctrine of frustration only applies when the new 
situation is ‘unforeseen’ or ‘unexpected’ or ‘uncontemplated’ as if this was an essential 
feature. But it is not so.
45
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In this case, Lord Denning opens up the possibility of a slight widening of the doctrine of 
frustration by declaring unforeseeability not a strict pre-requisite to a claim. There is sense in this 
approach, and it follows that some events may be highly unlikely to occur, although this is not 
completely unforeseeable. Of course, foreseeability and probability are extrinsically linked but 
essentially different things: just because an event is foreseeable does not mean it is probable, and 
of course it is impractical for parties to provide for every considered eventuality, especially when 
such eventualities only have a very remote chance of occurring.
46
 In Edwinton Commercial 
Corporation vs. Tsavlins Russ,
47
 the Court of Appeal held that foreseeability should be used 
merely as an aid to construction: 
In a sense, most events are to a greater or lesser degree foreseeable. That does not mean 
that they cannot lead to frustration. Even events which are not merely foreseen but made 
the subject of express contractual provision may lead to frustration where an event...lasts 
for so long as to go beyond the risk assumed under the contract and to render performance 
radically different from that contracted for.
48
 
The court held that the less foreseeable the supervening event, the more likely a result of 
frustration; however, the fact that an event was foreseeable was not a complete bar to the 
operation of the doctrine. This is another example of the continued development of the 
frustration doctrine and its ability to adapt itself to modern contracts and purposes. It provides a 
welcome breadth to a very narrowly interpreted doctrine.
49
  
 
7.6  Self-Induced Frustration 
 
If the frustration is procured by, or the fault of, either party to the contract, the party at fault 
cannot thereafter assert that the contract has been frustrated. Self-induced frustration is not, in the 
eyes of the law, frustration. It is submitted that it is entirely apposite that the doctrine of 
frustration does not protect a person whose own breach is actually the frustrating event. A case in 
point is Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp vs. V/O Sovfracht (The Eugenia)
50
. Here, a charterer already 
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in breach of contract ordered a ship to steam into a war zone, where the ship was immediately 
detained. It was held by the court that the charterer could not thereafter rely on the fact of the 
ship’s detention as a ground for frustration of contract. That said, deliberate failure to perform a 
condition precedent may not constitute an act of self-induced frustration per se. The court will 
examine the matter on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the proper construction of the 
contract. A negligent act by the defendant may well amount to self-induced frustration because 
such an event is not altogether outside the control of the defendant; indeed, he is the (albeit 
unintentional) author of it (see, inter alia, Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd vs. Imperial 
Smelting Corp Ltd
51
). 
In Maritime National Fish Ltd vs. Ocean Trawlers Ltd [1935],
52
 the respondents were the owners 
of a ship (the St Cuthbert) that had been chartered by the appellants. The ship was fitted with, 
and could only operate with, a type of narrow-mesh fishing net known as an ‘otter trawl’. When 
the charterparty was renewed, both parties knew it was illegal to use an otter trawl without a 
government licence.
53
 The appellants owned five trawlers and applied for five licences; only 
three licences were granted, and the appellants were free to choose which of their five ships 
would be covered. They deliberately excluded the St Cuthbert, given the free choice to include it. 
They were sued for the charter fee, their defence being that the charterparty was frustrated 
because it would be illegal to fish with the St Cuthbert. Unsurprisingly, the court held that the 
contract had not been frustrated because the allegedly ‘frustrating’ event had been self-induced 
by the appellants. In other words, the absence of the licence had been caused by the appellants’ 
own actions, and could not therefore be deemed a frustrating event. Accordingly they were liable 
to pay for the hire.
54
 
In J Lauritzen AS vs. Wijsmuller BV (The Super Servant Two) [1989],
55
 Hobhouse J sought to 
define self-induced frustration as a ‘label’ that has been employed by the courts to describe those 
situations in which one party has been held by the courts not to be entitled to treat himself as 
discharged from his contractual obligations. Hobhouse asserted that frustration is self-induced 
where the alleged frustrating event was caused by the breach or the anticipatory breach of 
                                                          
51
 [1942] AC 154. 
52
 [1935] AC 524. 
53
 Use of such nets is restricted on environmental grounds because the fine mesh catches small, immature fish. 
54
 Keenan D., Advanced Business Law, (11
th
 ed., Pearson, Harlow, 2000) 219. 
55
 [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 148. 
209 
 
contract by the party claiming frustration, or where an act of the party claiming frustration broke 
the chain of causation between the alleged frustration and the event, making performance 
impossible. Hobhouse also concurred with the court in Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd 
vs. Imperial Smelting Corp Ltd [1942]
56
 in including a situation where the alleged frustrating 
event was not a supervening event and not altogether outside the control of the parties within the 
ambit of self-induced frustration.
57
 
Ultimately, this case reached the Court of Appeal in J Lauritzen AS vs. Wijsmuller BV (The 
Super Servant Two) [1990].
58
 The defendants were contracted to transport a drilling rig for the 
claimants by sea. The defendants had two vessels capable of doing this work (the Super Servant 
One and the Super Servant Two). The contract left the choice of vessel to the defendants. The 
Super Servant Two sank before the contract was performed. Prior to the sinking the defendants 
had decided to use that ship to transport the claimants’ drilling rig and the Super Servant One 
had been contracted to do another job.
59
 
It was held that the contract had not been frustrated by the sinking of the Super Servant Two. 
Upon the sinking of the ship the defendants had still been free to perform their contract with the 
claimants by using its sister ship, the Super Servant One. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Bingham 
held that frustration should not: 
‘depend on any decision, however reasonable and commercial, of the party  seeking to rely 
on it.’ 
The Super Servant two case is one of the leading cases in this field, it is submitted, because it 
showcases the narrow confines and strict limitations within which the doctrine of frustration is 
permitted to operate. It also highlights the considerable advantages that may be provided by an 
appropriately drafted force majeure clause in a contract: Jackson vs. The Union Marine 
Insurance Co Ltd (1874).
60
 The Super Servant Two decision confirms that, if a contracting party 
wishes to insulate himself against the potential that he may be held to perform his obligations 
within a broader range of circumstances and eventualities, he must bargain (at the stage of 
contract negotiation) for the insertion of a hardship, intervener or force majeure clause because 
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the frustration doctrine will be narrowly construed, and any element of self-inducement will 
vitiate its operation in practice.
61
 
 
7.7  The Burden of Proof of Frustration 
 
The general rule in English civil law is that he who asserts and seeks to rely upon a point of 
evidence must prove it (and to the standard of the balance of probability).
62
 As the House of 
Lords confirmed in Davis Contractors Ltd vs. Fareham Urban District Council,
63
 which 
provides one of the classic statements of the modern law of frustration, the party seeking to claim 
that a contract has been frustrated owes the burden of proofing the contention. In Davis 
Contractors Ltd Lord Radcliffe held that: 
‘frustration occurs whenever the law recognises that without default of either party a 
contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because the circumstances 
in which performance is called for would render it a thing radically different from that 
which was undertaken by the contract. Non haec in foedera veni. It was not this that I 
promised to do’.64 
In essence, therefore, the party seeking to assert frustration of contract is under a burden to prove 
all the individual elements of the foregoing definition on the balance of probabilities. Lord Reid 
added in Davis Contractors Ltd: 
‘there is no need to consider what the parties thought or how they or  reasonable men in 
their shoes would have dealt with the new situation if they had foreseen it. The question is 
whether the contract which they did make is, on its true construction, wide enough to apply 
to the new situation: if it is not, then it is at an end’.65 
Therefore, the party seeking to assert frustration must also prove to the required standard that the 
contract is not wide enough in its terms to provide for the new circumstances.
66
 The same party 
is under a burden to prove that the allegedly frustrating event significantly changes the very 
nature of the outstanding contractual rights and/or obligations (not merely their difficulty or 
expense) from what the parties could reasonably have contemplated at the point of the contract’s 
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execution: see, inter alia, National Carriers Ltd vs. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd [1981]
67
 (noting 
the comments of Lord Simon of Glaisdale at p. 700 in particular). 
7.8  Prospective Frustration 
 
Prospective frustration deals with events that occur which are thought will probably eventually 
bring about the frustration of a contract, albeit with such events having not made this a certainty 
yet. Use of this claim enables frustration to be claimed prior to any real interfering or seriously 
interfering event having occurred on the premise that such an event is highly likely to occur. 
Generally, the effect of the events is determined at the time that they occur, rather than assessing 
how they eventually actually affect performance. It is felt that rights should not be held 
‘indefinitely in suspense’;68 therefore, where such intervening events are likely, parties should be 
allowed to apply for frustration as soon as possible instead of waiting for the events to unfold as 
predicted.  
Inevitably, this will lead to cases where frustration is upheld, although the events panned out in 
such a way that the performance of the contract was perfectly possible. This was the case in 
Embiricos vs. Sydney Reid & Co
69
 where Greek ships were contracted to voyage through the 
Dardanelles. However, war broke out between Greece and Turkey, and it was therefore held that 
the contract was frustrated due to the entrapment of the ships in passage. However, very 
unexpectedly Turkey allowed such ships an ‘escape period’, meaning that, had the contract been 
permitted to continue, it would have been capable of performance. This is clearly a unique 
situation, where an unexpected decision altered what was considered to be a gloomy prospective 
situation for the contract.  
The usual approach is that the intervening event is a kind that, in a reasonable view, will have a 
significant affect upon the performance of the contract, making performance impossible. If it is 
not reasonable to hold such an assumption because there is some question as to whether or not 
the intervening event will end up having a massively detrimental effect upon the contract, it is 
unlikely the prospective frustration rule will be allowed to apply at the start when the event is 
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known; rather, it may apply after the passage of some time, namely when the impact of the event 
is able to be better assessed. This does mean that such a claim will have to wait until the events 
are over, but just until a reasonable person would be able to determine that it would be highly 
likely to interfere with performance.
70
 
In such situations, the date of frustration is not necessarily the date when the intervening event 
occurred but will usually be the date upon which it was deemed that the event would have a high 
chance of frustrating the contract. This is exemplified in a series of cases concerning ships 
detained during the Gulf War.
71
 At first it was thought that the war would be over swiftly; when 
it became apparent that it would continue, these contracts were held to be frustrated. The date of 
frustration was deemed to be as soon as ‘sensible prognosis of the commercial probabilities’ was 
made, which essentially meant the date that it was realised that the war would continue for so 
long as to prevent the continuation of the ship’s services. Likewise, the same was deemed to be 
the case in situations of employment. In Notcutt vs. Universal Equipment Co (London) Ltd, an 
employment contract was deemed not terminated on the date an employee had a heart attack but 
rather on the date it was determined that the individual would not be returning to work.
72
  
 
7.9  Frustration of Purpose  
 
Frustration of purpose occurs where performance of the contract is still a possibility, but where 
such performance would be completely different to what the parties had originally imagined. 
Precisely defined, frustration of purpose is to be distinguished from the concept of impossibility 
or impracticability of performance. In a true case of frustration, it is not that either the 
performance of contract has become impossible or significantly more difficult than originally 
contemplated; rather, the party seeking discharge of contract on frustration grounds can still do 
that which the contract requires, but no longer has the need to do so which originally induced its 
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participation in the bargain.
73
 It means that it is still possible for the contract to be performed but 
there is no longer the existence of the purpose of contract. 
Frustration of purpose is narrowly applied in English law because the courts will always attain an 
interpretation to overcome any minor supervening obstacles (i.e. diffraction).
74
 As McKendrick 
argues, ‘the courts do not wish to provide an escape route for whom the contract has simply 
become a bad bargain’.75 The consequence is that frustration will not simply occur from a change 
of circumstances; rather, there must be an act that makes the foundations of the contract to fall 
away.
76
 The consequence of this is that there has to be such a change of circumstances that is so 
significant that the courts cannot overcome the obstacle through its re-interpretation in the 
commercial context.
77
  
The initial and exemplified case in frustration of purpose is called ‘coronation case’ Krell vs. 
Henry,
78
 which illustrates when this ground can be used, concerned contracts for the hire of 
rooms that would be overlooking the coronation procession of King Edward VII of United 
Kingdom, which unfortunately was subsequently cancelled due to the king’s illness. The 
contracts were held to have been frustrated because, although the rooms could still have been 
hired, there would of course be no procession to watch, and the view of the procession was the 
fundamental purpose of the contract. In addition, the court also noted that the doctrine of 
‘impossibility’ could not be applied in this case as it would not have technically been 
‘impossible’ for the lessee. The ruling of Vaughan Williams provides that the basis of frustration 
on purpose is when the purpose of the contract becomes impossible,
79
 meaning that the primary 
purpose of the contract has to be frustrated as opposed to a secondary requirement that can be 
struck out by the courts.  
The common element of frustration in the Krell case is not to see the Derby Day,
80
 but the 
enhanced price associated with the contract. The consequence is a narrow interpretation of a 
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common foundation of the contract.
81
. The result of this is that Krell is not commonly followed; 
rather, it is distinguished from.
82
 In actual fact, during the recent case of North Shores Ventures 
vs. Anstead Holdings Ltd,
83
 it was maintained that the narrow approach of Krell should be 
maintained in the application of frustration of purpose. Thus, the question centres on how to 
determine frustration of purpose. The basis of the Krell application is that the contract has to 
become fundamentally different to the original intentions of the parties. 
In these cases, the contract specifically mentions the procession; therefore, although the plaintiff 
was the hirer of the rooms suing for the loss of rent received, surely the defendants could have 
claimed for the loss of the procession as this was what the plaintiff had advertised? In declaring 
the contracts frustrated, the court recognised that neither party had assumed the risk that the 
procession would be cancelled; therefore, it was fairer to one party to hold the contract 
frustrated.
84
 
These cases are often compared with that of Herne Bay Steam Boat Co vs. Hutton,
85
 where there 
was a contract for the hire of a boat to look at the king’s review of the Navy and a cruise of the 
fleet. The king’s review was cancelled because of his illness; thus, the review would not take 
place, although it was still possible to cruise around and look at the fleet. The court therefore 
held that that contract had not been frustrated. This decision rests upon the fact that the purpose 
of the contract was for the hire of a boat and not solely for the purpose of watching the king’s 
review of the Navy. The court maintained that the cruise would have been possible without the 
viewing of the review because the fleet was still in the harbour.
86
 Clearly, the purpose behind the 
agreement of the contract is the key to claiming frustration under this ground. However, the 
decision in this case was helped by the fact that the whole part of the contract could be 
performed. 
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Normally, a contract will not be considered frustrated even if an intervening event prevents one 
party from putting to use the subject matter of the contract, even though the intended use was 
known to both parties.
87
 The courts will definitely not frustrate a contract because it became a 
bad bargain, even if it is arguably seemingly frustrated. In Amalgamated Investment & Property 
Co Ltd vs. John Walker & Son Ltd,
88
 the contract for the purchase of a house for redevelopment 
was upheld, even though the subsequent listing of the building meant development was difficult 
or even impossible. The listing of the building had caused the value to drop significantly, and 
even though surely the fact that the property had been purchased to develop was a common 
purpose of the parties and in their intentions at the time of contracting, frustration was denied by 
the courts, perhaps out of fear of allowing remedy for a bad bargain. 
The application of Krell illustrates that the frustration of purpose seems to be little more than the 
ground of impossibility. This has proven to be problematic because the international trend has 
been that there should be consideration of hardship in substantive claims of unforeseeable 
circumstance that results in the contract being impractical.
89
 The consequence of this is that there 
is an argument that there should be a limited ground of frustration of purpose.
90
 
 
7.10 Doctrine of Force Majeure Clause  
 
The term force majeure derives from the French language, and literally means ‘greater force’. It 
is a clause provided for in a contract that lists possible events that may delay or render 
impossible the performance of a contract, i.e. acts of God, war, damage or destruction to 
production facilities, terrorism or hostilities. The clause will make provisions in case of such a 
listed event and will assign risks according to what the parties decide appropriate.
91
 It developed 
as consequence of the newly developed doctrine of frustration, which was narrowly construed by 
the courts. Liability for breach of contract is strict; therefore, parties wanted to protect 
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themselves should an intervening event cause a breach.
92
 Since the frustration doctrine is so 
narrowly construed by the courts, force majeure clauses became more popular because parties of 
a contract were keen to specify and provide consequences for frustrating events, thus restricting 
their effect. Crucially, if the use of the doctrine of frustration is avoided, this may mean better 
consequences for the parties if such an intervening event does occur as there may be better 
specified remedies as opposed to the sudden ending of the contract.
93
 
If the force majeure clause deals with the event that has occurred sufficiently and is applicable, 
this will then mean that the doctrine of frustration will not apply. The use of such clauses also 
means that events will be caught by force majeure clauses that would not have been caught by 
the doctrine of frustration given that the doctrine is so narrowly interpreted. Parties do have to be 
aware, however, that if the force majeure clause does not cover the event that has occurred, the 
doctrine of frustration may still apply.
94
 Therefore, great care should be taken upon constructing 
a force majeure clause, and it should cover any form the intervening event may take, even 
extremely serious forms. In Jackson vs. Union Marine Insurance Co Ltd,
95
 the case concerned a 
ship chartered to sail from Liverpool to pick up cargo at Newport and then on to San Francisco. 
A force majeure clause was contained in the contract stipulating ‘dangers and accidents of 
navigation excepted’. The ship ran aground between Liverpool and Newport and took eight 
months to repair. The court held that the force majeure clause was not effective as it did not 
envisage an event as serious as the one that occurred. The contract was therefore held to be 
terminated for frustration. 
Indeed, great care should be taken in constructing force majeure clauses because the actual term 
‘force majeure’ has no defined meaning in law. Donaldson stated that, ‘the precise meaning of 
this term, if it has one, has eluded lawyers for years’.96 Use of the term ‘force majeure’ on its 
own will not be sufficient, and the events and consequences of a force majeure need to be 
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explained fully in the contract in order for the clause to be effective and not rendered void for 
uncertainty.
97
 
The wider the scope of the force majeure clause, the less likely the doctrine of frustration will 
apply. Nevertheless, significant events, such as seen above, may not fall within most force 
majeure clauses.
98
 There has been some opposition to this approach, with some arguing that the 
existence of a force majeure clause should exclude the operation of the doctrine of frustration; 
however, this has not been adopted in practice by the courts.
99
 
The main reason behind many parties being so keen to avoid the application of the doctrine of 
frustration where they have provided a force majeure clause is due to the difference in the results 
of the successful application of the two approaches. We know that if frustration is successfully 
argued it will bring about an immediate end to the contract. This is a very inflexible remedy, and 
sometimes a complete end to the contract is not desired by any party.
100
 A force majeure clause 
provides a more flexible solution; parties can ‘tailor the remedial consequences of the occurrence 
of any particular specified event’.101 When agreeing terms to a contract, the parties may sit down 
and consider events that could possibly hinder or prevent the performance of the contract, and 
specify exactly what these are and the consequences for if the event does happen. This allows 
parties to the contract to have the control and to decide if the contract can still be followed, rather 
than the frustration doctrine simply ending it. A successful force majeure clause will therefore 
provide parties more control over their own contract.
102
 
 
 
 
The concept of impracticability is termed in a number of phrases: economic hardship, hardship, 
economic frustration, economic impossibility, commercial hardship, impracticability,  
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7.11  Frustration of Contract by Impracticability 
 
commercial impracticability and so on.
103
 Thus, no difference between hardship and 
impracticability can be seen; they two terms used synonymsly.
104
 Impracticability is a legal 
terminology used to explain circumstances in which, although contractual performance is 
technically still physically possible, it has become economically excessively burdensome to an 
unexpected level, beyond the control and contemplation of the parties.
105
 
Impracticability is distinguished from impossibility as impossibility excuses performance when 
the subject matter cannot physically be performed; however, impracticability will be when the 
performance is still physically possible but the party performing the contract will be 
overburdened. Thus, impossibility is an objective condition, whereas impracticability is a 
subjective condition for a court to determine.
106
 
As has been discussed before, frustration deals with situations where, due to an intervening 
event, a contract is impossible to perform or, at the very least, radically altered to be of an 
entirely different nature. However, parties often argue that a contract has been frustrated because 
performance has become impractical, thus becoming more burdensome than was contemplated at 
the time of contracting, essentially meaning that performance would be something radically 
different to what was envisaged at the start. We also know that the doctrine of frustration, as it 
operates in English law, is construed very tightly; therefore, it is thought that, generally, a 
contract will not be frustrated for mere impracticability.
107
  
Generally, it has been argued that the existing English law does not support the view that a 
change in economic conditions, however radical and deep, does not affect the contract, and there 
are a number of cases that show that impracticability is not enough to frustrate a contract in 
English law. Treitel states about impracticability that, ‘the English cases do not provide a single 
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clear illustration of discharge on such grounds alone, and the possibility of such discharge 
appears to have been denied in a number of occasions in the House of Lords’.108 
The English law approach to the supervening events that make the contract impractical or 
difficult is very narrow and limited; this is resolute of the requirement of the principle of sanctity 
of contract and absolute contract in English law.
109
 However, impracticability has been applied 
and discussed in some of English cases. 
The case of Davis Contractors
110
 dealt with impracticability, with the court holding the view that 
the contract was not actually frustrated despite a delay of fourteen months and thus considerable 
more expense to the contractors, who argued that performance was therefore impracticable. 
However it should be mentioned that the increase in the price of the contract in this case was 
approximately 23%, with this total increase not considered as a grounds for discharge or 
adjustment—even in legal systems, which have more liberal views concerning the matter of 
impracticability.
111
 Therefore, the decision of this case by itself cannot be regarded as a definite 
English law position to impracticability. In the case of Staffordshire Area Health Authority vs. 
South Staffordshire Water Works Co,
112
 Lord Denning
113
 held that the contract between parties 
had been frustrated by inflation: since the agreement was made circumstances had arisen that the 
parties had not foreseen, and in such circumstances it was no longer binding on the parties.
114
 
When assessing impracticability, the issues usually centre on an increased cost of performance, 
which one party claims, somewhat understandably, makes the contract a radically different thing 
and economically impractical, and therefore argues that the contract should be frustrated. The 
courts, however, are wary of finding a contract frustrated because of what is considered a bad 
bargain. Generally, therefore, if performance of the contract is to cost more than anticipated, by 
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however much, the courts will not find that contract has been frustrated.
115
 Again this is an area 
of frustration law in which we see courts impose some very strict limitations on the doctrine of 
frustration, sometimes producing some harsh results. For example, in the case of Blackburn 
Bobbin Co Ltd vs. TW Allen & Sons Ltd,
116
 the supply to sellers had failed and the timber 
required was practically impossible to source elsewhere, and yet this was held to be insufficient 
for the doctrine of frustration to apply. 
However, as with many things governed by the common law, the issue is not always so clearcut, 
and there is evidence that, in certain extreme circumstances, impracticability will be enough to 
mount a successful claim for frustration. In Jackson vs. Union Marine Insurance, the contract 
was not ultimately impossible to perform, and yet was still held to be frustrated.
117
 Treitel argues 
that, in actual fact, there is little that is technically impossible, and most cases where the courts 
have determined performance impossible it has really only been impracticable. He cites the 
example of Taylor vs. Caldwell, highlighting that the defendants could have rebuilt the music 
hall, enabling the performance of the contract, albeit for considerable expense. He argues, 
therefore, that performance in these cases is not always truly impossible.
118
 
In English law, it has been specifically declared by the courts that a ‘wholly abnormal rise or fall 
in prices’ would not cause the frustration of a contract.119 Whilst it is apparent that 
impracticability will not usually provide a basis for a successful claim of frustration, there is 
evidence to suggest that the law could quite possibly be widened a little here along the lines that 
it has been in the United States to provide a more realistic approach.
120
  
In the case of long-term contracts and complex transactions, there are various clauses, such as 
variation clause, adaptation clauses and escalation clause, that deal with the change in 
circumstances of the contract. These clauses are not related to the discharge of the contract on 
the basis of frustration, but rather aim to ensure parties continue to perform the contract, 
although there are supervening events, such as clauses to extend the performance period if there 
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are circumstances to delay the contract performance or to modify the contract price due to the 
change in the price of the goods or the value of the currency.
121
 
 
7.11.1  Doctrine of Hardship Clause  
 
Hardship clauses are similar in action to force majeure clauses in that they will list an event and 
provide for eventualities should the event actually happen. The difference between the two 
concepts of force majeure and hardship is that hardship is where the performance of the contract 
has become much more burdensome but not impossible.
122
 Hardship deals with impracticability, 
whilst force majeure refers to performance of the party’s obligation being recognised as 
impossible, at least temporarily. Hardship constitutes a reason for change in the contractual way 
of the parties.
123
 The aim of the parties continues in terms of the performance of contract. Force 
majeure, however, is located in the context of non-performance, and deals with the suspension or 
discharge of the contract.
124
 
Hardship may be a misleading term as the clauses do not necessarily deal with hardship in the 
ordinary sense but will provide for situations where a contract has been affected by 
circumstances that have had a severe financial affect upon the parties, thus making the 
performance of the contract more burdensome or less beneficial for the parties than they could 
reasonably have expected.
125
 Such terms are used primarily in the case of long-term contracts 
where it is possible that, over a period of time, economic circumstances may change. Unlike 
force majeure clauses, hardship clauses provide a more flexible solution than the doctrine of 
frustration.
126
 They will provide for a revision or suspension of the contract in the event that the 
contract is significantly changed economically, and are used when parties want the contract to 
continue in such circumstances, rather than the doctrine of frustrating abruptly ending the 
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contract.
127
 On occasion, hardship clauses will include an option to terminate the contract,
128
 
although this is not usually a desire of the type of parties who include hardship clauses, their 
main concern being to re-apportion the risk rather than discard the contract, especially where it is 
a long-term contract. A hardship clause is generally intended to be used for the adaptation of the 
contract when changed circumstances have dramatically altered the economics of the contract. 
Thus, a hardship clause should be so drafted that it can be unambiguously fit for this crucial task. 
It should be so drafted that it comprehensively deals with the problem of changed circumstances 
when necessary.
129
 
Similar to force majeure clauses, great care must be taken in the drafting of a hardship clause, 
and the economic issues involved can be complex. Therefore, in some contracts, there will be the 
provision that an arbitrator or adjudicator is used in order to objectively determine the issues.
130
 
Nevertheless, this complexity of hardship clauses has led to some criticism of them. Kotzur 
states: 
The trouble with hardship clauses is that they only force the parties to sit down at 
a negotiating table; but this does not always result in a solution to the problem.
131
 
The criticism being levelled here is that the clauses do not necessarily provide a solution to the 
dispute, and discussions and negotiations following the invocation of a hardship clause may be 
lengthy and uncertain. Similar to force majeure clauses, unless a hardship clause covers in full 
the actual event that occurs, the doctrine of frustration still may apply. Evidently, hardship 
clauses are great when they work but will often not provide the certainty one wishes for in 
contracts.
132
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7.12  The Legal Effect of Frustration  
7.12.1  Automatic Total Discharge 
 
The effect of frustration is that the contract is discharged automatically at the time of the 
frustrating event as to its future operation, but it is not made void ab initio (from the 
beginning):
133
 Hirji Mulji vs. Cheong Yue Steamship Co Ltd [1926]
134
. The Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 makes various provisions in this eventuality, as does the 
common law. Thus, a court does not have the power at common law to allow the contract to 
continue and to adjust its terms to the new circumstances the contract discharged without any 
election by either party. The reason for why this approach has not found favour in the English 
authorities is that it would lead to uncertainty in respect to the agreed contract terms and would 
create the undesirable situation of courts having to formulate contract terms for the parties. This 
is contrary to the position that the parties would be in if there was simply a breach of contract: in 
that situation, the parties retain some choice over the results; they could choose for the contract 
to be ended or they could choose for it to continue. Frustration is therefore a very severe doctrine 
with harsh consequences for the parties.
135
 Frustration operates not only partially but totally. 
What this means is that the obligations of both parties are wholly discharged in so far as the 
performance of them had not fallen due when the contract was frustrated. Once a contract has 
been deemed frustrated, it is subject to total discharge at law, although it may be necessary for 
the court to tie up the loose ends left by the contract up to the point in time at which it was 
frustrated (Appleby vs. Myers (1867)
136
 and contrast BP Exploration Ltd v Hunt (No.2) 
[1982]
137
). Both parties are released from the obligations they owe to perform the contract after 
the date of discharge without incurring any liability for breach of contract. It should be noted that 
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the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act
138
 will not apply if the parties make their own 
provisions for the effects of frustration. 
 
9.12.2 Prospective Operation of Discharge 
 
Frustration discharges the contract prospectively, which means that the parties are released from 
their future contractual obligations but not from the obligations that be existent before the time of 
the frustration.
139
 Obligations under the contract that were due for performance prior to the date 
of frustration will still be enforceable, whilst all obligations occurring after the frustrating event 
will no longer be enforceable as the contract will have legally ended. This can leave losses 
falling quite arbitrarily, and the loss is said to ‘lie where it falls’. The law on such loss used to be 
governed by the common law, and often had harsh consequences for one party where the loss 
would fall extremely unevenly. Therefore, following much criticism of the common law, the 
Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 was enacted which endeavoured to apportion loss 
between the parties more fairly in the event of frustration ending the contract.
140
  
The law does not provide parties with protection for steps taken as a consequence of looking 
forward and anticipating the consequences of discharge by frustration of contract: Gamerco SA v 
ICM/Fair Warning (Agency) Ltd.
141
 As a matter of base logic, the doctrine does not apply to an 
event that is within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was concluded: 
Walton Harvey Ltd vs. Walker and Homfrays Ltd.
142
 With that said, this proposition was 
challenged by Lord Denning in Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp v V/O Sovfracht (The Eugenia),
143
 
and note also W. J. Tatem Ltd vs. Gamboa.
144
 The best view, it is submitted, is that the matter is a 
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question of fact and degree, and the extent to which the event in question is foreseeable.
145
 In the 
recent case of The Sea Angel,
146
 it was held by Rix LJ that: 
‘the less that an event, in its type and it impact, is foreseeable, the more likely it is to be a 
factor which, depending on other factors in the case, may lead on  to frustration.’ 
 
9.12.3  Money Paid or Payable before Discharge 
 
English law, on this point, was most unsatisfactory and ultimately quite convoluted. Originally, 
under the common law, if a contract required advance payment—that is, one party required 
payment, in part or in full, prior to any performance being carried out—they would not be able to 
recover the payment, and indeed if the payment was still outstanding they would be liable to pay 
it, even though the contract was frustrated.
147
 Such an advance payment was only considered 
recoverable if there was a total failure of consideration.
148
 
A similar imbalance was found where performance was required in advance of payment and 
there had been part performance prior to the contract being frustrated. In the event of this, the 
party who made part performance found themselves at loss as they would be without payment 
for the work that they had completed.
149
 Clearly in both situations the effects of the frustration 
were unsatisfactory, with the loss so arbitrarily distributed it often left one party significantly out 
of pocket. The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 was enacted to provide a fairer 
apportionment of loss.  
Under the Act where the contract stipulates full or part payment in advance prior to performance, 
the money paid will be recoverable and the party not liable to pay any that is unpaid, and it will 
not be necessary to demonstrate total failure of consideration.
150
 If the party who is receiving the 
advance payment has incurred expenses, the court has the discretion to agree to them retaining or 
recovering some of the advanced payment to offset the expenses; this is as long as the expenses 
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do not exceed the amount payable in advance and the court cannot award more than the expenses 
actually were. 
There are few reported case examples of the application of this statute in practice, however. In 
one we do have it would appear that the courts applied the law in a somewhat different way to 
which academics have interpreted it. In Gamerco SA vs. ICM/Fair Trading (Agency) Ltd,
151
 the 
court has been criticised as the judge awarded full payment in advance to be returned, with no 
deduction for the party’s expenses. This decision appears to be contrary to the provisions 
contained in the Act, which allow for expenses to be deducted from the advance payment return. 
The case is difficult to explain away on the facts but gives some indication that the courts are still 
unwilling to interfere with the bargain made by the parties to the contract. Of course many still 
hold the view that parties should be free to contract as they wish, and the provision of advance 
payment is a type of insurance and method of risk allocation in a contract that should not be 
interfered with by the courts.  
Where there is no provision in the contract for advance payment, there will be no compensation 
for expenses incurred;
152
 however, if one party makes part performance without payment and this 
provides a valuable benefit to the other party before the frustrating event, the court then has the 
discretion to award financial compensation to the performing party as they see fit in the 
circumstances. The award may not be greater than the value of the benefit, any expenses incurred 
by the party receiving the benefit, and also the effect that the frustrating event has had upon the 
benefit bestowed. Assessment of any such benefit is likely to be difficult as often work will only 
be half completed. The benefit must be a tangible one, and of assessable benefit.
153
 
 
9.12.4  Obligation other than to Pay Money 
The common law rules on this point, as articulated in Appleby Vs. Myers,
154
 were replaced by 
section 1(3) of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 (see also Fibrosa Spolka 
Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd 
155
. Section 1(3) provides as follows: 
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‘where any party to the contract has, by reason of anything done by any other party thereto 
in, or for the purpose of, the performance of the contract, obtained a valuable benefit (other 
than a payment of money…) before the time of discharge, there shall be recoverable from 
him by the said other party such sum (if any), not exceeding the value of said benefit to the 
party obtaining it.’ 
This is such amount as the court deems just, having regard to the full circumstances of the case 
and in particular regard to the amount of any expenses incurred before discharge by the benefited 
party and the effect (in relation to any benefit) of the circumstances of the frustration. This 
provision has been criticised by some commentators as ‘unnecessarily complex’, and has, on 
occasion, tested the interpretative capabilities of the courts. 
The leading judgment in this area is found in the case of BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd vs. Hunt 
(No 2),
156
 and again has been subsequently criticised. In this case, Robert Goff J. held that, in 
assessing valuable benefit, there is a need to first identify and give a value to the benefit; this 
would then be the upper limit of what could be awarded under s.1(3). The court should then 
decide at their discretion what sum they would award up to the limit decided. Goff also stated 
that, if the benefit accrued was destroyed by the frustrating event, there could be no award. This 
would mean that the value of the benefit was being assessed after the frustrating event when the 
wording of the statute suggests that this assessment of the benefit should take place before the 
frustrating event. The case law in this area is therefore rather disappointing and fails to bestow 
the full benefits that the legislation appears to promise.
157
 
The Act does not apply to all contracts, leaving those excluded to rely on the normal outcome of 
frustration. It will not apply where the contract has made an express provision regarding 
frustration, in insurance contracts or contracts for the carriage of goods by sea.
158
 It will also not 
apply to specific goods, generally perishables, nor to wholly performed contractual obligations 
distinguished from those affected by the frustrating event.
159
 In these situations, the loss will be 
born by the parties as it falls.
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                                    CHAPTER EIGHT 
 Frustration of Contract by Impossibility of Performance of 
Contract in English Law 
 
8.1  Introduction  
 
A contracting party is asked to fulfil the promises given, and is not easily excused from his legal 
responsibility. In the beginning, parties are obligated to perform their contractual liability; 
however, there is an exception if non-performance is caused by change beyond the parties’ 
control. The supervening impossibility of performance may bring about the discharge of a 
contract. The English doctrine of impossibility of contract has had a slow growth in its 
application and ability to discharge contracting parties from their obligations. 
This chapter, in an attempt to analyse the doctrine of impossibility and its operation in relation to 
contracts, will look closely at both the concept of initial impossibility arising from a common 
mistake on the part of both parties as to the state of things before the contract was agreed, and the 
concept of subsequent impossibility. In the case of frustration, on the other hand, the agreement 
is binding when entered into, but subsequently becomes impossible by virtue of a supervening 
event. This chapter will concentrate on the doctrine of frustration due to the focus on 
supervening events.
1
 
We will examine the concept of impossibility and the objective and subjective impossibility, and 
the rules relating to the discharge of contractual obligations and allocation of risk. We will look 
at the situation when either the subject matter or a thing essential for performance is destroyed or 
unavailable, either partially or completely. It will then consider how the death or supervening 
incapacity of a party will affect a personal contract. Towards the latter part of the dissertation, it 
will discuss the problems that arise when a method of performance becomes impossible or a 
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particular source becomes unavailable. It will conclude by looking at the effect of delay and 
temporary impossibility on a contract. 
 
8.2  The Concept of Impossibility of Performance 
 
The term impossibility and frustration sometimes are used as interchangeable words to mean a 
same doctrine. Some writers use the supervening impossibility or physically and legally 
impossible instead of frustration, or as synonymous words. In actual fact, the doctrine of 
frustration is wider than the term impossibility; thus, impossibility really is an aspect or part of 
the doctrine of frustration of contract because the events or applications of frustration may arise 
for a number of reasons, such as a supervening impossibility, illegality, impracticability or 
frustration of purpose. 
Impossibility of performance of contract simply means that it is the performance of the promise 
that became physically impossible for the person to perform the contract due to certain event that 
have occurred following the formation of contract, which is recognised as being beyond the 
control of parties. The clearest and most frequent case of impossibility is where it relates to the 
subject matter of contract, where the effect of events on a subject matter of contract are more 
applicative than the circumstances surrounding the parties, particularly in the case of commercial 
contracts.
2
   
There are cases where parties never actually reach a true agreement because they are mistaken as 
to some element of the contract before the contract is concluded and the cases where the contract 
becomes impossible to perform subsequent to the agreement having been reached. Generally 
speaking, in the first instance, the contract is void ab initio; in the second, an otherwise valid 
contract is brought to an end from the point at which the impossibility arises.
3
 
Originally, the English law was very strict in its insistence on the literal performance of absolute 
promises. English law had taken on the strict understanding that a particular promisor was 
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considered to be effectively bound by the promised expressly made. In the pre-19
th
 Century law, 
the general rule was that a change in circumstances after a promise was made did not excuse the 
promisor’s from performance—even if it made performance impossible4. This strict approach 
was established in Paradine vs. Jane.
5
 
However, as of 1863, the judiciary via their decisions through the courts looked to both relent 
and excuse the further on-going performance of a particular contract because of the fact that 
there was a condition implied
6
 through the doctrine of frustration.
7
 
 
8.3  Objective and Subjective Impossibility 
 
There are two types of impossibility of performance that discharge the duty of performance 
under a contract. Subjective impossibility is due to the inability of the individual promisor to 
perform, such as through illness or death, but it is not impossible for other parties. Objective 
impossibility means that no one can render the performance.
8
  
The distinction between objective and subjective impossibility appears to be derived from civil 
law systems in which the former was more readily regarded than the latter as a ground of 
discharge. For this purpose, impossibility was regarded as objective when performance could not 
be rendered by anyone, and as subjective when it could not be rendered by the promisor because 
of some disability personal to himself, but not rendered by others. It must be emphasised that it 
does not follow from the distinction that subjective impossibility can never provide the debtor 
with a defence.
9
   
The contract will have to be objectively impossible to perform before it is held to be void. The 
case of Thornborow vs. Whitacre
10
 holds that a party cannot escape liability on the grounds of 
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impossibility purely relating to his individual ability or circumstances. Neither will he be 
discharged from his obligations simply because he finds the contract particularly difficult or 
onerous to perform: ‘It is not hardship or inconvenience or material loss itself which calls the 
principle of frustration into play’.11 
Subsequent impossibility will similarly not excuse parties from performance if it was brought 
about by the conduct of one of the parties. The case of Southern Foundries Ltd vs. Shirlaw
12
 held 
at 717 per Lord Atkin that, ‘…conduct of either promisor or promisee which can be said to 
amount to himself of his own motion, bringing about the impossibility of performance is in itself 
a breach.’ 
Clearly, any impossibility that can be attributed to either party will be considered a breach of 
contract,
13
 and the defaulting party will become liable in damages in the usual way. Where the 
impossibility brought about by one of the parties existed at the time of the contract, he is likely to 
be held to have warranted possible performance of the contract and held to be in breach of that 
warranty.
14
 
As discussed above, it is sometimes possible for the courts to hold that a party made an absolute 
promise and therefore accepted the risk of the fact that the contract might be impossible to 
perform. Whether a contract is considered absolute will be a matter of objective construction of 
the terms of the contract. If the contract is held to be absolute, the party will be held to his 
performance—irrespective of whether the impossibility is his fault. In the case of Paradine vs. 
Jane (1647), Aleyn 26, a lessee, was held liable to pay rent even though he had been evicted 
from the property by armed forces during the civil war. A lease is a type of contract commonly 
regarded as being objectively absolute without reference to the subjective intentions of the 
parties. 
Overall, the contract must be objectively impossible to perform; the subjective views of the 
parties as to their circumstances and their personal ability to perform the contract will not usually 
be taken into account. Similarly, if a party is active in bringing about the impossibility, the 
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contract will not be seen as objectively impossible but rather as having been breached. 
Conversely, some contracts will be held to be objectively absolute, and the subjective intentions 
of the parties in forming the contract and their level of fault in bringing about the impossibility of 
performance will not be relevant.
15
  
In addition, the defence of impossibility became available only if objective impossibility existed. 
Objective impossibility
16
 occurred when the contractual obligation could not actually be 
performed. For example, if a musician promised to play a concert at a specific concert hall but 
the concert hall subsequently burnt down, it would be impossible to perform according to the 
contractual agreement and the musician would be excused from performing at that particular 
venue. Subjective impossibility
17
 exists when only one of the parties to a contract subjectively 
believes that she or he cannot complete the required performance.
18
 
 
8.4  Applications of Objective Impossibility 
8.4.1  Impossibility due to Destruction of the Subject before Delivery 
 
The destruction of the subject matter of contract is the most obvious application of impossibility 
of performance of contract. If the subject matter of a contract is destroyed after the time at which 
the contract was made and before the time when it should have been performed, the contract will 
be flustered by impossibility.
19
 As a result, the risk of destruction of goods sold but not delivered 
remains with the seller and would therefore frustrate the contract unless the seller has called 
upon the buyer or the relevant authorities to take possession of the goods.
20
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The most common example in English law for the destruction of the subject matter is the 
destruction of the music hall in the case of Taylor vs. Caldwell,
21
 which was the starting point in 
the development of the doctrine of frustration. This case is involved the destruction of the subject 
matter of the contract. In Taylor vs. Caldwell,
22
 the agreement was to let a music hall and 
gardens for concerts be played in four occasions. Before the first concert, however, the music 
hall was burnt down, and hence the contract was frustrated.
23
 Both parties were therefore 
released from their obligations under the contract. In coming to this conclusion, Blackburn
24
 
stated that: 
‘The debtor is freed from obligation when the thing has perished, neither by his act nor his 
neglect and before he is in default, unless by some stipulation he has taken on himself the 
risk of the particular misfortune which has occurred.’25 
This can similarly be applied to building contracts where a builder is contracted to carry out 
work to an existing building. In Appleby vs. Myers
26
 the plaintiff contracted to erect machinery 
on the defendant’s premises for a fixed sum. A fire destroyed the whole of the building and the 
partially erected machinery, and it was held that the contract was frustrated as the premises were 
entirely destroyed through neither party’s fault. This can perhaps be contrasted with Taylor vs. 
Caldwell
27
 and be considered a more correct approach in light of the restrictive use of frustration. 
It was only the hall that was burnt down in Taylor vs. Caldwell
28
 but that was deemed to be a 
fundamental element of the contract. In Appleby vs. Myers,
29
 if only the partly completed 
erection of machinery had been damaged but the building itself remained standing, the plaintiff 
would have had to start over again as the contract would not have been frustrated because the 
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performance of contract was still possible through introducing another part of machinery. This 
principle established in Taylor and subsequent cases
30
 is now contained in Section 7 of the Sale 
of Goods Act:
31
 
‘Where there is an agreement to sell specific goods and subsequently the goods, without 
any fault on the part of the seller or buyer, perish before the risk passes to the buyer, the 
agreement is avoided.’ 32 
It is important to note that this provision relates only to agreements of sale of goods. The 
importance of the distinction between specific and generic, or ascertained and non-ascertained 
goods, is crucial. It is thought that the enactment of Section 7
33
 mirrored the decision in Howell 
vs. Coupland
34
 where an agreement to supply 200 tons of potatoes from specified land was for 
specific goods. For example, if a seller was to agree to sell 100 tons out of 200 tons of King 
Edward potatoes in his stores, this would be deemed specific goods for the purposes of Section 7. 
On the contrary, however, if the agreement stated just 100 tons of King Edwards, this would be a 
contract for generic goods, and the contract therefore would not be frustrated. One curious point 
to note is that, where the goods are part of a specified bulk, Section 7 will apply only if the 
specified goods are given as a fraction or percentage of the bulk. It is difficult to see the rationale 
behind frustration applying where the goods are specified as ‘10% of those 200 bottles of wine’ 
and yet not applying where they are described as ‘20 of those bottles of wine’.35 
The terms destruction or perish are not defined by the Act, but it is given a broad interpretation 
so as to include stolen goods and partly perished goods.
36
 In Barrow, Lane & Ballard Ltd,
37
 for 
instance, a contract was for 700 bags of Chinese ground nuts. The 700 bags were held to have 
perished for the purposes of Section 6 when 109 of the bags were stolen prior to the agreement to 
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sell. The case of Asfar vs. Blundell
38
 above gives a good account as to what may be held to have 
perished in a commercial sense. 
 
8.4.2  Destruction of Goods after Passing of Risk 
 
Where goods are destroyed following the risk being passed to the buyer, the contract is not 
frustrated by impossibility by the destroying of the goods, and so the buyer must pay the price 
despite the goods having been destroyed because the seller performed his liability;
39
 this stands 
unless a demand has been made upon the seller to deliver the item sold, in which case the item 
then remains at the risk of the seller. 
Section 20 in SOGA states that the risk passes with property in the goods unless otherwise 
agreed. An amendment made to SOGA by the Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers 
Regulations 2002 inserted Section 20 (4),
40
 which now states that the risk remains with the seller 
until delivery where the buyer acts as a consumer. This is a welcome amendment as it seeks to 
protect consumers where goods are destroyed following an agreement to sell but before delivery. 
Although this means that the buyer may be able to claim frustration, this is a better position than 
it would be where the risk was to pass whilst the seller was still in possession and the goods 
destructed.  
However, although the destruction of the goods after the passing of risk will discharge the 
seller’s duty to deliver them, it will not totally discharge him from his outstanding obligation. 
The contract may, for example, cause him to transfer shipping documents, such as carriage and 
insurance, to the buyer so as to enable the buyer to obtain the benefits of the contract contained 
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in, or evidenced by, those documents, with such an obligation surviving the destruction of goods 
after the risk has passed.
41
 
It may be the case that, before impossibility arises, the subject matter has partly been delivered, 
such as if the two parties entered into a contract and the contract provides for the specific goods 
to be delivered by instalments and for the price to be paid after the completion of all deliveries. 
Other examples include after part of the deliveries has been made, the rest of the goods being 
destroyed or war breaking out in the seller’s country, thus making further export of the goods 
impossible, or if the buyer is unable to return the goods because he has resold the goods or has 
incorporated them in a building. 
There are difficulties that can only be met by providing a remedy of such a situation because the 
buyer may have re-sold at a price higher than the contract price and also higher than the current 
market price. In addition, non-performance is beyond the parties’ control.    
Some solutions can be considered. First, if we said that the buyer was to pay the cost price of 
goods the seller bought, there is no benefit for the seller. The second solution is to account the 
price of goods delivered from the price of the whole goods; however, the problem here is price, 
which could be the wholesale price or retail price. The first price will be for the benefit of the 
buyer; the second will benefit the seller. The third solution would allow the seller to claim the 
amount of benefit to the buyer, provided that this does not exceed the expenses shouldered by the 
seller.
42
 
The fourth solution involves requiring the buyer to account for the benefits he has derived from 
the goods. The consequence of the solution is the seller will get the benefit of the buyer’s 
advantageous re-sale or increase in the market price. 
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8.4.3  Partial Destruction of the Subject Matter  
 
The subsequent discussion is considered in regard to the destruction of the whole subject-matter 
of the contract. The destruction of some severable part of the subject matter of the contract 
resulting from a supervening event that does not affect the physical integrity of the rest of subject 
matter, such as destruction by fire of half of the goods in a warehouse, leaving the other half 
unharmed, for example, are cases that are to be distinguished from those where the whole is 
destroyed. 
It is interesting to note that the contract in Taylor
43
 was for the use of ‘Surrey Music Hall and 
Gardens’. It was therefore only part of the subject matter that was destroyed by the fire; the 
gardens still existed. However, it was held that the destruction of the music hall rendered 
performance of the contract impossible. This implies that, when part of the subject matter is 
destroyed, the courts will investigate the purpose of the contract. If the part that is destroyed 
renders the purpose impossible, the contract will be held to have been frustrated by its 
destruction. Accordingly, partial impossibility does not make the contract frustrated if it had not 
defeated the main purpose of the contract.
44
 
Where the contract is severable, it is possible that one part of the contract may become frustrated 
and hence discharged, whilst other parts remain undamaged. Furthermore, it may be that 
legislation renders a part of the contract illegal. It may be that illegality will excuse a minor 
obligation under the contract without discharging the total thing. For example, war time building 
restrictions may temporarily excuse a covenant to build, as was the case in Cricklewood Property 
and Investment Trust Ltd vs. Leighton's Investment Trust Ltd
45
. 
Aside from these specific examples, it is unlikely that there is any general doctrine of partial 
impossibility. In actual fact, the English law has difficulties in establishing how to deal with 
partial impossibility; this is due to the fact that, when the doctrine of frustration operates, it 
discharges the whole contract. In other words, the English law thinks of impossibility of 
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performance as a contract and not merely as an obligation.
46
 The cases in which it might appear 
that courts are applying such a doctrine can usually be explained by other means. For example, in 
the case of Egham and Staines Electricity Co Ltd vs. Egham UDC,
47
 where the courts held that 
the electricity company was excused from their contractual obligation to provide electricity for 
lighting during the time at which war-time lighting restrictions prevented them from so doing. 
Although this may, at first sight, appear to suggest the contract was frustrated partially, the courts 
actually held that it came within a force majeure clause, which stated that the parties would not 
be liable if their default was due to an unavoidable cause. 
In the case of Sainsbury (H R & S) Ltd vs. Street,
48
 in June 1970, the defendant, who was a 
farmer, entered into contract with the plaintiffs, who were corn merchants, to sell them 275 tons 
of barley from a crop growing on a land .Without the seller’s fault, only 140 tons were produced. 
The defendant sold the crops to other corn merchants at a higher price. The plaintiffs brought an 
action against the defendant, claiming damages in respect to the defendant's failure to deliver the 
140 tons actually harvested. The court rejected the seller's claim that he was excused from 
delivering any at all, that a contract of sale was subject to an implied term under which he was 
obliged to deliver the smaller amount if the buyer so requested, in which case the buyer is 
required, by Section 30(l) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1979, to pay for it at the contract price. The 
plaintiffs were therefore entitled to the damages claimed. 
It has been held that, where a party enters into several contracts and his supplies are subsequently 
reduced by other events, he is not excused from performance and must therefore pay damages for 
any contractual promises that he cannot meet. 
In this vein, the problem arises when the one party of contract has entered into contracts with a 
number of parties to supply each of them with specified goods from the same certain source. 
This subject matter becomes impossible in part, without any fault of the parties. The result is 
that, although the seller is not prevented from performing one of the contracts, he is prevented 
from performing all. There are cases such as this situation in the present time, which have arisen 
because the goods will be imported from an international source, which has ceased to be 
                                                          
46
 Nicholas Barry, ‘ Force Majeure and Frustration’ (1979) 27 American Journal of Comparative Law 231,245  
47
 Egham and Staines Electricity Co Ltd vs. Egham UDC [1944] 1 All ER 
48
 HR & S. Sainsbury Ltd. v. Street, [1972] 1 WLR 834 
239 
 
available to the seller because of export restrictions imposed by the authorities of the foreign 
country. 
As an example, an owner of a factory expected his factory to produce 10,000 tons of iron, and so 
he agreed to sell 2,000 tons to five individual buyers. The factory was destroyed completely by 
fire after the production of 6,000 tons, and so there is a need to establish a solution to the 
problem. The first possibility for solving this issue is that all contracts are discharged because 
there is partial impossibility, i.e. the seller cannot perform his obligation in full. However, this is 
not a practical solution as it would leave the seller free to go into market and sell the whole 6,000 
tons actually produced at the higher price, which would probably prevail because of the shortage. 
If the seller delivered 2,000 tons to any one buyer, the buyer should then have no cause for 
complaint.  
The second possible solution is no discharge of the contracts because the discharge must be as a 
result of events beyond the control of the party; however, the discharge came about because of 
the choice of the seller. If the seller chooses to deliver 2,000 tons to three of five buyers and his 
contracts with two buyers are not discharged, his inability to deliver anything to the other two are 
a result of his own choice. However, there is an objection to the solution that the seller has a free 
choice of buyers, and so he will deliver to who agrees to pay money more than the price in the 
contract. Moreover, the contracts cannot be discharged for two parties due to the seller’s choice; 
as a ground of discharge, a party cannot rely on an inability to perform, as can be seen in the case 
of Lauritzen A.S. vs. Wijsmuller B.V. (The Super Servant Two).
49
 
The third solution it that some of the contracts be discharged: if the seller delivers production to 
three buyers, the contracts with two buyers are discharged. However, the problem remains that 
the seller has a free to choose buyers; he will deliver to those who will pay the highest price. On 
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the other hand, the law may require him to deliver to those who had made the contracts at the 
earliest dates.  
The fourth solution is to suggest that the seller divide his production between five buyers, i.e. 
deliver 1,200 tons to each buyer, and he would be excused from each contract with regard to the 
balance of 800 tons.
50
 
The first and second solutions should not be adopted because of the reasons mentioned above. 
The third and fourth solution can be adopted as this is related to the frustration of contract by 
partial impossibility with the division of supplies between some or all parties. However, the 
fourth solution is closest to the principle of pro rata division or the principal of allocation of 
supplies. Importantly, there is no legislation in English law
51
 for the allocation of supplies or 
cases illustrating this principle; however, it is possible in the case of partial impossibility to apply 
the rules relating to bankruptcy, which relates to the allocation of payment of debts between 
creditors. Importantly, this is only if the seller becomes bankrupt following a court’s decision.  
 
8.4.4  Impossibility by Unavailability of the Subject Matter 
 
A contract may be impossible to perform where the subject matter of the contract is not 
destroyed but becomes unavailable for the purpose of performance by the reason of it ceasing to 
be at the disposal of the parties. The contracts for charter parties have been frustrated when, for 
example, a ship was seized, detained or requisitioned, and when cargo was impossible because of 
a strike at the port. Sales contracts have been frustrated when, for instance, the goods were 
requisitioned.
52  
Where both parties are mistaken as to the availability of the subject matter at the time of the 
contract, this may be sufficiently fundamental to avoid the contract. The leading case on this 
issue is that of Courturier vs. Hastie,
53
 in which the parties entered into a contract for the sale of 
a cargo of corn, which was believed to be in transit from Salonica to England. Unknown to both 
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the parties, the corn’s quality had deteriorated to such an extent that the master had sold it. The 
House of Lords held that the matter turned on the construction of the contract, concluding that:  
‘The contract plainly imports that there was something which was to be sold at the time of 
the contract, and something to be purchased, no such thing existing… judgment should be 
given for the defendants.’54 
However, the court in Couturier did not mention the word ‘mistake’; they based their reasoning 
on the construction of the contract and the fact that there was a total failure of consideration on 
the part of the sellers.  
Lord Denning applied a different interpretation in the case of Solle vs. Butcher
55
 in which he held 
that there was an implied condition precedent that the contract was capable of performance. He 
reasoned that, in Couturier, the parties had proceeded on the assumption that the goods were 
capable of being sold when, in actual fact, they were no longer available for sale. Lord 
Denning’s interpretation does seem to give effect to the most likely intention of the parties; 
however, in the absence of a clear intention to release each other from the agreement if the 
subject matter is not available, it is not clear when Lord Denning is suggesting a term of this 
nature should be incorporated within the contract. 
The exact legal basis for importing this term has been the subject of some debate amongst 
commentators, and will be discussed briefly. The draftsmen of the Sale of Goods Act 1979
56
 
appear to have interpreted the decision as stating that a mistake as to the existence of the subject 
matter of the contract inevitably renders it void.
57
 Moreover, impossibility may arise where the 
performance of a contract depends on the continued state of affairs after the making of contract 
ceases to exist. If the subject matter becomes unavailable after the contract has been concluded, 
this may also render the contract frustrated for impossibility. For example, in the case of Bank 
Line Ltd vs. Arthur Capel & Co,
58
 a charter party was held to be frustrated when the ship was 
requisitioned and so unavailable to the charterer. Temporary unavailability may also suffice, 
although this will be discussed later. 
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In a lot of cases, the unavailability of subject matter is only temporary, and in some 
circumstances the subject matter of a contract are still in existence, which simply may not be 
available for the purpose contracted. In the case of International Sea Tankers Inc. vs. 
Hemisphere Shipping Co. Ltd,
59
 a ship of oil was trapped in Shatt-al-Arab because of the 
outbreak of war, and so it was an impossibility to perform the contract to carry oil from Iraq. It 
held the charter party indirectly frustrated due to the unavailability of the subject matter.
60
 
 
8.4.5  Impossibility of the Method of Performance  
 
Where a method of performance has been agreed on and that method has subsequently become 
impossible, the contract will be frustrated. However, it is not sufficient that the parties 
contemplated a particular method of performance, although it must have been expressly agreed 
that this was the exclusive method by which the obligation would be carried out. This is 
demonstrated in Nickoll & Knight vs. Aston, Edridge & Co,
61
 where a cargo of cotton seed was 
to be sold and shipped at certain Egyptian ports by a steamship called ‘Orlando’ to be delivered 
to plaintiffs in the United Kingdom. When the ‘Orlando’ subsequently ran aground, the plaintiffs 
brought an action for breach of contract against the defendants for failing to ship the cargo. It 
was held that
62
 the contract was frustrated since there was an implied term that, if at the time of 
performance the ‘Orlando’ was not fit, the contract would be at an end. This, in fact, displays the 
weakness in the implied term approach to frustration. It would surely not have been the 
intentions of the parties to render the contract at an end; rather, the use of another fit for purpose 
vessel or a delay to allow for the ‘Orlando’ to be repaired would have been more likely 
contemplations. 
In Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd,
63
 the House of Lords refused to imply a term that shipment was to be 
made via the Suez canal. The parties both expected that shipment would be via the Suez canal 
when it closed in 1956 because of the war between Egypt and Israel; there was no shipping of 
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goods from or to East Africa via that particular canal. But there was no expressed stipulation; 
hence, the House of Lord held that sellers should have shipped the goods by the alternative route 
around Cape of Good Hope. The parties have to look for all impossible ways to help them to 
perform the contract. A further case where the contract was not frustrated by closure of the Suez 
canal is that of The Eugenia
64
 above, where the alternative journey from Genoa to India via the 
Cape of Good Hope increased the journey time from 108 days to 138 days.
65
 In both cases, the 
cargo was such that delay would not affect it, and the only effect was to make the journey longer 
and more onerous for the charter party. 
In a contract for sale and supply of goods, it will not be a defence for the seller to say that goods 
are not available from the source from which he originally intended to get them. Even if the 
source is the sole source from which goods can be obtained, a mere interruption or reduction of 
supplies due to commonplace difficulties will not frustrate the contract; they are ‘the warp and 
woof of industrial and commercial aggravation’. In Blackburn Bobbin Co Ltd,66 the seller was 
not discharged from his obligation where its source of supply was cut-off due to the outbreak of 
war. This extends to the situation where the seller’s supplier chooses not to supply to the seller, 
rendering his performance impossible.
67
 The contract will still not held to be frustrated despite 
this not being the fault of the seller. It is submitted that, in each of these cases, the seller assumes 
the risk by asserting that the goods can be supplied as agreed. 
It is clear that, if a party is seeking to rely on the fact that their performance has become 
impossible because of the unavailability of a source to discharge them from their obligations 
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under the contract, the source must have been one which was in the minds of both of the parties 
at the outset.
68
 
 
 
8.5  Applications of Subjective Impossibility  
8.5.1  The Death of a Person Essential to Performance 
 
Most commercial contracts do not have need of performance by particular person because the 
commercial contracts in usual are made between companies. Thus, the death or illness of a 
person does not normally prevent the performance of a commercial contract, and so death does 
not make performance impossible in this kind of contract. However, a contract for personal 
service, as well as sometimes in the case of commercial contracts, will be impossible in the 
instance of death if a particular person is required by any party of contract to be a part of 
performance of the contract, such as a designer or an engineer.
69
 The death of one party may 
make the contract is impossible to be performed in requiring personal performance from one or 
both of parties. For example, a contract of apprenticeship, employment, or agency is ended by 
death of any one of the parties. The rule is stated by Pollock C.B. in Hall vs. Wright: 
‘All contracts for personal services which can be performed only during the lifetime of the 
party contracting are subject to the implied condition that he shall be alive to perform 
them; and should he die, his executor is not liable to an action for the breach of contract 
occasioned by his death’.70  
Under general contract law, the death of a party will not have any effect on the contract or any of 
the rights accrued under it. The personal representatives of the deceased person are bound to 
complete performance on his behalf insofar as the estate allows, and they may sue for the return 
side of the agreement. This is not the case when personal relations are the foundation of the 
contract. In such an event, the death of one or other of the parties, the contract is prima facie 
discharged.
71
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Importantly, the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 will apply in some situations. 
Where part of the contract can be severed and those parts of the contract have been performed 
before the contract was discharged due to the death of the party, or were discharged but for 
payment of an ascertainable sum, the courts must treat that part as a separate contract that had 
not been frustrated. This provision keeps in mind severable obligations already performed, but 
departs from the common law refusal to allow the recovery of money paid or benefits conferred. 
Contracts that might be discharged because of the death of one of the parties include contracts 
between principle and agent as in Graves vs. Cohen,
72
 during which the court had to consider a 
contract between a jockey and his employer, a racehorse owner. It was held that the death of the 
employer frustrated the jockey’s contract since the contract created a relationship of mutual 
confidence. This common law position stands but has diminished in importance owing to 
statutory provisions in relation to the most important parts of employment, which deal with the 
effect of death on a contract of employment. One statutory example can be found in the 
Employment Rights Act 1996, Section 176. In the instance that an employee whose employer 
has given him notice to terminate his contract of employment dies before the notice expires, the 
statutory provisions relating to redundancy payments apply as, if the contract had been duly 
terminated by the employer by notice expiring on the date of the employee’s death, this may not 
be the case when the employer is in a partnership and only one of the partners dies. In the case of 
Phillips vs. Alhambra Palace Co.,
73
 the death of one partner of a firm who owned a music hall 
was held not to discharge the contracts of performance. 
In relation to partnership generally, a partnership will be frustrated as regards all the partners on 
the death of any of the partners unless there has been an alternative agreement. Neither the 
surviving partners nor the personal representatives of the deceased are obliged or entitled to carry 
on the partnership.
74
 If a partner gives valid notice of the dissolution but dies before the receipt 
or expiration of the notice, the dissolution will take effect on the date of death rather than at the 
expiration of the notice. 
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8.5.2  Illness of a Person Essential to Performance 
 
A contract for personal services, if it is to be performed by the promisor himself, will be 
discharged if, without default on his part, he becomes physically incapable of performing the 
contract. For example, if a contract with a lawyer to take a case is made but the lawyer suffered a 
stroke, causing him to lose his mental ability, the contract will be frustrated by mental illness. 
The serious illness of the party of contract may frustrate personal contracts; it will do so if illness 
is continued for long time or if it is of such a disabling character as to preclude performance. 
Examples of when a party might become incapable of performing the contract include when an 
employee becomes incapacitated by illness. In the old case of Robinson vs. Davison,
75
 the court 
held that the illness of a piano player contracted to play a concert frustrated the contract. In the 
case of Hart vs. AR Marshall & Sons (Bulwell) Ltd,
76
 the contract of employment was held to be 
frustrated by the indefinite illness of the employee. It is likely that the length of service will be a 
relevant factor in determining whether the contract is frustrated by prolonged illness. The test of 
whether or not illness will be sufficient to frustrate the contract will depend on whether the 
illness is such as to cause an impact in the business sense in regard to engagement. In Notcutt vs. 
Universal Equipment Co.,
77
 the employment contract was frustrated when an employee had a 
heart attack and would never work again. In the case of Mount vs. Oldham Corpn
78
 it was held 
that the absence of a headmaster from a school through illness was not sufficient to put an end to 
his employment relationship with the education authority. 
However, illness will not automatically frustrate an employment contract as it is a question of 
degree and whether the employee’s incapacity is such that further performance would be either 
impossible or radically different from that undertaken by him and accepted by the employer. 
Relevant considerations will include the terms of the contract, the nature and duration of the 
employment, the nature of the illness, the period of past service and the prospects of recovery.
79
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Hence, in Condor vs. The Barron Knights Ltd,
80
 a contract was devised where a drummer was to 
play seven nights a week, but who subsequently had a nervous breakdown and was advised to 
play no more than four nights a week for medical reasons. This contract was frustrated. 
The factors that need to be taken into account when assessing whether or not a contract of 
employment has been frustrated by long-term absence due to the illness of the employee include, 
for example, the terms of the contract, the length and nature of the employment, the length of 
service of the employee, and the nature of illness.
81
 
This would seem straightforward enough as it is clear that, if the person contracted to perform a 
service was unavailable through no fault of their own, it would then be impossible for the 
contract to proceed. If the contract was for commercial services or for the sale of goods, the 
contract would then unlikely be frustrated due to serious illness as the contract could be 
performed by an alternative person and/or the business. Ellington uses the example of a tailor 
who dies whilst producing a suit. If his widow finished the suit and delivered it, the contract 
would not be able to be frustrated.
82
 
 
8.5.3  Imprisonment of a Person Essential to Performance 
 
An employment contract will also be frustrated by the imprisonment of the employee. In the case 
of Hare vs. Murphy Bros Ltd, 
83
 a foreman had worked for the same employers for 20 years but 
was given a 12-month prison sentence, which was considered sufficient to render the contract of 
employment impossible. A temporary internment will not be sufficient to discharge a contract of 
agency. Call up for military service has also been held to frustrate a contract of employment. The 
National Industrial Relations Court
84
 dismissed his claim of unfair dismissal on the grounds that 
his sentence of imprisonment amounted to a breach by the employee of his contract of 
employment of such a serious a nature that it constituted a unilateral repudiation by him of that 
contract. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning did not feel that a breach of contract had 
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occurred because the event that had led to the employee’s imprisonment was in no way 
connected with his contract of employment, and his imprisonment was the act of the court that 
had sentenced him. He said: 
‘The sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment frustrated the contract of employment. I know 
that it was brought about by his act, namely, the unlawful wounding. In that way it may be 
said to have been self-induced; but it was still a frustrating event’ 
When the employee being imprisoned is prevented from continuing the work under the contract, 
frustration due to imprisonment is easy to see as the imprisonment will prevent the employee 
from being able to do his job; however, the employer would be wrong to think that any period of 
imprisonment would constitute frustration. The employment appeal tribunal has ruled that an 
employee that was effectively prevented from working for some time due to bail conditions did 
not have the employment end due to frustration, and the employer could have chosen to actually 
terminate the employment if it had so wished.
85
  
Where an employee is imprisoned for a substantial remainder of the employment contract’s 
duration, it may be frustrated by the employer; however, it was held in FC Shepherd vs. Jerrom
86
 
that the employee is barred as this would be self-induced frustration, although the Court of 
Appeal held that the employee was not unfairly dismissed. The contract of employment was 
frustrated. Essentially, although imprisonment can frustrate an employment contract, the effect of 
imprisonment is not just on an employment contracts but includes personal contracts, such as 
agency contract.  
 
 
 
8.5.4  Competence or Deskilling  
 
It is very controversial for an employment contract to be frustrated by virtue of illness or 
imprisonment as the supervening event may well have been outside the control of both parties 
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and the employer may need to replace an employee for practical reasons. However, it has 
recently been recognised that a contract may be frustrated by ‘de-skilling’; this, it is submitted, is 
a somewhat alarming development in today’s employment background where performance 
targets play such a major role.
87
 The case was Gryf Lowczowski vs. Hinchinbrooke Healthcare 
NHS Trust,
88
 and the employee was a consultant whose clinical capabilities were in doubt. On 
the facts of the case, it was held that the contract was not in fact frustrated as there was a 
significant chance of re-skilling taking place. In addition, the catastrophic effect this would have 
had on the consultant was also taken into account. This is an area that is unsuitable for the 
doctrine of frustration as the employer’s interests, where competence is concerned, are addressed 
fully by the law of employment contract. From the employee’s point of view, this may be seen as 
a way for the employer to circumnavigate the protections against unfair dismissal in employment 
law. This case highlights that the doctrine of frustration can be difficult to apply in many 
employment cases. 
 
 
8.5.5  Impossibility by Bankruptcy   
 
Frustration of contract by bankruptcy may be discussed under frustration by illegality because 
law and courts will deal with bankruptcy cases or under impossibility if the financial ability of a 
party means that a contract became impossible to perform. The party of the contract who filed 
for bankruptcy will be discharged from the obligation by impossibility but to repay their debts as 
long as they give up all assets owned.  
Personal contracts are not terminated due to bankruptcy; in these circumstances, it may be 
appropriate for the court to consider frustrating the contract if the bankruptcy has affected the 
contract significantly. There is scarce case law in the UK concerning personal contracts 
frustrated due to bankruptcy; therefore, the operation of the doctrine in these circumstances must 
be rare. However, with a lack of judicial precedent on the issue combined with the fact that a 
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contract usually will not be frustrated for bankruptcy, it is important that the juristic basis of 
frustration is clear in order that it may be applied to new situations such as this.  
Andrew Burrows states that, whilst there is no argument as to the existence of the doctrine of 
frustration, there is dispute concerning the juristic basis of the doctrine.
89
 The case of National 
Carriers vs. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd
90
 is very useful in terms of analysing the basis of the 
frustration doctrine as the judges in this case provide a nice analysis of the various bases of the 
doctrine. Lord Hailsham identified five theories on the basis of frustration: the implied term 
theory, a fair and just solution, removal of the foundation of the contract, total failure of 
consideration, and the construction theory. It is useful to look at these theories in more detail in 
order to analyse how they fit in with the reality of the use of the doctrine of frustration. 
The effect of bankruptcy and insolvency is not usually considered in the same light as frustration 
and common mistake; however, where the seller in a sale of goods contract becomes insolvent 
before the goods have been transferred to the buyer, the distinction between ascertained and non-
ascertained goods becomes of paramount importance. Neither the bankruptcy nor insolvency of a 
person terminates a contract already made, but when a bankruptcy order is made, all property or 
rights vested in the bankrupt at the time pass to the trustee of the bankrupt’s estate.91 It may be 
impossible for a buyer to obtain goods bought from the seller who goes into bankruptcy unless 
he can show that certain ascertained goods, although still in the possession of the bankrupt seller, 
had actually been transferred in title to the buyer. In Re Goldcorp Exchange
92
 it was established 
that unless the goods purchased could be ascertained, then the purchaser would merely be a 
creditor and hence would barely be able to recover anything. 
SOGA makes special provision for the situation where the buyer becomes insolvent and, by 
virtue of Section 39(1)(b), an unpaid seller can stop goods in transit even after parting possession 
in such circumstances. Section 41(1)(c) provides that the seller can refuse to deliver except 
against payment in cash. Although insolvency does not put a contract at an end, a notice of 
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insolvency may have the effect of a repudiation of the contract as the buyer is essentially saying 
they are unable to fulfil their obligation to pay the purchase price.
93
  
Ellington comments that bankruptcy will not usually terminate a contract.
94
 He states that 
contractual rights will normally be passed over to the trustee in bankruptcy, and contracts can be 
enforced against the trustee—unless they are personal contracts. The contract price will then be 
added to the list of ordinary creditors by the trustee. Clearly, this is not a very satisfactory 
conclusion for the party at risk. Their name might be added to the list of creditors, but this is 
contingent upon the amount of creditors: they will be unlikely to receive anything near what they 
are owed under the contract. Depending upon what point they were at in the contract, they may 
prefer to cut their losses and terminate the contract immediately. A party to a contract with a 
bankrupt may be able to apply to the court for the contract to be discharged. It would then be 
down to the court to apportion fair payments from either party in respect of work done and 
according to what it deems to be fair.
95
 
 
8.6  Temporary Impossibility  
 
Temporary impossibility arises when a thing or person essential to the performance of a contract 
becomes temporarily unavailable for a period. In cases where the performance is rendered 
impossible but only temporarily, the question is centred on whether contractual performance 
when resumed would amount to performance of a fundamentally different contract.
96
 
For supervening events, it is possible to suspend the contract without discharging it all together.
97
 
For example, the illness of an employee might excuse his absence from work for the course of 
the illness without actually discharging the whole employment contract. Temporary impossibility 
may also be sufficient to frustrate the entire contract, such as in the case of the temporary 
unavailability of the subject matter of the contract, as per Jackson vs. Union Marine Insurance 
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Co.
98
 A ship was chartered in November with a provision that it proceed with all possible 
dispatches from Liverpool to Newport, where it was to load a cargo and proceed to San 
Francisco. The ship ran aground between Liverpool and Newport, and was not fully repaired 
until August the following year. The contract was held to be void because the ship was 
unavailable for the voyage for which it was chartered. A voyage in August the following year 
was thought to be radically different from that which was agreed. It is clear that, even if the 
impossibility is only temporary, it may be that the delay is sufficient to render the contract 
impossible to perform. 
The party of the contract may have a temporary excuse for the non-performance of temporary 
impossibility, such as when the illness of an employee was not of such duration as to frustrate his 
contract of employment, meaning the employee would not be in breach of the contract through 
failing to work whilst ill. The excuse can extend to cases where the employee is temporarily 
prevented from performing by other causes beyond his control.  
As has been established, the time is the essence of the contract. A contract will be discharged by 
temporary impossibility where it can be performed on the day or days over the temporary 
impossibility extends. The illustration of this situation is provided by Robinson vs. Davison,
99
 
where a contract where a pianist was to give a contract on a specified day was held to have been 
discharged. 
Where the contract is one of fixed duration and the unavailability of the subject matter is only 
temporarily unavailable the court must:  
‘…consider the ratio of the interruption in contractual performance to the duration of the 
contract. The higher the ratio the more likely the contract is to have been frustrated’.100  
In the case of The Nema,
101
 a charter party became frustrated when a strike closed the port at 
which the ship was due to load. There were seven voyages contracted for between April and 
December; only two could be completed. 
A contract that does not express a specific time for performance is not of the essence, but may 
however be discharged by reason of the length of delay resulting from temporary impossibility.  
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8.7  Length and Effects of Delay  
 
Frequently, as has been established, supervening event causes delays in the performance of the 
contract, causing financial losses for one of the parties.  
It is important to remember that the delay must not be attributable to either of the parties if it is to 
be considered a frustrating event. This means that long delays in the arbitration itself, which are 
brought about because of inactivity on both sides, cannot frustrate the contract because they are 
self-induced. It is the length of the delay that is important in determining whether or not the 
contract will be frustrated. As has been seen in the case of Jackson above, the delay has to be: 
‘of such a character that the fulfilment of the contract, in the only way or ways 
contemplated and practicable, is so inordinately postponed that the delayed fulfilment will 
involve something commercially or fundamentally different from that contemplated in the 
contract’.102  
War is one example of an event that could cause delay to the performance of a contract. Delay 
caused by war might be long enough to frustrate the contract, but there is no irrefutable 
presumption that the outbreak of war will do so. In the case of Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna vs. 
Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd,
103
 for example, the contract was frustrated as a result of 
the delay caused by the outbreak of war. The contract was for the building of machinery in 
Poland, which was to be delivered to England within three to four months of the settlement of the 
final contract details. Before the delivery, however, the Germans occupied Poland, and the 
machines were not able to be delivered. This was a contract in which the time for delivery was 
specified and the length of occupation frustrated the purpose of the contract; however, each 
situation depends on its facts.  
It seems likely that the delay will have to be something that the parties would not have thought to 
contract against and something that would be of equal concern to both of them. In the case of 
Davis Contractors vs. Fareham Urban District Council,
104
 the claimant contractors agreed to 
build 78 houses for the defendants at a charge of £94,000. The work was scheduled to last for 
eight months; however, owing to a shortage of skilled labour, it actually lasted for twenty-two 
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months, and the cost was in the region of £115,000. It was argued that the contract had been 
frustrated by the length of the delay. The court held that the contract had not been frustrated. 
Lord Radcliffe stated: 
‘The possibility of their not being enough labour was before their eyes and could have been 
the subject if special contractual stipulation….Though timely completion was no doubt 
important to both sides, it is not right to treat the possibility of delay as having the same 
significance for each.’ 
He concluded that the doctrine of frustration ought not to be used to get the contractor out of an 
unfortunate contractual predicament that he could have guarded against.
105
  
The relationship between delay and frustration can be said to be one of degree, depending on the 
facts of the specific situation at hand. It has been held that the appellate courts should therefore 
be reluctant to interfere with the findings of the lower courts and arbitrators. In the case of 
Kodros Shipping Corpn vs. Empresa Cubana de Fletes, The Evia
106
 at 368 The House of Lords, 
held in relation to the exact date of frustration caused by delay: 
‘The choice of date in this case, as in the others, was for the umpire or arbitrator concerned 
and is not a matter for your Lordships' House.’ 
Whether or not delay will cause frustration may, to some extent, also depend on the type of 
contract under examination. If the contract is a commercial contract, it seems that delay is more 
likely to affect its substance. In the case of National Carriers Ltd vs. Panalpina (Northern) 
Ltd,
107
 Lord Simon stated that: 
‘Commercial men must be entitled to act on reasonable commercial probabilities at the 
time they are called upon to make up their minds.’ 
Thus, businessmen are often thought by courts to be entitled to know where they stand, and 
should not be required to wait on events.  
With regard to delay, the same principles apply as across the whole doctrine of frustration. The 
courts will be concerned with considering the details of what the parties agreed, whether 
expressly or impliedly. They will then look at whether the delay was self-induced, and whether it 
was something that could have been foreseen and dealt with by a contractual stipulation. If it was 
not, they will look in detail at whether the length or effects of the delay actually altered the 
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substance of the performance to a degree that was substantially different from that which the 
parties had contemplated when they entered into the agreement.
108
 
 
8.7  Impossibility by Contract by Illegality  
 
Even if the performance of a contract is still technically possible, a contract may be frustrated 
because, since the contract was agreed, there has been a change in the law that now renders 
performance illegal. As Lord Macmillan stated: ‘it is plain that a contract to do what it has 
become illegal to do cannot be legally enforceable’.109 As discussed briefly earlier, if the 
performance of the contract was illegal before it was agreed, frustration will not apply, and the 
contract will be dealt with under the rules for illegal contracts. It is only a supervening change in 
the law that will permit the use of the doctrine of frustration. Essentially, the reasoning behind 
this is that no one can be assumed to have taken the risk that the contract would become illegal. 
Most obviously this will occur if legislation is enacted after the contract is agreed, which affects 
the legality of performance.  
Many of the historical cases on frustration due to illegality deal with contracts rendered illegal by 
war. The case of Avery vs. Bowden
110
 concerned supervening illegality. This concerned a 
contract for cargo to be picked up from Odessa. However, due to the Crimean war, a subsequent 
law was passed prohibiting the loading of cargo at an enemy port. It was therefore found that the 
contract had been frustrated due to the supervening illegality. Had this law been passed 
unknowingly to the parties prior to the agreement of the contract, the contract would likely have 
been a mistake rather than frustrated.  
Under the Trading with the Enemy Act 1939, it is, as the title suggests, illegal to trade with a 
country with which the UK is at war. Therefore, if a war is declared before a contract is fully 
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performed, the contract will be frustrated.
111
 Similarly, if anything to do with the performance of 
contract is subsequently prohibited by law, the contract may be frustrated.
112
 
There are also situations where the illegality affecting the performance of the contract is only a 
temporary or a partial illegality, encompassing only some of what the contract covers. 
Temporary illegality is dealt with in much the same way as temporary impossibility in that the 
court will look to the facts of the case and decide what is proportionate and reasonable. For 
example, in National Carriers Ltd vs. Panalpina
113
 the local authority blocked the access to a 
warehouse which was on a ten year long lease for twenty months. The defendant could not rely 
upon frustration as excuse for failing to pay their rent as the length of time the illegality 
prevented performance was minor in terms of the length of the contract. Where partial illegality 
is concerned, the issue upon which the courts will focus is whether the illegality defeats the main 
purpose of the contract or just part of it. If it defeats the main purpose, the contract will be held 
to be frustrated;
114
 if, on the other hand, the illegality is only applicable to part of the contract 
and not the main part, the parties will not be able to rely on frustration to end the contract.
115
 
In any event, even if the contract is not frustrated, the parties should be able to rely on the 
supervening illegality for non-performance of the part of the contract that is now illegal. Similar 
to temporary illegality, illegality will provide an excuse for non-performance as long as the 
illegality lasts.
116
 
Treitel argues that the concept behind frustration for illegality is the question of public interest. 
There is obviously a public interest that the law is observed, and Treitel argues that the degree of 
presumption that a contract will be frustrated for illegality is dependent upon the public interest 
in upholding the particular law.
117
 If there is a contract provision dealing specifically with 
illegality, such as when providing for a temporary suspension of the contract, where the export of 
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a particular thing was unlawful, for example, this may survive the frustration doctrine in the 
interests of later continuing trade and because the provision supports the law.
118
 
A subsequent change to the law may also frustrate a contract and hence discharge the parties 
from future performance obligations. Where the performance of the contract has been rendered 
frustration by an Act of Parliament passed after the contract was made, the promisor is then 
excused from performing his promise. The presumption is that parties intend the contract to 
operate in accordance with the law on force at the time at which the contract was agreed. This 
rule has, for example, been used in the context of employment agreements.
119
 The same principle 
applies when the method of performance is rendered illegal by an act of the state under delegated 
legislation or a declaration of war or a ban on exports etc.
120
 Again, if the contract requires 
performance in another country, it will be discharged if that performance becomes illegal under 
the law of that country. 
The law may ban doing something undertaken in the contract or may prevent the use of the 
subject matter for the common purpose of the parties. A contract implemented during a war is 
illegal if it involves commercial communication with an enemy. The public policy considerations 
on the prohibition against trading with the enemy are based on exception because observance of 
this prohibition can affect the survival of the nation. This point is reflected in a number of special 
rules that apply where the performance of contracts was legal but which is later affected by this 
prohibition. Such a contract is illegal at common law on the ground of public policy that would 
tend to aid the economy of the enemy country. If, in fact, performance would not involve any 
further commercial contact with the enemy of enemy, the contract is considered illegal.
121
 
Of course, illegality must not always mean that a contract is frustrated; in some contracts, the 
parties may have agreed that one party bears the risk that the contract will subsequently become 
illegal, and that party will therefore bear the loss.  
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                             CONCLUSION  
 
General 
 
 The aim of this conclusion to give a final finding and a critical analysis of the formers chapters 
and to recognise certain parts and directions they may be useful and suitable for this aria of the 
law to progress in the future. 
At the first, the discussion in the second chapter is an attempt to provide a brief account and 
general characterisation of the very large sphere of Sharia. We will find that Islamic law is 
becoming increasingly recognised and accepted within the Western world and, as a result, the 
way in which it is developed and interpreted is gaining much greater attention. Fundamentally, 
when looking at Islamic law, the central premise is the fact that God is seen as the divine law, 
and whilst there are multiple different ways in which God's word is translated into legal practice 
and applied by jurists, it is this concept of God being central that is fundamental. The various 
different aspects of Islamic law being considered include the main sources of Islamic law and the 
jurisprudence that is applied on a day-to-day basis, recognising that there are potentially several 
different accepted ways of Islamic law operating both in the traditional sense and also in the 
modern context. All of these factors are deemed relevant to the application of Islamic law, both 
currently and going forward into the future—particularly where there is an emergence of the use 
of Islamic law in traditional Western societies. 
From the discussion it might be summarised that the question of Sharia requires a thorough 
study. One should discuss each area of Sharia under its own heading. As a conclusion, one might 
observe that Sharia is a blessing of God to the community owing to its universality, perfection, 
effectiveness in preserving all the necessities of existence, and provision of what is needed to 
build a civilisation and its identity. The belief that Sharia manipulates merely a religious point of 
view is rejected; the argument or accusation that Sharia is predominantly concerned with the life 
in the hereafter also not acceptable. The discussion denies these wrong allegations. 
The Sharia is comprised of all the elements that give Islamic life its particular colour and taste, 
and it contributes to the achievement of Islam's higher objectives. As such, the community will 
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only achieve success and felicity in this life and in the Hereafter if the objectives, purposes and 
principles of Sharia are clearly understood and appreciated. The objectives and principles of 
Sharia are embodied in the divine revelation, i.e., the Quran, the Sunnah and in other secondary 
and supplementary sources of Islamic law.  
It should also be noted that the various provisions of the law of some Muslim states are based on 
Islamic law. It seems to be necessary and appropriate for foreign parties (businessmen, 
companies and investors) to be familiar with and to understand the Islamic terms and rules, 
values and traditions—all of which are embraced by Sharia, particularly where there are 
extensive dealings or transactions between these states. In actual fact, Islam and its law do not 
allow of divisions between the various facets of human life. Religion cannot be separated from 
politics, morality and economics, just as the human personality cannot be compartmentalised into 
religious, political and economic segments. As such, Sharia regulates not only legal rights and 
obligations, but also non-legal matters. It also provides moral guidance for human conduct in 
general. Therefore, the Muslim community should organise its life primarily by reference to 
religious values and spiritual principles. In other words, the establishment of political, economic 
and social order should be based on those particular values. It is necessary to emphasise that 
some Muslim countries have implemented and practiced Islamic law not only in limited areas, as 
has been asserted by some scholars, but also throughout the various fields and aspects of life, i.e. 
economics, politics and social policy, as well as the law. 
 In chapter two in second part, particular attention has been directed towards the Saudi legal 
system. Saudi Arabia's legal system recognises the supremacy of divine sovereignty. Saudi 
courts rely on the principles of Sharia jurisprudence, and apply statutory laws to cases before it 
unless they conflict with the Islamic Sharia. The Board of Grievances represents an example of 
an Islamic judicial body that has been adopted in order to cope with modern society. Saudi 
Legislature has taken a major step forward in terms of modernising the Saudi Judicial System. In 
Saudi Arabia, the Sharia primary sources, the Qur'an and the Sunnah, have supremacy over all 
laws and man-made regulations or normative instruments. However, sometimes Saudi law is 
more widespread than Sharia law, and encompasses Islamic law and the law and rules adapted 
from other laws within the general framework of Sharia principles. There are a few exceptions to 
this rule, particularly in regard to Saudi law, which is unconnected to Islamic law and principles, 
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such as the Banking Law and practices, which controls some activities that are obviously 
forbidden in Islamic law, namely interest. This raises many controversial discussions and 
objections in Saudi Arabia. 
Saudi law is unwritten, especially civil and commercial laws, although there are legal principles 
apply to a lot of cases; however, there are differences between the judgements of judges even if 
the cases are similar. In recent years, especially from 2007 when the judicial system in Saudi 
Arabia was developed, the judiciary in Saudi Arabia has been in need of review and update in the 
field of commercial and civil laws, as well as procedures law. Furthermore, Judgements also 
need to be published and be in everyone's reach as there is a lack of published judgement. 
Although the development is moving slowly, Saudi Arabia attempts to establish a comprehensive 
legal system. This target requires great effort of re-studying Islamic law and several international 
laws so as to reform the law in Saudi Arabia in consistency with contemporary law. 
The chapter three we discussed law of contract in Islamic law, which is considered one of the 
most important topics, as discussed in Islamic law. It must be emphasised that the classical 
jurists of Islamic law did not attempt to develop a general theory of contract; rather, their efforts 
were concentrated on the detailed and individual treatment of each contract, with jurists 
categorising each contract into classes of nominate contracts with their own distinctive rules. 
Any study of the concept and scope of contract in Islamic law has to start from consideration of 
the various contracts in Islamic law. In the authoritative books, each contract has been defined 
separately and examined meticulously. It will be suggested, however, that this separate treatment 
of contracts is more of a reflection of the process by which Islamic law was developed, as 
opposed to any conscious desire to specify the sphere of contracts. It was, in particular, a 
necessary and inevitable by-product of the process of Islamic law, meaning the subjection of 
practices in markets to the overriding norms of the Islamic religion in which jurists were 
engaged. This process was necessitated by the fact that Islam is regarded not only as a religion 
but also as a way of life. As a result of changing the social life and changing in dealing in the 
markets and the trade in the following centuries, scholars had legislated rules for each nominated 
contract those used to be in practice, with the jurists covering all rules of contracts in the method. 
It is true that the contract of sale provided a ground for analogy. The majority of legal researches 
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all encompass a section on contract of sale in which important ground rules are provided for 
contracts in general.   
In the present time, contemporary jurists have attempted to develop a comprehensive theory of 
the contract in Islamic law, with many books and researches in the theory of the contract in 
Islamic law published; however, it must be noted that, although it is positive development in the 
law of contract, but these theories are not comprehensive: there is no book or research covering 
all topics of the contract that are discussed under contract theory as is happening in English law. 
The other problem is terminology; jurists use different terms to the same meaning, such as in 
regard to force majeure, supervening events, exceptional circumstances, impossibility, 
impracticability and hardship, where some writers use force majeure or supervening events as 
opposed to frustration. Accordingly, jurists must give greater attention to the terms to determine 
their meaning and the need to adopt standardisation of terminology. It is true that the 
development and prosperity of writings of legal and jurisprudence books were in medieval times, 
and so cases and examples given will be old. Also, the jurists were responsible for the 
development of Islamic law from its main sources rather than judges. 
The essential argument that has emerged in Islamic law concerns whether or not the parties are 
free to make transactions outside the scope of the stipulations of Islamic law of contract. Jurists 
argue that, by virtue of the proven by the lawgiver are void and have no legal effect in the law. It 
is important to note that this view also extends to obligations not expressly permitted by Islamic 
legal nominate contracts—established by early jurists. 
Law of contract differs from other branches of law of obligation in one important respect: that 
the parties themselves are free to make their own terms on which to enter to enter into a contract. 
The main opinion in Islamic law recognises the concept of freedom of contract and condition in 
the law. Accordingly, parties are granted relative freedom to make whatever type of transaction 
and stipulation they choose so long as they are not in contradiction with the general Islamic 
principles. The supporters of freedom of contract in Islamic law form the majority opinion of 
jurists. Thus, non-restriction of nominate contract types is therefore the general rules in Islamic 
law, where jurists who support this opinion, based on authentic and unambiguous evidence, 
deduce that every contract and condition is legally valid even though it is not mentioned in the 
primary sources—unless, of course, it is in contrast to general religious rules. 
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In subchapter three  3.3 and 3.7 when one takes the time to understand Islamic contract law as 
being derived from the principles of freedom of contract, its various peculiarities to a Western 
scholar become explicable and justifiable. For example, the idea that a party should be allowed 
to escape a contract simply because circumstances changed, rendering his obligations more 
onerous, would be deemed a dangerous proposition under Western paradigms of contract law; 
yet, when one takes into account Islam’s prohibition of gharar and the libertarian principle from 
which this prohibition itself is derived, one is forced to accept that the doctrine of imprecision is 
a necessary feature of Islamic contract law. In actual fact, this is caused by a lack of 
understanding of the differences between the views of jurists in Islamic law schools. The 
observation is that there is a noticeable lack of high-quality Western research in the field of 
Islamic contract law. Those sources that do purport to provide detailed insights into Islamic 
contract law generally fail to identify the nuances between the approaches of the four schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence. 
In chapter four has been discussed and analysed part of the main topic of the research frustration 
of contract in Islamic law, we found that the main problem with the method adopted in the 
traditional books of Islamic law is that it is not based on a consolidated theory. Muslim jurists 
have not tried to create a general and organised doctrine of frustration of contract. The doctrine is 
nowhere clearly expressed and the individual rulings assume many different forms and are to be 
found dispersed throughout the traditional legal books. The majority of traditional jurists have 
been mostly looking for solutions rather than principles, and any researcher will often find 
himself faced with some different opinion in the same cases. Although Islamic Law did not 
define frustration as term, this does not mean there are no applications of the principles of 
frustration. In this research, it has been concluded that Islamic law applies the principles and 
provisions of frustration widely, which has been discussed in the form of details under the types 
of nominate contract and under different doctrines. 
In the research in chapter four and five, we built a completed theory of frustration of contract by 
elements found in the Islamic traditional literature; the main factor is change of circumstances, 
which make performance of contract onerous or impossible. We recognised in the qur’anic 
principle of justice and equity there are many verses, which illustrate that no difficulties, 
hardship or burden will not be imposed on people, and the Prophet saying; there shall be no 
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unfair loss nor the causing of such loss also the legal maxims and the principal of necessity. 
Therefore, frustration is designed to avoid onerous or hardship in performing contract. We 
applied these principles on all cases of frustration; we found that they support an adoption of 
discharge of contract because of frustration; this is the starting point to build the theory.   
 
After that we looked for more details of cases related to frustration of contract in the books of 
Islamic law and in the views of scholars, than we found doctrine of excuse udher . Also the 
doctrine of natural disaster al-jawaih can lead to the discharge of the contract due to natural 
calamities, which destroy the fruit and crops. Even the main areas to which the doctrine of udher, 
under the Hanafi School, are applied on leases and fluctuation of currency and the doctrine of al-
jawaih was applied on destroy the fruit and crops, in this research it  also been discussed, with it 
established that the doctrines of udher and  al-jawaih are applied more broadly in Islamic Law in 
regard to supervening events that make the contract impossible or difficult to perform, whether 
the effect is objective or subjective. Then we continued to create the theory of frustration of 
contract by looking at and researching all nominated contracts in the Islamic law , which are 
discussed by scholars, it is found that many of the details and cases  related to the frustration of 
contract found in many contracts , for example, some of the issues relating to frustrate of purpose 
are discussed under  the contract of  seal and others in the contract of lease , as well as the 
impossibility of performance of the contract because of the death of one of the parties of the 
contract, was discussed in all kinds of contracts in classic Islamic books. We have collected all 
the details and issues related to the frustration from several of contracts form traditional books of 
Islamic jurisprudence. Then we studied and analysed them and put them with the rules, elements 
and principles which aforementioned. Despite the lack of writings about a complete theory of the 
frustration of contract in Islamic law, it was possible to establish this theory. In this work an 
attempt was made to set out the elements of the Islamic law of frustration of performance and 
create theory of frustration as they appear to someone familiar with modern law systems and, 
particularly with English law. Finally, we built a completed theory of frustration in the Islamic 
law. In conclusion, that frustration is considered in Islamic Law, and leads to the discharge of 
contract. 
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This thesis specifically in chapter four and five has also attempted to unify the legal terms 
relating frustration comparable to that in English law because the writings of jurists use many 
different terms to identify the frustrations, and the use of supervening events, force majeure, 
impossibility and intervening events.  
It should be stressed that the researcher found a way to avoid the difficulties resulting from the 
reference to the strict rules of some Muslims jurists by differentiating between own opinion of 
jurists and Islamic law, and by giving the latter precedence over the former. So as to avoid the 
strict application of the some opinions in commercial transactions by resorting to the more 
flexible opinions—as this is consistent with the provisions of Islamic law and freedom of 
contract—the application of the doctrine of frustration in Islamic law in order to remove the 
hardship and difficulties, this is basic principle in Islamic law. 
In fact, at the time of the Prophet and the time afterwards, spanning up until the 19
th
 Century, 
there were law cases in general or related to the contract that occurred between parties of the 
contract, who then asked the Prophet to issue a judgment in the dispute in the case, as well as 
scholars and judges who came after the Prophet. However, with the beginning of the 20
th
 
Century, when scholars began writing books in Islamic law broadly, most cases related to 
contracts, including to frustration, posed by scholars were purely hypothetical questions in order 
to give solutions to the legal problems.  
Frustration of contract limits the principle of sanctity of contract. Islamic law assigns great 
importance to the doctrine of freedom of contract; however, in its application to frustration, 
Islamic law has a high degree of flexibility and malleability. Although this flexibility is also 
justified on the bases of intention and free will of the parties, the parties should not be required to 
be bound by a contract which, due to the change of circumstances, is significantly different from 
the one they originally foreseen, when the contract was freely concluded between them in the 
first place. 
In chapter four Force majeure exonerates a party to a contract if he can successfully attribute 
injury to circumstances beyond his control. The nature and scope of the force majeure is 
determined by the terms of the contract and the circumstances surrounding each case. Although 
there is no specific rule to be found in traditional Muslim jurists about force majeure, it can be 
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recognised through the rules relating to the conditions in the contract. The general rule is that the 
parties of the contract are free to put any beneficial terms in the contract, and the terms must be 
performed, as well as the rules of the right of the option to termination the contract. 
 
In chapter four we also discussed the doctrine of supervening events provides that, following a 
contract being entered into, an event occurs that was exceptional and could not be anticipated, 
and also has the result of making an obligation that was entered into much more onerous than it 
was initially where an undertaking was first made, a contract is then considered to have become 
impracticable. The rationale behind such a doctrine is the maxim in the Islamic religion that there 
should be no hardship in religion, and all parties should help one tolerate any difficulty that 
arises so as to create equity in society. The effect of finding that there has been such an 
intervening event is to render a contract as invalidated as if it had never been entered into, with 
courts applying the law of unjust enrichment to try and ensure that parties do not benefit as a 
result of the contract being invalid. As is commonly seen, however, case law illustrates that there 
are greater complexities and nuances associated with the matter. 
In chapter four, we saw application of Islamic law of frustration of contract on some case in 
Saudi Arabia.  Frustration of contract in Saudi law only is discussed in some the Judgements of 
the courts, which are unpublished and inaccessible by the researcher; although there have been 
attempts to publish the judgments, attempts are still weak and insufficient. In addition, there are 
no written laws relating to the contract or frustration, except labour law and the law of Public 
Procurement Contract Regulations; thus, the legislative authorities should set laws relating to 
contracts generally containing the rules of frustration in order to achieve clarity of legal opinion 
in such cases. 
The importance of this study lies in the trend prevailing in Muslim scholars and writers at the 
present time, where the rules of contract—including frustration in Islamic law—should no longer 
be left outside the domain of the reassertion of the Islamic law within the sphere of civil liability. 
In this respect, Saudi Arabia was one of the leading Arab countries known to have acknowledged 
the importance of introducing the classical principles on frustration into judicial applications, and 
it can be seen that there has been a trend towards the reassertion of the Islamic law—at least in 
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the theoretical sense in another Islamic countries. Although there are no written laws in Saudi 
Arabia relating to frustration, the court cases apply this principle on the basis of the provisions of 
Islamic law. 
Chapter five discussed, Analysised of whether there can, in fact, be considered a doctrine of 
impossibility of performance in Islamic contract law, akin to that of frustration in common law. 
The above has therefore looked at doctrines of impossibility of performance, of frustration, and 
how these apply in the real modern world. The basic foundation of Islamic contract law and how 
it applies obligations does not appear to specifically refer to the impossibility of performance. 
However, notions of hardship and udhur—as interpreted differently by the Islamic schools of 
thought—has rendered in the framework of supervening events that applies so as to govern the 
impossibility of performance in Islamic contract law. The fact that supervening events can be a 
natural or artificial event has meant that the doctrine, in effect, applies as a comprehensive 
framework. The applications of impossibility through the analysis and extrapolation of Islamic 
law by the writings of jurists was either linked to the subject matter of the contract or to the 
parties of the contract. The destruction of the subject matter of the contract gives rise to the 
question of risk, under Islamic law, where the rules determining which party bears the risk when 
the specific article is destroyed depends on whether the obligor is holding the subject matter in 
question. The rule is that, when the subject matter is held in hand, the possessor is absolutely 
liable for its destruction, loss or decrease in value—regardless of whether or not it was caused by 
his fault, the act of a third party, or a misfortune from heaven. No defence is allowed to 
exonerate him from his duty to restore the property and he is bound to make good the loss. 
One need not distinguish between impossibility rendered by an Act of God, an impossibility 
rendered by death or illness, or an impossibility rendered by bankruptcy. All that is considered 
when determining whether or not the doctrine is applied and any compensation that might be 
paid to a losing party as a result of the doctrine applying is whether requirements of the doctrine 
of supervening events are met, including foreseeability and fault to be attributed to parties. As 
such, one might come to the conclusion that the doctrine of supervening events is the sole body 
of law governing impossibility of contracts, a body that covers all frustration, force majeure and 
Act of God clauses as seen in civil and common law traditions.  
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It must however be highlighted that this analysis is an art rather than a science. The essential 
problem is that doctrines are not set in stone; indeed, there are differences between the different 
schools of thought in Islamic law in terms of how impossibility of performance, supervening 
events and frustration would be treated when interpreting a contract. Quranic principles, as set 
out in prophetic traditions and the practice of the Prophet, are accepted as sources of contract 
law, although there are differences in terms of the interpretation of particular aspects of these 
sources.  
Furthermore, there is even an argument as to whether or not new conceptions of law are allowed 
to be introduced to respond to the particular challenges that are seen today. As one author notes: 
‘In the tenth century, Muslim Scholarship came to a consensus that Islamic law or Sharia was 
finalised as laid down in juristic writings. The task of the forthcoming generations was to follow 
these laws. This Consensus also announced that further individual, independent reasoning or 
personal interpretation would not be necessary or permissible. The doors of Ijtihad (independent 
or personal interpretation) were henceforth closed.’ Indeed, this is furthered by the fact that, 
whilst the common law on contract came about as a result of judicial decision, Islamic contract 
law developed as a result of discussion and consensus, polemic. Thus, there was no hierarchal 
authority to determine the contentious issues that came about.  
All of this has a large impact of course on the question of how the doctrines of frustration, 
impassivity of performance and supervening events are interpreted in the modern day. As seen 
above, the notion of impossibly of performance is largely different today than it must have been 
when Islamic contract law first evolved. The debates on whether or not Islamic contract law is 
considered able to develop and respond to new challenges that exist today impacts upon how 
impossibility of performance features in different interpretations of Islamic contract law by the 
different schools of thought in existence.  
Some academics and theorists in the area disagree with the idea that consensus on the law has 
been reached, and it is now simply time to apply the law. Some of them, for example, point out 
that the theory of contract law depends on the state at the time, public interest, and the overriding 
spirit of Islamic law. Thus, Islamic ideals should be applied, although different rules need to 
apply to different situations; there would be little point in keeping old rules and trying to fit them 
into a new situation simply for the sake of formalism. Such an approach would have to be the 
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one applied in order for the doctrine of frustrating events to be found. The debate between the 
approaches above does, however, render the analysis subject to the basic premise of scholars 
accepting that Islamic contract law is capable of change and interpretation: as pointed out above, 
the doctrine of supervening events appears to have arisen largely as a result of notions of 
hardship, as applied in Islam. In actual fact, the issue of changes in the currency value that 
Muslim jurists showed the problem clearly without filling the gap, that most jurists believe that 
there is no discharge of contract for the change of currency. It is not possible to find a valid 
justification in Islamic law that can authorise the transfer of losses to the other party, the reason 
is due to the change in the currency does not exist largely in the past time .This issue needs to be 
reviewed in Islamic law by jurists. 
In chapter five as a final note, however, it must be appreciated that there will always be nuances 
and differences in thought between all different jurisdictions. Impossibility of performance and 
how it applies in Islamic contract law must be looked at as a matter of consensus opinion. The 
doctrine of supervening events and its rendering in certain contracts as impossible of being 
performed appears to reflect exactly such consensus. In the writer’s opinion, it is this doctrine 
that forms the foundation of impossibility of performance in Islamic contract law. 
 
In chapter six we discussed the discharge of contract in English law, in general it is obvious that 
English law of contract is the basis of many common law systems over the world; the essence of 
English common law is that it is made by judges sitting in courts, applying legal precedent In 
English Law. There is unwritten legal system in England and Wales such as law of contract. 
However, jurists, academics and lawyers wrote the contract on a lot of studies and research; 
complete theory of the contract in English law has been much discussed. The discharge of the 
contract theory is most important issue in contract law, and the frustration of contract in 
particular warrants more discussion and research owing to the fact that, historically, the concept 
of frustration has been invoked to mitigate the onerous doctrine of absolute contracts where 
performance of a contract is prevented by supervening events for which neither party to the 
contract is responsible and loss allocation is required. 
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The discharge of contract in English law refers to the termination of obligation contract due to 
court orders or after making a mutual agreement to terminate. In addition, contract discharge can 
be as a result of contract breach, performance discharge of even material discharge. Contract 
discharge happens when the contract is terminated before the obligations that should have been 
met by the contract come to an end. In most cases, discharge of contracts calls for the parties to 
pay for damages caused by the nullification of the contract. If the contract is discharged due to 
breach of the contract, the party who breached the contract is expected to put for all injuries 
caused by the nullification process. In practice, most contracts are discharged by performance; if 
a contract is discharged by performance, however, there are no secondary obligations to pay for 
since the contract has been completed only before the speculated period. A contract is said to 
have been discharged if its initial obligations are terminated. In some cases, after the primary 
contracted is ended, secondary obligations arise. Importantly, however, such obligations cannot 
be considered a formal part of the primary contract. 
Since a contract is created by means of an agreement, it may also be discharged by another 
agreement between the same parties. Contract discharge by agreement occurs when parties agree 
to end a contract before it has been performed fully. The original contract may not provide for its 
termination, but the parties may make a new agreement to end their contractual obligation.  
Where one party has already fully performed their side of the contract, they may require the 
other party to give value in exchange for release from the remaining obligation. The party 
promising to release the other party may change their mind before the value is paid. However, if 
the party in breach has relied on the agreement and has changed their situation in some way, a 
court may force the party, promising release to keep to the agreement.  
A contract may contain a term that, if some specified event occurs after the contract is formed, it 
may be terminated at the option of either or one of the parties. This is a condition subsequent e.g. 
the return of an item that is defective for a refund. It is however required that the parties involved 
adopt an agreement that is legally binding when discharging a contract by making an agreement 
to prevent one of the parties from changing their mind and suing the other for breach of contract 
in the future.  
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In chapter six we discussed discharge of contract due to breach of contract is only applicable 
where the breach of contract is as a result of conditions or fundamental breaches. Conditions 
breach refers to failure of one part to meet the essential terms of the contract. This means that, if 
it is breached, it would render the contract meaningless. A condition can either be expressed by 
parties themselves or indeed can be implied by law. On the other hand, fundamental reaches 
occur due to non-purposed terms forcing the other party to breach the contract; however, 
warranty breached cannot result in contract discharge due to breach. 
The analysis undertaken in  chapter 6 highlights the nature and scope of the mistake and 
frustration doctrines. It is apparent that mistake is a more likely exigency than a sufficiently 
frustrating event that the contract must be terminated. Given the intensely circumstance-driven 
nature of the cases that have considered each doctrine, it is likely impossible to fashion 
definitional parameters with any greater degree of precision than that provided by the authorities 
cited here. 
It can be seen that the issue of discharge of contracts is dealt with by the doctrine of supervening 
events in Islamic Law. This can be seen as akin to that of frustration in the English law, although 
there are various differences between the two. 
 
Chapter Sven discussed frustration of contract in English law, this is controversial subjects in 
English law and has passed through stages of development, began when the court did not 
recognize the frustration in the seventeenth century to complete theory in the present time. 
English law doctrine of frustration deals with all the circumstances in which make the 
performance of contract becomes impossible, impracticable or illegal because of supervening 
event is beyond the control of the parties, it including subjective and objective impossibility, 
impracticability or hardship, frustration of purpose and illegality. 
In fact in English law the first attempt to create a general principle of frustration, was the 
destruction of the subject matter of contract in music hall case Taylor v Caldwell in 1863. It has 
been evidenced from the start that, even prior to the development of the doctrine of frustration, 
the courts looked unfavourably at interfering with private contracts, preferring to leave such 
negotiations to the parties themselves. However, in a more modern context, it was recognised 
that there are some contractual disputes that it is necessary for the court to involve themselves 
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with, and gradually over time the doctrine of frustration has widened somewhat to include claims 
for events and circumstances that the court—at least at one time—would not have considered. 
Nevertheless, whilst the doctrine of frustration has clearly expanded and become more widely 
used, this is not to say that it is a widely used doctrine on the whole. The courts continue to 
approach frustration with narrow interpretation, and only in much specified circumstances will 
parties be able to escape their contractual agreements by claiming frustration. It would be 
observed that the development of the doctrine of frustration indicates the development by way of 
weakness into absolute contract step-by-step, haltingly and hesitatingly, and the approach of the 
contract has been gradual rather than straight and direct.   
There is also evidence that, in the modern context, parties are a little more reluctant to rely on the 
doctrine of frustration because of the limited remedy if it is argued successfully. Savvy 
commercial contract lawyers are now often able to provide clauses in a contract, such as force 
majeure and hardship clauses, which can circumvent the use of the doctrine of frustration, and 
accordingly enable parties to have more control over what happens to their contract should it be 
interfered with by a supervening event.  
One element of frustration law that has significantly changed, however, is the financial 
apportionment of loss after a successful claim. Now this area is governed by statute, it  provides 
for fairer more equitable approach to loss apportionment, thus avoiding the situation where one 
party bears more than their fair share of the loss. We have also seen, however, that, whilst the 
statute provides the means for a fairer approach for such parties, the courts, in practice, remain 
reluctant to interfere with the private contracts, and decisions tend to err on the side of the 
common law approach, and do not as yet provide for completely fair loss adjustment. Clearly, 
therefore, whilst the development of the doctrine of frustration has been remarkable, there is still 
some development and widening of scope possible in order to ensure that parties to contracts 
affected by frustration receive a fair settlement of the issues and losses arising. The study of the 
English doctrine of frustration would suggest that, as far as the problem of impracticability or 
economic hardship is concerned, a distinction should be made between the concept of frustration 
and its applications in practice. It was discussed that the doctrine of frustration, from a 
conceptual perspective, is capable of being applied in cases of economic changes in the contract. 
An examination of the English cases and judicial statements in the context of cases involving 
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impracticability suggests that, potentially, economic troubles can be regarded as a ground for 
discharge under the doctrine of frustration. The doctrine has the potential to apply in such 
situations because the present dominant test for the operation of this doctrine—namely 
fundamental change of performance—shows that it is not the nature of the supervening event 
that matters so much as the effect of the event on the performance of the obligation. Thus, this 
test can be satisfied by a very severe change in the economics of a contract. However, this 
amount is not enough to say that the English doctrine of frustration is theoretically applicable in 
cases of commercial or economic hardship. The extent of economic hardship which would 
provide the requirement of the performance being fundamentally different from that which was 
undertaken by the contract under the English doctrine of frustration is far from the concept of 
economic hardship which established in this study. The extent of economic changes which would 
be regarded as relevant under this doctrine must be very excessive and something near to 
impossibility. Therefore, the concept of economic hardship—as defined by this thesis—is not 
within the ambit of the English doctrine of frustration. 
The problem that has to be required in the law of frustration is when the supervening events have 
been foreseeable or foreseen by the parties. Foreseeability events or contemplation of the 
contracting parties: There is In English law different view about this point. Some cases see that 
events must be beyond the anticipation of the parties to consider the frustration. A more liberal 
opinion has been adopted by another case sees that is not merely anticipated event by the parties 
makes the doctrine of frustration is inapplicable. As well as investigative, the level of knowledge 
of the parties by court is not impracticable and not helpful. We think that the later opinion is the 
nearest to principals of English law and the most suitable of the natural of commercial contracts 
in nowadays.  The standard to be accepted must be objective and unchanging, because the 
capacity may differ from person to person, as will the examination by which any person is to be 
judged. With this noted, it is questioned: what are the tests to be adopted? English law has to 
adopt objective test to determine whether or not an event can be said to be foreseeable at the time 
of the conclusion of contract  
In conclusion, one of the most striking characteristics of the law is the narrowness of the 
confines in which it can operate successfully. There are numerous gateway conditions; these 
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must be strictly adhered to or a finding of frustration of contract will be denied. The doctrine is a 
necessary component of the legal system—that much is certain.  
in chapters seven and eight, as we saw  in English law, Although the doctrine of frustration in 
English law seems to be flexible and wide, there are certain obvious restrictions that appear to 
reduce its application of frustration such as frustration must not be self-induced .Frustration of 
part of a contract: The general opinion taken in English Courts is that the doctrine can be applied 
only to the whole performance and not if only there is partial impossibility as we discussed in 
chapter eight. A more certain law of frustration is required. Frustration is a doctrine is proper 
limits. English courts have stuck to a strict approach in regard to the application of the doctrine 
of frustration; this is rooted to the doctrine of absolute contracts, which existed in the past. 
Despite these limits, the courts have made clear some extent in some of their recent judgements; 
they need to be given more detail than has until now been done so as to provide answers to such 
questions including the extent to which something short of physical impossibility might be 
frustration, including the extent to which frustration of purpose is recognised, whether leases are 
really a special case, the meaning of fault of one party as a factor debarring reliance on 
frustration, whether partial or temporary impossibility is recognised, the remedies available 
following frustration and other questions which were dealt with in this work. English law would 
hold its role as the leading law in the field of commerce and those businessmen throughout. They 
would continue to choose it as the applicable law of their contracts dispute. It is logical to give 
judges the power to adjust the terms of the contract to new situations when both parties intend to 
continue to perform their contractual obligation in the changed circumstances instead of inducing 
automatic discharge of the contract as the only solution in all cases of frustration. By providing 
applicable law to judges, such power should be kept within reasonable limitations so as to avoid 
uncontrolled flexibility of the law. Thus, English law must also avoid the all-or-nothing method. 
In fact, that the doctrine of frustration is one of the most important issues in the theory of the 
contract because frustration is not a theoretical doctrine but rather a practical application in all 
cases relating to frustration. Moreover, frustration is one of the deeper issues of the contract, as 
well as the most accurate and the most difficult, because the doctrine affects the performance, 
which is considered the main purpose of the contract. The doctrine of frustration is not a new 
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doctrine created by recent legislation but is considered a theory with historical roots, which has 
passed the stages of development. 
The doctrine of frustration provides a most valuable contribution to contract law, and has been 
the elimination of the absolutism and presentation of a softened, more malleable legal front, 
whilst preserving general contractual integrity through insistence on compliance with exacting 
criteria. This is a difficult balance to strike, and the law on frustration has done a reasonable job. 
The doctrine of frustration does not contradict the binding force of the contract, but because of 
the exceptional circumstances, the contract is discharged, with frustration a changeable doctrine 
according to supervening events and economic circumstances from time to time. 
 
 
Chapter eight is discussion frustration of contract by impossibility of performance of contract, 
which is considered as the mean part of frustration of contract In English law, it has been 
established that impossibility is the legal theory which has full elements that make it practically 
theory, and which is developed by new cases, with new principles coming from such cases. The 
impossibility must be in the nature of the thing to be done (objective impossibility) or in the 
inability of the promisor to do it (subjective impossibility). The impossibility becomes available 
if objective impossibility exists. Objective impossibility occurs when the contractual obligation 
cannot actually be performed. Objective impossibility is often referred to by the statement ‘the 
thing cannot be done’, which is widely recognised in English law, and has more judicial 
applications than the subjective impossibility. The destruction of the subject matter of the 
contract perhaps by supervening events or the unavailability of the subjective matter and the 
method of performance demonstrate the importance of English cases relating to frustration.  
As we saw in chapter six and eight It is clear that in both the case of initial and subsequent 
impossibility the courts are dealing with the allocation of risk between the parties of an event 
which neither of the parties foresaw occurring when they entered into a contractual relationship. 
In both cases the courts are dealing with the construction of the contract. If the contract made 
provision for the event then the contract governs the situation. Both doctrines operate within very 
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narrow confines and operate on the premise that men should be held to their bargains. If the 
parties have not expressed a term dealing with the event in question, the courts will have to 
analyse the entirety of the contract to establish whether one can be implied as having been in the 
contemplation of both parties as something essential for the performance of the contract. In this 
respect both doctrines are similar, there are different juristic principles one relating to the 
formation of contracts and the other to their discharge. The doctrine of initial mistake operates to 
rectify a situation in which the parties were never in genuine agreement because they were 
mistaken as to the presence of a particular set of circumstances. In the case of subsequent 
impossibility or frustration the parties must have been in genuine agreement as to the essential 
features of the contract whether expressly or impliedly, but a supervening event has rendered 
those features substantively and radically different from that which they envisaged. 
In conclusion, we have seen that the doctrine of frustration indeed operates very narrowly, 
although it does allow for the termination of contracts due to subjective impossibility arising 
from the death or illness of a contract party. The juristic basis for the doctrine, however, is 
slightly more ambiguous; this can be a problem when considering other more ambiguous events 
that could frustrate a contract, such as bankruptcy. Initially, we considered that the implied term 
theory was used to justify frustration. However, it has since been seen that there are also 
significant merits to the ‘foundation of the contract’ test, and it certainly appears to work well as 
far as impossibility for illness, death or bankruptcy is concerned. Nevertheless, the construction 
theory has received immense support by courts. 
One further common example of frustration is found where impossibility of performance has 
arisen from changes in the law. By way of illustration, in the event that a contractual agreement’s 
performance is rendered impossible by an Act of Parliament implemented after the contract was 
made, the promisor is then excused from performing their promise. This is because it is 
presumed that the parties need to form their contractual agreements on the basis of the law in 
existence when the particular contract is put in place. The same principle is applicable in the 
event that performance is made to be impossible legally through the presence of legislation in the 
circumstances delegated, through powers exercised under differing legislation. 
Application of the doctrine of frustration on lease contract there is argument in English law about 
it; the majority of the House of Lords decided that the doctrine was, in principle, as applicable to 
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leases as to any other contract, , although its application may be less frequent than to other types 
of contact. More attractive alternatives in property law way by the possible enactment of a 
statutory right for the tenant to surrender the lease in cases in certain supervening circumstances. 
. Property owners and lessees, particularly in commercial hires, would be well advised to avoid 
frustration by the putting of express clauses  in contract relating to common supervening events. 
In the changing world of today, the law of impossibility of performance forms an important part 
of the general law of contract, and particularly attracts the attention of businessmen and their 
legal advisers. A more certain doctrine of frustration in English law would ensure that English 
law would retain its role as the leading law in the field of commerce, and that businessmen 
throughout the world would continue to choose it as the governing law of their contracts. The 
English law of frustration must also be more generous. The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) 
Act, 1943, did not add to the events on which a contract is discharged for frustration of 
performance; rather, the Act only changes the legal consequences of a discharge for impossibility 
of performance when that takes place by law independently of the Act. 
 
 
Comparative study    
 
 
 At the final part of the research we looked to all chapters and studied the features of Islamic law 
and English law, we found that there are similarities and differentness related to the frustration of 
contract law, the differences and similarities were found and concluded in many of the points in 
subchapters of this research in the following:          
  
 The features that are common to Islamic and English law are their antiquity and their continued 
development without any major disruption or interruption over many hundreds of years. The two 
systems have very old principles and have not lost their strength over the years. Another 
similarity is absence of a legal code; in most European and Arab countries general law has been 
codified. However, Islamic and English law, as well as Saudi law, are uncodified. But the 
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essence of English common law is that it is made by judges in individual cases; rules of law 
made by judges must be followed in later cases. However, in Islamic law jurists were responsible 
for its development from its main sources rather than judges. An important feature of English 
law is that cases are published and accessible to everybody, but in Saudi Arabia the situation is 
different as most of the cases are unpublished, which means judges and lawyers do not know the 
precedents and this is a negative aspect of the Saudi legal system. Attempts have been made to 
publish the cases but they are still weak. 
Unlike English contract law, which is very much based upon general legal and equitable 
doctrines, contract law under Islamic law tends to be highly specialised, in that different sets of 
rules have developed to regulate different types of agreement. As Saudi Legal explains, “The 
Islamic Law texts do not set out an all-embracing theory of contract law which applies to all 
types of contracts. Rather, the texts deal with certain contracts, such as sales, hire, loans, agency 
and guarantees, in individual chapters. Accordingly, certain rules which apply, for example, to 
contracts of sale do not necessarily apply to guarantees, and vice versa.” Instead of general 
theories of contract law, there are principles of contract law and it is these principles which, 
when applied, give Islamic law its conceptual coherence. There is no general theory of contract 
law in Islamic law. Indeed, this is furthered by the fact that while the English law on contract 
came about as a result of judicial decision, Islamic contract law developed as a result of 
discussion and consensus, polemic. Thus, there was no hierarchical authority to determine the 
contentious issues that came about. 
 
 
English law has a complete theory of frustration of contract . It is generally argued that Islamic 
law has no general theory of contract; this argument is based on the fact that the law books do 
not contain any general contract theory and this is true for all the fields dealt with in these books. 
Regarding contracts, Islamic jurists have categorised each contract into classes of nominate 
contract with their own distinctive rules. Therefore, the development of Islamic contract law is 
the result of the method undertaken by Muslim jurists to elaborate a system to categorise the 
nominate contracts by determining whether, in any given contract, right passed in ownership or 
possession, and whether consideration is passed or otherwise. At the present time jurists are 
establishing a theory of contract in Islamic law similar to the theory of contract in English law.  
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  In addition, the very process of critically evaluating Islamic contracts law or the various schools 
thereof is very different when evaluating English laws or theories. The primary reason for this is 
that, unlike English contract law, which has been designed by humans in a pragmatic way, 
Islamic contract law is the result of the interpretation of primary Islamic texts (or secondary 
teachings) combined with the continuous need to promote the principles of commutative justice 
and liberality; therefore, to critically evaluate contract Islamic law is either to doubt scholastic 
interpretations of religious texts (a task best reserved for theological scholars) or to doubt the 
importance or integrity of the principles upon which it is based. As a Western lawyer, the author 
feels unqualified to encroach into either of these domains.
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It is very difficult to compare the approaches of English and Islamic law as regards the freedom 
to make contracts. This is mainly due to the fact that the various, and sometimes conflicting, 
views put forward by the jurists of the different schools make it very difficult to speak of Islamic 
law as a unitary system. For the purposes of comparison we will take freedom of contract to 
mean the extent to which the legal system recognises and gives validity to contracts created by 
the parties. In that sense, freedom of contract is the general rule in English law. Any contract 
made by the parties will be legal and enforceable, unless it is contrary to public policy or 
otherwise illegal. In Islamic law there are two views. According to the first view, the rule 
appears to be that the parties have no freedom to make contracts. In this rule, as has been argued 
in the text, there is the useful exception of economic necessity. If the existence of a new contract 
becomes an economic necessity, it will be given legal validity. Although this exception is a very 
limited one, it is useful in so far as it could be invoked – indeed has been – by the contemporary 
Islamic jurists to give legal recognition to the various contracts necessitated by modern economic 
and business life. However, the opinion adopted now is that the parties are free to make any 
contract on condition that does not contradict the Islamic law.  Cultural order in English law 
systems is built on the principle of liberty which emphasises the freedom of the individual as an 
ultimate objective in their national legal systems. Hence, a wave of scholarly contribution began 
a long time ago to implement the principle of individual freedom through different 
multidisciplinary institutions. Capitalism as a political and economical idea emerged to serve the 
optimal objective of a system of liberalism. On the application of this cultural order to its legal 
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system, the freedom of the individual is an undisputed pillar of private/public laws, including the 
law of contracts. Unsurprisingly, then, freedom of contract is the major principle of the doctrine 
of contract in English common law. Islam takes a different stand. Its legal system, although 
conceptually it shares the same values (liberty, justice and equality) of most legal orders, has its 
own interpretation through different multidisciplinary institutions. So the principle of 
permissibility instead of freedom of contract is the meaning of liberty. It means that the 
individual is free to enter into a contract if that contract is not prohibited under Islamic law. 
Politics and economics are too limited, to some extent, to the same principle in order to serve 
both public and private interests and not only the interest of either. The question is what role the 
law of contracts plays in allocating resources. In other words, what is the normative justice of 
contract: corrective or distributive justice?
123
 
 
 
Islamic contract law therefore shares many similarities and differences with English contract law 
and how it is treated, and has strict laws on the formation and adherence to contracts. One of the 
most contentious aspects of Islamic contract law, however, remains that of how impossibility of 
performance, otherwise known as frustration, is treated. In English systems, frustration can be 
regarded as taking place “when there supervenes an event without default of either party and for 
which the contract makes no sufficient provision which so significant changes the nature (not 
merely the expense or difficulty) of the outstanding contractual rights and/or obligations from 
what the parties could reasonably have contemplated at the time of execution that it would be 
unjust to hold them to the literal sense of its stipulations in the new circumstances in such a case 
the law declares both parties to be discharged from further performance”. 
    
 
In explaining how Islamic law treats frustration of performance, one is required to recall the 
basis and foundation of Islamic law and particularly the different manner in which it has arisen 
when compared to English conceptions of contract law. The English conception of contract law, 
whether arising from the civilian system or the common law system, derived from the particular 
legal and economic theories that were seen in the 18th and 19th centuries. Both of these times 
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saw resurgence in the popularity of natural law theories and gave rise to doctrines of laissez faire 
economic theory. As such, contract law was predicated on the general idea of freedom of 
contract and not imposing onerous obligations on people. This too affected how frustration of 
performing a contract was brought about in English contract law.   
 
Contractual relationships occupy different spaces in Islamic law versus its English law 
counterparts and the broader global social consciousness. In the former, a contract is regarded as 
a promise of performance, where the inability to deliver on the promise results in the contract 
being deemed a nullity. In the English system as the leading English law example, a contractual 
promise is more often characterised as a guarantee and, depending on its interpretation as 
conditional or unconditional, the promisor may be obligated to the opposite party even where the 
subject matter of the contract no longer exists. These distinctions carry additional significance 
when Islamic impossibility principles are examined. Further, Islamic law places lesser 
importance on the ‘sanctity of contract’ and the associated importance of contractual promises as 
expressed in English law. 
 
 
However, the different ways in which different systems of frustration of contract law have come 
about also have different implications. In English law frustration of contract came about in the 
18th and 19th centuries as a result of increases in numbers of contractual transactions, a direct 
result of the industrial revolution and a general increase of material products in society. English 
contract law and doctrines of frustration therefore tend to deal with the productions of industry in 
mind. Islamic contract law, however, is much more rooted in history, coming about in the 
seventh century. This was long before the period of the English industrial revolution and was 
generally aimed at contractual exchanges in the primary and secondary sectors, rather than 
tertiary ones. Although English law delayed adoption of the doctrine of frustration, it now has a 
good theory of frustration of contract. Islamic law does not have a complete theory of frustration, 
as Islamic law approach in the adoption of legal theories; also English law was in dire need of a 
theory of frustration in order to get rid of the restrictions of the principles of absolute 
contracts.
124
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Different legal effects can be seen in English jurisdictions as well as in Islamic contract law 
ones. When frustrating a contract, there are two theoretical legal positions: one can take the 
contract back to before it was agreed, placing both parties in the position they would have been 
in had the contract never been agreed in the first place; alternatively, one can take the contract 
forward in time to the position the parties would have been in had the agreement been 
performed. In English jurisdiction, the latter amounts to awarding expectation damages to 
parties, while the former is seen as rescission and parties are granted reliance damages, namely 
the expenditure they have incurred as a result of entering into the agreement in the first place. As 
such, one might come to the conclusion that the doctrine of supervening events is the sole body 
of law governing impossibility of contracts, a body that covers all frustration, force majeure and 
Act of God clauses that is seen in English traditions.
125
  
 
The attitude of Islamic law on the effect of the frustration of performance on contracts differs 
from that of English common law in some aspects. While in English law the occurrence of the 
frustrating event brings the contract to an end immediately and automatically, under Islamic law 
frustration of performance does not necessarily operate to discharge a contract immediately and 
automatically. However, if the subject matter of the contract is destroyed the discharge of the 
contract will be immediate, but, for example, in frustration of purpose and partial impossibility 
the discharge of the contract is not necessarily immediate, the party can perform the contract. By 
what has been said so far, two main differences between the approaches of Islamic and English 
law towards the doctrine of changed circumstances are noticeable. Firstly, under English law, the 
application of the doctrine results in the coming to an end of a contract and, thereby, automatic 
discharge of the obligor. According to Islamic law, on the other hand, this is an unsuitable 
solution in these cases. Sometimes the promisor might prefer continuation rather than dissolution 
of the contract, notwithstanding even enormous difficulties. Hence, Islamic law gives him an 
option to cancel the contract if he so desires. The option should, however, be exercised promptly 
by a contractor who was unaware of loss when he made the contract. The difference between the 
two systems in this respect results from the fact that the judicial basis supporting the doctrine in 
each system is different from the other. In English law, material change of circumstances must 
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destroy the ‘foundation’ of a contract. When the foundation of a contract falls away, the contract 
falls away with it. Under Islamic law, on the other hand, a contract remains valid even under 
changed circumstances because it has all the requirements of a valid contract. It must be added 
that even by following the practice of certain Muslim jurists in basing the doctrine on the 
‘implied term’ theory, one comes to the same conclusion that the party incurring loss has a right 
of termination. This is due to the fact that, under Islamic law, the party who benefits from an 
express or implied condition of the contract has a right of termination if the condition is not 
satisfied.
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Impossibility has three possible manifestations in English law that are mirrored in its Islamic 
equivalent: the loss or destruction of the contract subject matter; a circumstance that prevents the 
promisor from completing the contract; and the operation of an external factor on contract 
completion, such as legal impossibility, or frustration or purpose. The force majeure/Act of God 
concepts are often cited in this connection. 
 
The Islamic frustration/impossibility doctrines are so broad and potentially flexible that many 
circumstances that would be deemed insufficient grounds under all English law systems are 
sufficient under Islamic doctrines. It is apparent that when English law or impossibility 
principles are employed to give the analysis a comparative element, Islam, through the combined 
weight of the authorities derived from Shari’ah sources, will sanction a significantly broader 
range of circumstances that may permit parties to avoid obligations that would remain 
enforceable in the other systems. The attitude of Islamic law on the effect of the frustration of 
contract on contracts differs from that of English common law. While in the latter the occurrence 
of the frustrating event “brings the contract to an end forthwith, without more and automatically 
under Islamic law, frustration of the contract does not necessarily operate to discharge a contract. 
Automatic discharge is only one of the effects that frustration of the contract may have on 
contracts. What we have discussed so far in this thesis indicates that impossibility of 
performance may have one of the following effects on contracts under Islamic law. 
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It is a general rule of Islamic law that a promise to do what is initially impossible is void; the 
reason is probably that no serious intention to create legal relations can be supposed where both 
parties know of the impossibility. Merely going through a form of words that the parties know 
means nothing and will not make a contract. In cases where the parties contract for a result both 
deem possible, the invalidity of the contract can be based either on the existence of an essential 
error or on the basis of impossibility of performance. Both approaches have the same result, as in 
both cases the contract will be void under Islamic law as well as English law. 
 
There is a significant difference between the approaches adopted by Islamic and English law 
relating to the doctrine of frustration of contracts. The difference lies in the fact that Islamic law 
sees a contract as a promise of a performance. When the party cannot perform because of 
impossibility, the promise is void. English law, on the other hand, sees a contract as a guarantee 
of a result. Therefore, under English law a promisor may still be held liable for damages when 
the contract concerns a promise of the impossible – for example, a promise to deliver a thing 
which does not exist – if, as a matter of construction, the contract can be regarded as an 
unconditional guarantee rather than a guarantee conditional upon the possibility of performance. 
In such cases, the promisor can be held to have warranted the possibility of performance. 
 
To frustrate the contract due to impossibility, it must be the absolute possibility of performance 
of an obligation in Islamic law necessitates the existence of the specific subject matter of a 
contract, for instance the thing sold, as distinguished from the price at the time of the formation 
of contract, such as the sale of a fetus in the womb. English law in this respect is similar to 
Islamic law, subject, of course, to what was said earlier regarding unconditional guarantees, and 
adopts the rule that when, in a contract for the sale of specific goods, the article regarding which 
the parties are contracting is not in existence, the contract is void. This is established by Section 
6 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1979, which says: “Where there is a contract for the sale of specific 
goods, and the goods without the knowledge of the seller have perished at the time when the 
contract is made, the contract is void”. It is clear that the rule that necessitates existence of the 
subject matter of contract at the time of its formation only applies to contracts concerning 
specific goods. In a contract concerning generic goods, the quality, quantity and description of 
the goods must be determined at the time of making the contract. When a contract concerning 
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generic goods automatically becomes a contract concerning specific goods as soon as the seller 
has chosen the article he intends to deliver, it follows that the property in the goods chosen but 
not delivered shall pass to the buyer and that their destruction shall bring the contract to an end, 
and discharge the parties from their obligations. This argument, however, cannot be accepted, 
because it means that the nature of a contract agreed between the parties is changed with the sole 
intention of one party, i.e. the seller, and without the other’s assent. This cannot be reconciled 
with the basic principle of Islamic law underlying the law of contract that all aspects of contracts 
are governed by two free wills. In fact, it is this principle that distinguishes contracts from 
unilateral legal acts in Islamic law. An example of this latter category is the acquaintance of a 
debtor by his creditor, which shall be effective with the sole consent of the creditor. Under 
English law, where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained goods, the property in the 
goods will pass to the buyer when one party unconditionally appropriates goods to the contract 
with the assent of the other. The assent may, however, be express or implied. 
 
Under both Islamic and English law, an agreement to sell specific goods is avoided if the 
goods perish before the risk passes to the buyer. The two systems, however, differ as to the 
time at which the risk passes to the buyer. Islamic law, in an approach similar to German and 
old common law, holds that the risk does not pass with property. As a result, the risk of 
destruction of goods sold but not delivered remains with the seller and would, therefore, 
frustrate the contract unless the seller has called upon the buyer or the relevant authorities to 
take possession of the goods. This approach is the opposite of the approach adopted by 
modern English law, according to which a contract for the sale of specific goods passes both 
the property and the risk at once. 
Under Islamic law, unlike English law, the effect of frustration of a purpose forming an 
express or implied term of the contract is not to bring the contract to an end, but to give the 
beneficiary the right of termination. In such cases, Islamic law concurs with English law in 
holding that the contract comes to an end upon frustration of its purpose, because when the 
foundation of a contract falls away, the contract falls away with it. Thus, a contract comes to 
an end if frustration extinguishes the subject matter of the contract. An example frequently 
given by traditional jurists concerns the case of a man who employs a dentist to remove his 
painful tooth, but the pain disappears after the formation of the contract. 
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The scope of this rule in Islamic law is comparatively narrow. Not all damage to the article 
sold shall cause automatic frustration of the contract in Islamic law; unlike English law, the 
rule only applies when the destruction is total and is caused by a so-called Act of God. If the 
thing sold is not totally destroyed but merely becomes defective before delivery and the 
defect is not caused by either party’s fault, the purchaser shall have a right of termination of 
the contract; this means the party has the right of option to continue or to discharge. Islamic 
law and English law concur in holding that in contracts in which delivery suggests 
performance of the contract, the destruction, by any circumstance, of the subject matter after 
delivery will not frustrate the contract, because a completely performed contract cannot be 
frustrated. 
 
That there is a difference between Islamic law and English law in the application of 
frustration on the lease contract. Where there is a lack of clarity in English law about that. 
Whilst Islamic law apply the frustration of contract on the lease contract, the doctrine of 
udher, which was created in the first to apply on the lease contract.  The reason for this 
difference, that Islamic law consider the contract of lease as transfer the usufruct of the 
property to the lessee. Whilst English law see the contract of lease as conveyance and vests 
in the lessee an estate in the land itself. However, the majority of the House of Lords in the 
case of Panalpina considered that the doctrine of frustration is Applicable in principle to the 
contract of leases too. But the application of frustration on the contract of lease  may be less 
common than to other kinds of contract. 
 
English law has difficulty in knowing how to deal with partial impossibility. This is due to 
the fact that when the English law doctrine of frustration operates, it discharges the whole 
contract. In other words, the common law thinks of impossibility of performance or 
frustration of a contract and not merely of an obligation. However, the courts have used other 
means to deal with the problem. Meanwhile, in Islamic law jurists have given some rules and 
examples about partial impossibility and the contract may be frustrated due to partial 
distraction of the subject matter. 
127
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In English law where the parties have expressly provided that the contract is to be performed 
exclusively in the stipulated manner, impossibility in the agreed method of performance may 
bring the contract to an end. If, for instance, a seller contracts to deliver a particular shipment 
via a special road, or in a named ship, he may not be held responsible if the road is blocked 
or the ship stranded on that date. This requires that both parties should have contemplated a 
particular method of performance as an implied term of the contract. And in this respect it 
must be remembered that Islamic law – like English law – is very reluctant to interfere with a 
freely negotiated contract by implying a term into it, unless there can be no doubt that, 
although the term was not expressly mentioned in the contract, it was, nevertheless, intended 
by both parties that it should form part of the contract. Islamic law does not discuss 
impossibility of the performance method, but in fact gives the parties the right to set any 
condition terms in the contract, so according to the principles of Islamic law the parties can 
express any performance method.  
 
The rules of Islamic law on the subject of impossibility of performance are flexible. Unlike 
the English law rules of frustration, they do not involve an all-or-nothing approach. 
Impossibility does not necessarily terminate a contract; the effect of temporary impossibility 
under Islamic law does not completely discharge performance but suspends it until the 
impossibility ends. 
 
Islamic and English law recognises the impossibility of the contract, whether subjective or 
objective impossibility if a person is essential to perform the contract. As far as subsequent 
bankruptcy is concerned, Islamic law concurs with English law in holding that a contract is 
not terminated by the bankruptcy of one of the parties thereto. Both systems agree that a 
person only becomes bankrupt on the making of an appropriate decree by the court. Although 
bankruptcy does not, in the normal circumstances, terminate prior contracts, it may, under 
Islamic law, confer certain rights on the other party. In the case of the sale of goods, for 
example, bankruptcy or insolvency of the buyer confers on the seller the right to withhold 
delivery. In contracts involving a personal element, in which some personal act of the debtor 
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himself is required, his death brings the contract to an end, under both Islamic and English 
law.
128
 
 
As far as English law is concerned, there have been attempts to regard economic factors, 
such as inflation, devaluation and price rises, as frustrating events. In spite of these isolated 
attempts, the decisions of the English courts show that they are not prepared to hold a 
contract frustrated simply because the cost of performance to one party has risen sharply. 
 
The difference between the two systems is that Islamic law is more readily prepared to allow 
the application of the principle of changed circumstances. One should not, however, interpret 
this statement liberally and conclude that either contractor may revoke the contract because 
of a change in his personal circumstances. It has even been suggested that a contractor in a 
Muslim jurisdiction hired under a contract of service to dig a well may rescind the contract 
should he strike rock after the first few feet of digging. One has to be cautious in accepting 
this statement unconditionally.
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